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 CHAPTER 1 
EXECUTIVE CONTROL:  
AN OVERVIEW 
When asked to define the concept of executive control, any researcher in the 
field will agree that it is much easier to explain what it is not, than to say 
what it exactly is. In this first chapter, I will nevertheless try to provide the 
reader with an introduction to the concept of executive control and with a 
résumé of the unsatisfactory state of affairs in executive function theory 
today. The introduction ends with the presentation of the research issues 
addressed in the present dissertation.  
INTRODUCTION 
Animals with less than a hundred thousand brain cells are able to collect 
food, avoid predators and raise offspring. The human brain holds 
approximately 100 billion nerve cells. The interaction between the large 
amounts of neurons offers much flexibility to human behavior. However, 
increasing flexibility induces more complexity in the sense that within a 
diversity of behavioral options, the appropriate one has to be selected as a 
function of a specific goal. An emergent property of this behavioral diversity 
is that somewhere in the brain must reside a supervisory, coordinative 
cognitive function which guarantees that appropriate action is taken so that 
purposeful, goal-directed behavior arises. In cognitive psychology, this 
notion of a supervisory cognitive function is mostly referred to by the term 
executive control or executive functioning. 
The assumption of a distinction between a control mechanism and a set of 
controlled mechanisms (such as language or memory) is not an arbitrary one. 
The roots of executive function research lay in neuropsychology and it is 
particularly from this domain that the need for a functional and anatomical 
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distinction between control and controlled mechanisms stems (e.g. Shallice 
& Burgess, 1991). Over the years, many cases have been described of 
patients suffering from an impairment of executive control functions, which 
is generally referred to as dysexecutive or frontal lobe syndrome (Duncan, 
1986; Luria, 1969; Shallice, 1982; Shallice & Burgess, 1991, 1993, 1996). 
Dysexecutive patients “…show a broad loosening in the structure of thought 
and action: the normal picture, a coherent sequence of actions and mental 
activities that allow the achievement of some selected goal, is distorted, 
sometimes bizarrely, by the omission of crucial components and by the 
intrusion of irrelevant or interfering material. According to the 
circumstances, the patient might seem mentally passive or inert, or 
disinhibited and distracted…” (Duncan, 2001, p. 820). What is particularly 
interesting about this syndrome, is that dysexecutive symptoms such as 
disinhibition, mental rigidity, perseverance or inertia can co-occur with 
intact language, short-, or long-term memory functioning, for example. This 
indicates that the syndrome does not affect the cognitive system as a whole 
but that it selectively impairs the mechanism(s) responsible for producing 
effective, organized and purposeful behavior. More broadly speaking, it is 
not the entire repertoire of cognitive abilities that is affected in this kind of 
pathology, but the cognitive system that coordinates these abilities for the 
purpose of daily goal-directed behavior. This pattern of selective impairment 
of executive functioning has lead towards the consensus that control and 
controlled processes can be functionally differentiated (Baddeley & Wilson, 
1988). As can be derived from the term “frontal lobe syndrome”, executive 
control and the set of controlled cognitive abilities can also be distinguished 
on neuroanatomical grounds. Based on the observation that frontal lesions 
are strongly correlated with executive impairment, executive control is since 
long assumed to be a privileged function of the frontal lobe, more precisely 
of the prefrontal cortex (Shallice, 1982, 1988). 
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AUTOMATIC VERSUS CONTROLLED BEHAVIOR 
In the previous section, it was described how in cognitive science a 
distinction is made between controlled and control processes, both on 
functional and on anatomical grounds. Of course, not all human cognitive 
activity is executed under executive control. Behavior can also be the 
outcome of automatic processing (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968; Schneider & 
Shiffrin, 1977). The distinction between automatic and controlled behavior 
(see also Schneider, 1993) is important in order to fully understand the 
concept of executive control. Automatic behavior, such as automatically 
orienting to an unexpected event, primarily relies on bottom-up processing 
which means that the behavior is largely dependent on physical properties of 
the event (e.g. the loudness of a sound or the size of a visual stimulus). 
Moreover, automatic behavior is suitable for routine activities but quite 
inflexible and inefficient in novel or problematic situations. Controlled 
behavior on the other hand, heavily relies on top-down processing, which 
signifies that the behavior is guided by an intention or goal. Controlled 
processing is much more flexible and crucial to manage novel, dangerous or 
problematic situations (Norman & Shallice, 1986). 
Behavior is highly adaptive and in this view, also automatic and controlled 
behaviors do not stand for two discrete categories of cognitive abilities 
(Miller, 1999). First, controlled behavior can become more automated. 
Second, certain circumstances might require perfectly automated behavior to 
become executively controlled again. Consider the following example. 
When a mainland European child is introduced to road traffic, it is instructed 
always to look to the left before crossing a street. At the beginning, it 
imposes heavy demands on the child’s executive control system to apply 
these rules. By contrast, an adult person is able to cross the street while even 
pursuing an in-depth conversation, because the crossing rule is applied 
automatically by that age. This illustrates how controlled behavior can 
become more automated. However, when a mainland European adult travels 
to the UK, crossing the street becomes problematic because the inverse 
14     CHAPTER 1 
traffic rules apply there and as a consequence, the automated behavior 
becomes ineffective, even dangerous. Accordingly, crossing the street in the 
UK will again impose large demands on a mainland European person’s 
executive control system in order to suppress the automated behavior and 
apply the unfamiliar UK rule. This shows that specific behavior (like 
crossing the street) can be either controlled or automated, depending on the 
specific circumstances.  
The distinction between automatic and controlled behavior might be quite 
understandable, still very little is known about the cognitive processes that 
guide controlled behavior (Rabbitt, 1997). Executive processing has always 
been and still is one of the least understood aspects of human cognition. 
Researchers have spoken about a “Cinderella area of (cognitive) 
neuropsychology” (Burgess, 1997, p. 81) and an “embarrassing zone of 
almost total ignorance” (Monsell, 1996, p. 93).  One main reason for the 
slow and limited progress in executive function research is that it has proven 
particularly difficult to obtain good measures of executive performance 
(Burgess, 1997), when compared to other domains of cognitive science like 
word recognition, sentence processing or mental arithmetic, for example. A 
number of methodological issues encountered in executive function research 
are addressed in the following section. 
MEASURING EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONING 
Any study that attempts to gain an insight into the cognitive processes 
underlying executive control requires a valid and reliable executive 
measuring instrument or task. But what determines the executive nature of a 
task? There are at least three approaches to define an executive task. One 
approach is to use patients with frontal lobe damage as the gold standard, 
and call tasks on which these patients are impaired executive tasks, based on 
the assumption that the executive control mechanisms reside in the frontal 
lobes. Another approach considers correlation with Spearman’s (1927) gF 
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(fluid intelligence) as the standard for determining executive involvement 
(Duncan, 1995), despite the fact that differences in intelligence are within 
the same approach often accounted for by differences in executive ability. 
The third approach is to define a certain function as executive, and to call 
executive any task that is assumed to involve this function. The problem 
with those three definitions is that they all suffer from circularity and that 
there exists no straightforward way to break through it. Although the 
distinction between circularity and convergence is sometimes debatable, 
converging evidence from three approaches that tackle the same underlying 
mechanism is the only way to advance in executive function research. 
One important psychometric issue in the measurement of executive 
functioning is the task purity problem (Rabbitt 1997). It is particularly 
difficult to obtain relatively pure measures of executive control. On the one 
hand, many classical executive tasks (e.g. Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, 
Tower of London and Tower of Hanoi) are not pure in that they tap both 
executive and non-executive functions, such that performance can be 
disrupted in many, also non-executive ways (Reitan & Wolfson, 1994). This 
can explain why executive tasks generally have poor discriminant validity 
(i.e. discriminating between executive and non-executive abilities). Also the 
construct validity of many conventional executive tasks is low. Several 
studies have examined the intercorrelations of performance on batteries of 
executive tasks and generally the correlations are low with no substantial 
clustering (Duncan, Johnson, Swales, & Freer, 1997; Miyake, Friedman, 
Emerson, Witzki, Howerter, & Wager, 2000; Rabbitt, 1997). This is the case 
even between executive tasks that are assumed to measure one specific 
postulated executive function, such as inhibition (e.g. Friedman & Miyake, 
2004). This indicates that the conventional executive tasks often appear to 
have little more in common than what executive and non-executive tasks 
have in common, and this is particularly worrying for measures that are 
intended to tap the same theoretical construct. Finally, also the test-retest 
reliability of executive tasks is generally poor. Several studies pointed out 
that especially novel tasks are effective in assessing executive functioning 
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(see Rabbitt, 1997), but because tasks are novel only once, the test-retest 
reliability is low, a concern that seems to be largely applicable to executive 
tasks. 
So far, I have introduced the concept of executive control, and outlined the 
unsatisfactory state of affairs in executive function research today (for an 
elaborate review, the reader is referred to Rabbitt, 1997). The purpose of the 
present dissertation is to contribute to a clarification of the concept of 
executive control from a working memory perspective. The following 
section explains why working memory is believed to play a central role in 
executive control and how Baddeley’s (1986) working memory model was 
used as a theoretical framework for the behavioral studies reported in this 
dissertation.  
WORKING MEMORY AND EXECUTIVE CONTROL 
The essence of executively controlled behavior is that it is not random or 
arbitrary, but that it serves an internal goal. The notion of goal-directed 
behavior is central to any theory of executive functioning (Miller & Cohen, 
2001). Meaningful, purposeful behavior can only be established when a task-
goal and the means to achieve this goal (i.e. the task-rules) are efficiently 
represented. Analogously, the failure to maintain a task goal is central to the 
concept of dysexecutive behavior. An increasing number of studies argue 
that goal neglect, the disregard of a task requirement although it has been 
understood (Duncan, 1995), is to an important degree responsible for the 
poor performance on executive tasks, as observed in patient populations with 
frontal lobe damage (Nieuwenhuis, Broerse, Nielen, & de Jong, 2004). 
Assuming that the effectiveness of controlled behavior is associated with the 
capacity to maintain task-goals and task-rules active, then somewhere in the 
brain a mechanism must reside that serves this maintenance function. The 
cognitive mechanism par excellence responsible for temporarily keeping 
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information in an active state, is working memory. It thus seems reasonable 
to assume that task-goals and task-rules are types of information that can be 
maintained in working memory, through which working memory is 
attributed a central role in executive functioning. Traditionally, working 
memory is defined as a system for short-term maintenance and manipulation 
of information and in this view, most working memory theories distinguish 
between storage and processing (see Miyake & Shah, 1999, for a 
comprehensive review of contemporary models of working memory). One of 
the most influential working memory models of the last decades is 
Baddeley’s model (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Baddeley, 1986). Baddeley’s 
working memory model was originally conceived as a tripartite system, 
comprising an attentional control system, the Central Executive, which 
coordinates the operation of two subsidiary systems, the Phonological Loop 
and the Visuospatial Sketch Pad. The Phonological Loop is held responsible 
for the temporary storage of speech-based, verbal material (Baddeley, 1986) 
whereas the Visuospatial Sketch Pad is assumed to preserve imagery and 
spatial information (Logie, 1995).  
Baddeley’s model was used as a theoretical framework for the working 
memory studies reported in this dissertation, for a number of reasons. First, 
as a multicomponent model, it is relatively exhaustive in the sense that it 
encompasses both the concept of executive control and two specialized, 
domain-specific storage systems, through which a substantial part of 
working memory is theoretically covered. This theoretical advantage is of 
particular importance for a research project as the current one, which is 
aimed to differentiate executive from non-executive processes in working 
memory. The second is a methodological reason. Within Baddeley’s model, 
there is a long history of studies that have used the dual-task paradigm to 
investigate working memory involvement in a variety of cognitive abilities, 
both in healthy and pathologic, young and older populations (e.g. Baddeley, 
Bressi, Dellasala, Logie, Spinnler, 1991; Baddeley, Gathercole, & Papagno, 
1998; Bradley, Welch, & Dick, 1989; Duyck, Szmalec, Kemps, & 
Vandierendonck, 2003; Gathercole, 1999; Kemps, Szmalec, 
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Vandierendonck, & Crevits, in press). In the dual-task paradigm, a target 
task is performed concurrently with a secondary task thought to tap a 
specific working memory component. If both tasks substantially interfere, it 
is concluded that the specific working memory component is involved in the 
target task and thus in the cognitive processing that the task is assumed to 
measure. For these kinds of designs, the term “dual-task paradigm” is 
becoming less usual than the more appropriate term “selective interference 
paradigm”. Both names imply that tasks are implemented in a so-called 
dual-task setting but it is particularly the notion of selectively interfering 
with a specific working memory component or component process that 
makes the methodology valuable. 
Baddeley’s working memory model has benefited from decades of 
experimentation. Especially the theory on verbal and visuospatial working 
memory received much attention. These theoretical constructs are nowadays 
empirically well-founded, easy to operationalize and they can account for a 
majority of empirical findings from diverse populations. On the other hand, 
the development of the Central Executive, working memory’s1 theoretical 
implementation of the concept of executive control, has been much slower 
and problematic (Baddeley, 1996). However, the difficult advance in 
executive function research is not especially characteristic of the working 
memory model; it is rather exemplary of an unsatisfactory situation in all of 
executive function research. Nevertheless, if Baddeley’s working memory 
model intends to remain influential in the future, its theory on executive 
functioning (the Central Executive) needs more elaboration. To this day, 
promising steps have been taken in that direction (Baddeley, 1996; Miyake 
et al., 2000; Rabbitt, 1997) but still a lot needs to be done. In what follows, I 
will explain how the present dissertation aims to contribute to reach that 
                                                     
1 Note that from this point on, the term working memory will be used throughout the 
text, without explicitly mentioning that Baddeley’s model is referred to. 
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objective, but first, the working memory theory on executive control, for 
which the Central Executive stands, will be outlined briefly. 
THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE 
Although conceptualized already with the inception of the model in 1974, a 
more clear definition of the Central Executive (CE) had to wait until 1986, 
when Baddeley equated the Central Executive with the Supervisory 
Activating System (SAS) component of Norman and Shallice’s (1980) 
model of attentional control. Initially, executive functioning was associated 
with rather vague concepts such as planning or problem solving and the role 
of the CE in those cognitive abilities was equally ill-defined. An often heard 
criticism at that time was that the CE is nothing more than a homunculus, a 
little man who sits in the brain and in some mysterious way makes all the 
important decisions (Baddeley, 1996). For an important part under pressure 
of the methodological and psychometric restraints described earlier, 
executive abilities like planning or problem solving have been redefined in a 
set of executive functions, such as inhibition, updating or switching (e.g. 
Miyake et al., 2000). Also complex problem solving tasks (such as the 
Tower of London) have become less conventional measures of executive 
control, now that they have given way to executive tasks that are much more 
specific in the executive function(s) they target (e.g. Go/Nogo task for 
inhibition, n-back task for updating and Trail Making Test for switching). 
Also the definition of the CE has been updated (Baddeley, 1996) and 
concepts as inhibition, switching and dual-tasking, for instance, are now 
generally seen as functions of the CE.  
In the light of this evolution, two theoretical issues have become particularly 
pertinent. They are both related to the following question: Is executive 
control a unitary system with multiple functions or is it best regarded as an 
agglomeration of functionally separable control processes that can interact? 
The first problem is to identify the potentially separable control processes. 
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Although often postulated executive functions such as inhibition or updating 
are more basic than concepts like planning or decision-making, it is possible 
that they are not the basic elements of executive control and that they are in 
turn fractionable into more fundamental units of executive control. The 
fractionability of the Central Executive is an important topic in working 
memory research today (Baddeley, 1996; 2000). Second, how are these 
control processes or the often postulated executive functions related to each 
other? Are they indeed functionally differentiable and is the Central 
Executive merely a generic term for a number of separable executive control 
functions, or is it equally reasonable to assume that the often postulated 
executive functions reflect different task demands that are met by a common, 
unitary control system (e.g. Miyake et al., 2000)? In summary, the main 
challenge for executive function researchers today is to find out (1) to what 
extent executive functions can be fractionated (i.e. which are the basic 
elements of executive control) and (2) what we are essentially fractionating: 
executive control processes or executive tasks/task demands (i.e. executive 
mechanisms versus task demands that require executive resources)?  
A number of - mainly correlational - studies have started to address the 
issues outlined above. Lehto (1996), for example, was among the first to 
observe low intercorrelations between commonly used executive function 
tests (Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, Goals Search Task, Tower of Hanoi). 
Similarly, Miyake et al. (2000) examined the intercorrelations between a set 
of tasks that are assumed to measure the executive functions inhibition, 
updating and shifting. The results of the latter study pointed towards 
moderate intercorrelations, but also clear separability. The patterns of 
correlation observed by Lehto and Miyake are mostly used as empirical 
evidence against the hypothesis that executive control is a unitary system. 
However, this is somewhat at odds with the studies that find similar patterns 
of moderate correlation between performance on tasks that are assumed to 
measure the same executive function, like inhibition for example (e.g. 
Duncan et al., 1997; Friedman & Miyake, 2004). The latter finding is in turn 
often taken as evidence that also concepts as inhibition are not unitary. This 
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may perfectly be true, but if studies show low patterns of correlation 
between any kind of executive task, one should also be sensitive to the 
alternative explanation that the correlations might be masked by 
psychometric problems (e.g. task impurity), as described earlier in this 
introduction. If the conventional executive tasks are not pure because they 
involve both executive and non-executive processes, moderate correlations 
amongst those tasks can still point towards a common underlying executive 
control mechanism. 
A number of years ago the original working memory model, as described 
above, has been revised. Baddeley (2000) argued that working memory 
contains a temporary storage system for multimodal information which 
makes it possible to link short-term memory with long-term memory 
information in a unitary episodic representation. One of the main reasons for 
putting forward a multimodal storage system was that the Central Executive 
itself was conceived of as a control system with no storage capacity and that 
a number of empirical findings could not be accounted for without such 
capacity (e.g. Baddeley, Vallar, & Wilson, 1987; Wilson & Baddeley, 1988). 
Consequently, a fourth component was added to the working memory 
model, called the Episodic Buffer. To this day, the Episodic Buffer remains 
principally a theoretical concept that is not made operational yet. It is thus 
not possible yet to directly investigate its role in executive control, from a 
working memory perspective. However, assuming that working memory 
would be involved in executive control by maintaining the task goal and the 
means to achieve that goal, and given that the Episodic Buffer has a 
modality-free maintenance capacity while the Central Executive has not, the 
Episodic Buffer may eventually turn out to play a role in executive control. 
 THE PRESENT DISSERTATION  
From what preceded, it can be understood that the concept of executive 
control is, although essential for purposive behavior, still poorly understood. 
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What is needed in order to improve the situation is a number of good 
paradigms to study executive control. Today, there is a lack of such 
paradigms (Barnard, Scott, & May, 2001; Van der Linden, Collette, Salmon, 
Delfiore, Degueldre, Luxen et al., 1999). The purpose of the current 
dissertation is twofold. First, it is aimed to meet this methodological 
shortcoming by working out a new method to investigate executive control 
within the working memory framework. The second objective is to apply the 
new method in order to gain a theoretical insight into the concept of 
executive control, by way of addressing the following research question: is 
executive control a unitary system or is it rather a conglomerate of separable 
executive functions? The goal of the thesis is pursued with both behavioral 
and electrophysiological studies. 
RATIONALE 
The rationale of the new method is based on earlier working memory studies 
which were aimed at developing relatively simple secondary tasks for 
selectively interfering with the Central Executive (e.g. Vandierendonck, De 
Vooght, & Van der Goten, 1998a; 1998b). At that time, while the selective 
interference paradigm (cfr. supra) was frequently used to investigate 
working memory involvement in several cognitive abilities or tasks, there 
already existed a number of secondary tasks that selectively interfered with 
the working memory slave systems (e.g. articulatory suppression for the 
Phonological Loop and matrix tapping for the Visuospatial Sketchpad). 
However, it proved much more difficult to obtain relatively pure executive 
secondary tasks; pure in the sense that the tasks interfere with the Central 
Executive with no measurable involvement of the slave systems. In answer 
to these difficulties, Vandierendonck and colleagues (1998a) presented the 
Random Interval Repetition (RIR) task as a selective source of interference 
with executive control in working memory (see also Random Interval 
Generation task in Vandierendonck et al., 1998b). In essence, the RIR task is 
a parametrical variation on a simple RT task in the sense that the Inter-
EXECUTIVE CONTROL     23 
Stimulus Intervals (ISIs) are not fixed but random. By comparing the 
patterns of dual-task interference of the RIR task, relative to the dual-task 
effects of a Fixed Interval Repetition task (FIR task or standard simple RT 
task with fixed ISI) on a number of primary tasks involving executive 
control, Vandierendonck et al. (1998a) demonstrated that the randomness of 
the ISIs is a determining factor for executive involvement in the RIR task.  
The rationale behind the current strategy is that knowledge of the task 
manipulations or parameterizations that affect the executive demands of a 
task also contains information about the executive nature of the process(es) 
that underlie performance on that task. With respect to the randomization 
parameter for example, it can be postulated that input monitoring is required 
when stimuli are presented at an unpredictable (or random) rate. In this view, 
the observation that a random simple RT task involves more executive 
control than a fixed simple RT task implies that input monitoring is an 
executive process. Accordingly, the methodological goal of this dissertation 
is to establish a method for estimating the executive demands associated 
with parametrical variations on reaction time tasks (by analogy with the 
random versus fixed simple RT task comparison) in order to gain knowledge 
of the task demands and the respective process(es) that constitute executive 
control.  
BEHAVIORAL STUDIES 
In Chapters 2 and 3, I present two behavioral studies in which the new 
method is introduced, validated and further applied. Chapter 2 
operationalizes the process of response selection ─ which was quite recently 
proposed to involve executive control (e.g. Hegarty, Shah, & Miyake, 2000) 
─ by comparing a simple RT task and a choice RT task (a choice RT task 
involves response selection in addition to the processing demands of the 
simple RT task; Schubert, 1999). Then, in a series of experiments, the 
executive demands of response selection are estimated by testing whether the 
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specified task manipulation (simple RT task versus choice RT task) causes 
additional interference with primary tasks that involve executive control and 
by verifying whether the additional interference is not mediated at the level 
of working memory’s slave systems. In Chapter 3, a similar approach is 
taken. Starting from the hypothesis that a one-back choice RT task (i.e. an 
RT task that requires participants to delay a response until presentation of 
the next stimulus) operationalizes the executive function of updating, we 
investigate the patterns of dual-task impairment of a choice RT task and a 
one-back choice RT task on a number of primary tasks that tap the different 
subcomponents of working memory.  
ELECTROPHYSIOLOGICAL STUDIES 
As denoted before, the method to study executive control introduced in the 
work at hand is intended to gain knowledge of the task demands and the 
respective process(es) that constitute executive control. Unfortunately, task 
demands and the processes that deal with those demands do not necessarily 
form a one-to-one mapping (Burgess, 1997) and this makes it particularly 
difficult in the behavioral studies to draw conclusions at the processing level. 
In Chapter 3, for example, we compare the patterns of dual-task interference 
of a standard choice RT task with a one-back choice RT task. On theoretical 
grounds, it can be argued that the one-back choice RT task operationalizes 
the postulated executive process of updating (cfr. Chapter 3) and that 
therefore, the one-back task is anticipated to involve more executive control 
than a standard choice RT task. Suppose that this hypothesis turns out to be 
correct, what can we conclude about the process of updating? It would be 
quite circular to interpret such a result as evidence for the position that 
updating is an executive process. As I argued earlier in this introduction, a 
good way to get round circularity is to search for convergence in other 
paradigms. In this vein, Chapters 4 and 5 estimate the effects of the 
parametrical RT task manipulations on neurophysiological processes by 
means of Event Related brain Potentials (ERPs). Scalp-recorded ERPs are 
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generally accepted as a valuable method for indexing brain activity 
underlying cognitive processes. In addition, ERP components associated 
with RT tasks have been well validated throughout decades of research. 
Accordingly, the purpose of the electrophysiological part of this dissertation 
is to explore the ERP basis of the effects observed in the behavioral studies. 
By doing this, I hope to gain an insight into the cognitive processes 
underlying executive task performance. 
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 CHAPTER 2 
RESPONSE SELECTION INVOLVES EXECUTIVE 
CONTROL EVIDENCE FROM THE SELECTIVE 
INTERFERENCE PARADIGM  
Memory & Cognition (in press)1 
The present study investigated whether response selection involves execu-
tive control, by using the selective interference paradigm within Baddeley’s 
(1986) working memory framework. The interference due to response selec-
tion was estimated by comparing the patterns of dual-task interference of a 
simple and a choice RT task with a number of established working memory 
tasks. Experiment 1 compared the impairment of the RT tasks and articula-
tory suppression on forward and backward verbal serial recall. Experiment 2 
measured the adverse effects of the RT tasks and matrix tapping on forward 
and backward visuospatial serial recall. Finally, Experiment 3 examined the 
impairment of the RT tasks on two measures of executive control, namely 
letter and category fluency. Altogether, the three experiments demonstrated 
that response selection interferes with executive control and that the interfer-
ence is not produced at the level of working memory’s slave systems, which 
supports the assumption of executive involvement in response selection. 
 
                                                     
1 This paper was co-authored by André Vandierendonck and Eva Kemps 
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INTRODUCTION 
The notion of an “executive” system refers to a domain-free, limited-
capacity attentional mechanism that is responsible for the control and 
coordination of cognitive processes during complex cognitive tasks. For 
many years, executive control has been one of the least understood parts of 
human cognition. At the outset of executive function research, ill-defined 
concepts such as planning or problem-solving were used as references of 
executive control (see Rabbitt, 1997, for a review). Over the years, these 
higher-level concepts have been refined in a number of more basic executive 
functions, such as inhibition, switching or updating (e.g. Miyake, Friedman, 
Emerson, Witzki, Howerter, & Wager, 2000). It is obvious that the tasks 
used to measure these functions call on an array of processes and that some - 
but probably not all - of these processes involve control of attention or 
executive control. Thus, underlying the traditionally proposed executive 
functions, more fundamental processes of executive control may be at work. 
In recent years, a number of studies within various paradigms of cognitive 
psychology have suggested that executive control might be involved in 
response selection  (Bunge, Hazeltine, Scanlon, Rosen, & Gabrieli, 2002; 
Hegarty, Shah, & Miyake, 2000; Klauer & Stegmaier, 1997; Rowe, Toni, 
Josephs, Frackowiak, & Passingham, 2000; Smyth & Scholey, 1994) or in a 
response selection task (i.e. a choice reaction time task; Allain, Carbonnell, 
Burle, Hasbroucq, & Vidal, 2004). Nevertheless, the idea that response 
selection is executively controlled remains somewhat controversial. One 
reason for the controversy might be that the term “executive” has always 
been associated with higher-order cognition, while response selection is 
instead believed to be a basic process. Another reason could be that the idea 
of an executively controlled response selection process is uninviting since 
virtually every cognitive task involves response selection. In this view, 
almost every cognitive task requires executive control to some extent. As a 
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consequence, even the use of simple secondary tasks, such as spatial tapping 
and articulatory suppression, might become problematic if it would appear 
that at least under particular conditions, these tasks require an executively 
controlled response selection process (Hegarty et al., 2000). We suggest that 
this skepticism is largely a result of the rather loose usage of the term 
response selection. To avoid any such ambiguity, in the context of the 
present study, response selection is understood as “a decisional stage about 
the identity of a required reaction” (Schubert, 1999, p. 422). This definition 
imposes a restriction in the sense that not every produced response is the 
result of a deliberate choice process. 
PRESENT STUDY 
This study was set up in order to investigate whether executive control is 
involved in response selection. The experimental rationale is based on the 
selective interference paradigm, using Baddeley’s (1986) working memory 
(WM) model as a theoretical framework. The original WM model proposes 
that the architecture of working memory comprises two slave systems, one 
for short-term maintenance of phonological information (the Phonological 
Loop) and a similar one for visuospatial codes (the Visuospatial Sketchpad). 
These two storage systems are controlled and coordinated by a supervising 
agent, the Central Executive, which is assumed to be responsible for 
executive control.  
In the present study, the interference due to response selection was estimated 
by comparing the patterns of dual-task interference of a simple and a choice 
RT task with a number of established working memory tasks. According to 
several authors, the difference between both RT tasks lies in the fact that the 
choice RT task involves response selection, in the sense of a decisional stage 
about the identity of a required response, whereas the simple RT task does 
not (Donders, 1868; Frith & Done, 1986; Schubert, 1999). 
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The hypothesis of the current investigation is that the requirement to select 
among responses calls on executive control, but does not require verbal or 
visuospatial processing. Accordingly, Experiment 1 used forward and 
backward verbal serial recall tasks in order to determine whether the 
interference due to a choice RT task is larger when the primary task requires 
more executive control and whether this interference is produced at the level 
of the Phonological Loop. Experiment 2 used forward and backward 
visuospatial serial recall tasks for a similar test at the level of the 
Visuospatial Sketch Pad. Finally, a traditional neuropsychological task, 
namely verbal fluency, was used in Experiment 3 to determine whether a 
choice RT task caused additional interference with executive control. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
The first experiment was designed to investigate whether the interference 
due to a choice RT task is larger when the primary task requires more 
executive control and whether this interference is produced at the level of the 
Phonological Loop. To that end, we compared forward and backward serial 
recall of consonants under single-task conditions and under three dual-task 
conditions in which forward and backward serial recall was simultaneously 
executed with the simple RT task, the choice RT task and with articulatory 
suppression (i.e. a task that selectively interferes with verbal processing).  
In forward verbal serial recall, participants are asked to reproduce the verbal 
material in the same order of presentation whereas in backward recall, the 
verbal material is recalled in the reverse order of presentation. Performance 
for backward recall is usually observed to be worse compared to forward 
recall, although different measures of performance and manipulations of the 
nature of the verbal material have produced some exceptions (e.g. Engle, 
Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999; Farrand & Jones, 1996). By cuing the 
required direction either pre or post presentation of the items, early studies 
(Hinrichs, 1968; Nilsson, Wright, & Murdock, 1979) have demonstrated that 
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participants reverse verbal material at encoding and not at retrieval, provided 
that the direction of recall is known in advance. With respect to the nature of 
the cognitive processes involved in forward and backward verbal serial 
recall, there is a nowadays predominant view which Rosen and Engle (1997) 
called the Complexity view, which explains the differences between both 
directions of verbal recall in terms of processing complexity or executive 
demands. It states that both forward and backward recall of verbal items 
involve a similar degree of phonological processing (Rosen & Engle, 1997), 
and that - beside the executive demands associated with verbal serial recall 
in general (e.g. Engle et al., 1999) - backward recall requires a directional 
transformation which taxes additional executive resources compared to 
forward recall (Ashman & Das, 1980; Case & Globerson, 1974; Jensen & 
Figueroa, 1975; Schofield & Ashman, 1986). Over the years, several studies 
have supported the view that the reversing operation involved in backward 
verbal serial recall relies on executive control (Elliot, Smith, & McCulloch, 
1997; Farrand & Jones, 1996; Gathercole, 1999; Gathercole & Pickering, 
2000; Groeger, Field, & Hammond, 1999; Lezak, 1995; Smyth & Scholey, 
1992; Vandierendonck, De Vooght, & Van der Goten, 1998a; 1998b). 
The evidence for a comparable verbal involvement and a differential 
executive involvement in forward and backward verbal serial recall tasks 
offers a rationale to implement the latter tasks in a selective interference 
paradigm in order to dissociate verbal from executive involvement in an 
interference task. Given that participants perform the directional 
transformation at encoding when the direction of recall is pre-cued, it can be 
anticipated that also in a blocked design, where the direction of recall is 
manipulated in two conditions, the reversing will be performed during the 
encoding of the verbal material. In addition, given that the reversing 
operation at encoding is executively demanding, it can also be expected that 
an executive secondary task concurrently performed during the encoding 
phase, will differentially affect forward and backward verbal serial recall 
(such as in Vandierendonck, De Vooght, & Van der Goten, 1998a; 1998b). 
Conversely, given that the verbal demands are comparable for both 
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directions of recall (Rosen & Engle, 1997), a verbal secondary task is 
anticipated to similarly affect forward and backward verbal serial recall.  
Based on the previous considerations, the following predictions were 
formulated for the current experiment. First, since the choice RT task 
involves response selection whereas the simple RT task does not, we 
expected that the choice RT task would interfere more with forward and 
backward verbal serial recall than the simple RT task. Second, if response 
selection is executively controlled and not produced at the level of the verbal 
working memory slave system, we predicted that the choice RT task would 
impair backward verbal serial recall more adversely than forward verbal 
serial recall, while articulatory suppression would similarly affect both 
directions of recall. Before formulating the prediction associated with the 
simple RT task, we should point out that in all experiments reported in this 
study, the duration of the inter-stimulus intervals (ISIs) of the simple and 
choice RT tasks was pseudo-randomized, for the following two reasons. 
First, the inclusion of random ISIs induces executive demands in a simple 
RT task (Vandierendonck et al., 1998a). Such an executive control task is 
important in order to investigate whether a response selection process creates 
an additional executive load. Second, pseudo-random variable intervals 
reduce the probability that in a simple RT task, participants would respond 
based on anticipation rather than responding to the stimulus. Accordingly, 
we predicted that the simple RT task would also interfere more with 
backward than with forward verbal serial recall. 
METHOD 
Participants and Design. Forty-four first-year students enrolled at the 
Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences of Ghent University 
(Belgium) participated for course requirement and credit. They were 
randomly assigned to one of two reproduction instruction conditions 
(between-subjects: 21 participants in the forward and 23 in the backward 
RESPONSE SELECTION AND EXECUTIVE CONTROL     37 
recall condition), in which verbal serial recall was performed under a single-
task condition and in concurrent execution with articulatory suppression, a 
choice RT task and a simple RT task. These within-subject conditions, which 
also included single-task simple RT and choice RT conditions, were 
counterbalanced according to a randomized Latin square. 
Materials and Procedure. The consonants were chosen from 13 groups 
with low intergroup confusability according to their Dutch pronunciation. 
The groups were: (B, D, P, T), (C), (F, S), (G), (H, K), (J), (L), (M, N), (Q), 
(R), (V, W), (X), (Z). A string of consonants was composed by selecting one 
letter at random from each group in order to minimize the phonological 
similarity between the letters. The RT tasks used two different and easily 
discriminable tones with a frequency of 262 (C1 note) and 524 Hz (C1 plus 
one octave). Each tone lasted 200 msec. For both RT tasks, the interval 
between two consecutive bleeps was either 900 or 1500 msec, randomly 
chosen with the constraint that no more than three consecutive intervals were 
of equal duration.  
The participants were seated at an 80486 PC with a 15-inch color monitor. 
The instructions were presented on the computer screen and the experiment 
started with a practice session that consisted of two single trials. A trial 
started with the presentation of a fixation cross (+) in the center of the screen 
and a sound. After 500 msec the cross disappeared and after a 2000 msec 
blank screen, the first consonant was displayed for 1500 msec, followed by a 
500 msec blank screen before the next consonant appeared. The sequence 
ended with a sound and three exclamation marks (‘!!!’) which were meant to 
trigger the reproduction. The participants were instructed to reproduce as 
many consonants as possible in the same or reverse order of presentation, 
according to their instruction condition. Oral recall was registered by the 
experimenter. At the end of reproduction, the experimenter started the next 
trial. After the two-trial practice, a verbal span task followed, which was also 
meant as a practice and was not included in the counterbalancing scheme. 
The verbal span task started with a sequence of three consonants and ended 
38     CHAPTER 2 
with a sequence of eight consonants. Three trials were presented per 
sequence; each participant performed 18 (6 sequences x 3) trials, regardless 
of their individual performance.     
After the practice sessions, participants started with the six conditions that 
were included in the counterbalancing scheme. In the control condition, 
participants performed the verbal span task alone. In the dual-task 
conditions, participants had to perform a secondary task (simple RT task, 
choice RT task or articulatory suppression) during the presentation phase of 
the memory task but not during retrieval. The secondary tasks started 5000 
msec before the primary task began and both primary and secondary tasks 
ended with the final sound that triggered primary task recall. For the simple 
RT task, participants were required to hit the ‘zero’ key on the numeric pad 
with the index finger of their right hand as fast as possible after they heard a 
tone. So as not to delay reaction time by movement time, the participants 
were instructed to rest the index finger of their right hand on the ‘zero’ key. 
During the choice RT task, participants were required to hit the ‘one’ key or 
the ‘four’ key on the numeric pad as fast as possible after they heard a low or 
a high frequency bleep, respectively. The participants were instructed to rest 
the index finger of their right hand on the ‘one’ key and their middle finger 
on the ‘four’ key to avoid target seeking movements between both keys. In 
the articulatory suppression condition, participants were required to 
continuously repeat aloud the word ‘de’ (Dutch for the). They were 
instructed and practiced so that the pace was not less than two and not more 
than three repetitions per second. The experimenter continuously verified 
that this pace was respected throughout the experiment. The remaining two 
conditions that were included in the counterbalancing scheme were a single-
task simple RT and a single-task choice RT task condition (each for 12 
periods of 20 seconds). 
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RESULTS 
The performance on the RT tasks will be analyzed and discussed after all 
three experiments are presented. As dependent variable for the verbal 
memory task, we used a transformation of Kendall’s rank correlation 
coefficient Tau, which reflects the proportion of stimuli recalled in correct 
relative order. This measure, τ', is obtained as follows: 
 
 
where τ' is the Kendall rank correlation between the presented and the 
recalled order of items, n is the number of presented items and nr is the 
number of recalled items. This formula yields an index between 0 and 1. 
Higher values denote many recalled items in correct order. Low values are 
obtained when the order is strongly violated or when only few items are 
recalled. Commission errors are not taken into account. The proportions of 
consonants recalled in correct relative order were expressed as a function of 
a 2 (Reproduction Instruction: forward and backward) x 4 (Condition: 
control, articulatory suppression, choice RT and simple RT) mixed design. 
 The data obtained from the three experiments reported in this paper were all 
analyzed by means of a repeated measures analysis based on the multivariate 
general linear model. The main effects of Reproduction Instruction, F(1, 42) 
= 4.14, p < .05, and Condition, F(3, 40) = 121.31, p < .001, were significant. 
The Reproduction Instruction x Condition interaction, F(3, 40) = 3.24, p < 
.05, was also significant. This interaction is displayed in Figure 1. 
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The predictions were tested by means of planned comparisons. These 
revealed that, under a single-task control condition, performance for forward 
and backward serial recall of consonants was comparable, F(1, 42) = 2.36, p 
> .10. Performance under articulatory suppression did not differ as a 
function of the Reproduction Instruction, F < 1: articulatory suppression 
affected both forward, F(1, 42) = 188.26, p < .001, and backward recall, F(1, 
42) = 125.51, p < .001, in a similar way. Recall was also impaired by the 
concurrent choice RT task and this was larger for backward than for forward 
recall, F(1, 42) = 5.07, p < .05. The dual-task impairment due to the simple 
RT task was also larger for backward than for forward recall, F(1, 42) = 
6.70, p < .05, replicating a finding reported by Vandierendonck et al. 
(1998a). The interaction of Reproduction Instruction with the planned 
VERBAL SERIAL RECALL
 Forward
Backward
Control Artic Supp Choice RT Simple RT
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
tra
ns
fo
rm
ed
 T
au
Figure 1. The proportion of consonants recalled in correct relative order (transformed 
Tau) as a function of the 2 (Reproduction Instruction: forward and backward) x 4 
(Condition: control, articulatory suppression, choice RT and simple RT) mixed design 
(Experiment 1). Whiskers denote standard errors. 
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contrast between Articulatory Suppression and the Choice RT task was 
significant, F(1, 42) = 6.44, p < .05. The interaction of Reproduction 
Instruction with the contrast between the Choice and the Simple RT task was 
not significant, F < 1. 
DISCUSSION 
In line with the earlier findings described in the introduction to this 
experiment, we observed that the simple RT task interfered more with 
backward than with forward verbal serial recall, whereas articulatory 
suppression similarly affected both directions of recall. With respect to the 
choice RT task, we observed that in both recall conditions, the choice RT 
task affected primary task performance more than the simple RT task did. In 
accordance with the predictions, the findings also showed that the adverse 
effects of the choice RT tasks were more pronounced when the primary task 
required backward compared to forward recall. Furthermore, with respect to 
the patterns of interference with forward and backward verbal serial recall, 
we observed a parallelism between the choice RT task and the simple RT 
task on the one hand, and a dissociation between articulatory suppression 
and the choice RT task on the other hand. The parallelism suggests that the 
choice RT task gives evidence of an executive pattern of interference and the 
dissociation indicates that the interference due to the choice RT task is not 
verbally mediated. Hence, we conclude that the choice RT task interferes 
more when the primary task requires more executive control and that the 
interference is not produced at the level of verbal working memory. 
 As we described in the introduction to this experiment, backward verbal 
serial recall is generally found to be poorer compared to forward verbal 
serial recall (but see Engle et al., 1999; Farrand & Jones, 1996). In the 
present study, we observed a similar level of performance for both directions 
of recall (p = .13). However, in the forward and backward verbal serial recall 
practice phase, which was always performed prior to the counterbalanced 
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conditions (see Materials and Procedure), we did observe a difference in 
performance in favor of the forward condition (p = .02). This suggests that 
the difference between forward and backward recall might have disappeared 
through the practice effects associated with the completion of five (one 
practice and four counterbalanced conditions) verbal serial recall conditions 
in total. Interestingly, the additional executive demands associated with 
backward recall were not altered by practice. This shows that also when 
forward and backward recall yield similar levels of performance, the 
processing differences between both tasks remain measurable. 
So far, the findings of Experiment 1 indicate that the interference effects of a 
task involving response selection are amplified when the executive load of 
the primary task is larger. Moreover, the interference does not seem to be 
produced at the level of the phonological slave system. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to further support the position that the 
choice RT task gives evidence of an executive pattern of interference and to 
examine the possibility that the interference from the choice RT task occurs 
at the level of the visuospatial working memory slave system. Accordingly, a 
short-term memory experiment was designed in which a simple RT task, a 
choice RT task and matrix tapping (i.e. a task that selectively interferes with 
visuospatial processing) were concurrently executed with a forward and a 
backward variant of the Corsi blocks task.  
The Corsi blocks task requires participants to point to a series of blocks in 
the same (forward) or reversed (backward) order as presented by the 
experimenter. It is a popular measure of visuospatial serial recall which is 
considered to be the visuospatial counterpart of the verbal memory span task 
(for a review of the main findings, see Berch, Krikorian, & Huha, 1998). 
Despite the fact that both verbal and spatial serial recall were initially 
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assumed to be equivalent measures of short-term memory, albeit in different 
modalities, there is a considerable amount of neuropsychological and 
experimental evidence that verbal and spatial serial recall are not similar in 
all respects (see Smyth & Scholey, 1992, for an extensive review).  
Regarding the nature of the working memory processes involved in the 
forward version of the Corsi blocks task, it has been demonstrated that 
visuospatial and to a lesser extent also executive resources are deployed 
(Vandierendonck, Kemps, Fastame, & Szmalec, 2004; Vecchi & 
Richardson, 2001). Contrary to what holds for verbal span, it is a replicated 
finding that performance for spatial serial recall is not impaired by producing 
the items in reversed order (Isaacs & Vargha-Khadem, 1989; 
Vandierendonck et al., 2004; Wilde & Strauss, 2002). Smyth and Scholey 
(1992) attribute this to the fact that “in the spatial domain, it is possible for 
memory items to be maintained as a visuospatial pattern with no 
involvement of serial order” (p. 161). Hence, Smyth and Scholey (1992) 
suggested that whereas executive resources are required to reverse the order 
of presentation of verbal items, additional resources are not required to 
reverse the order of presentation of the spatial Corsi block items. This 
position is supported by the finding that an executive secondary task affects 
forward and backward recall of Corsi block sequences to a similar extent 
(Vandierendonck et al., 2004).  
Another particularity of the Corsi blocks task is that the visuospatial 
demands seem to decrease in the backward version of the task. The latter 
position is supported by the observation that matrix tapping is more 
detrimental on forward than on backward recall (Vandierendonck et al., 
2004) and by the neuropsychological finding that visuospatially impaired 
patients, compared to a group of matched controls, give evidence of a similar 
level of performance for the backward Corsi blocks task but lower 
performance for the forward version of the task (Mammarella, Cornoldi, & 
Donadello, 2003). Recently, Vandierendonck and Szmalec (in press) directly 
addressed the issue of decreased visuospatial resources in the backward 
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Corsi blocks task. They suggested that performance on the backward 
memorization of block sequences benefits from a recency effect in the sense 
that participants can recall the last three to four blocks without rehearsing 
them. This might explain why matrix tapping, a task that is known to 
interfere with the visuospatial rehearsal process (e.g. Logie, 1995), interferes 
less with the backward Corsi blocks task.  
The evidence for a comparable executive involvement and a differential 
visuospatial involvement in forward and backward visuospatial serial recall 
tasks, suggests that it should be possible to dissociate visuospatial from 
executive involvement in an interference task concurrently executed with the 
forward and the backward Corsi blocks task. Accordingly, Experiment 2 
aimed to dissociate executive from visuospatial processing involved in a 
choice RT task by means of comparing the interference of a choice RT task 
with the forward and backward Corsi blocks task, to the interference due to 
an executive control task and matrix tapping. 
Based on the previous considerations, the following predictions were 
formulated. First, knowing that the Corsi blocks task involves executive 
control (Vandierendonck et al., 2004; Vecchi & Richardson, 2001), we 
expected that the choice RT task would interfere more with the Corsi blocks 
task than the simple RT task. Second, according to Vandierendonck et al. 
(2004) and the evidence discussed in the previous paragraphs, we anticipated 
that the executive control task (simple RT task) would similarly affect the 
forward and backward variants of the Corsi blocks task whereas matrix 
tapping would interfere more with the forward variant. Finally, if response 
selection is executively controlled and not produced at the level of the 
visuospatial working memory slave system, we would expect that the choice 
RT task, like the executive control task, would similarly affect the forward 
and the backward Corsi blocks task, and that the choice RT task would 
dissociate from matrix tapping in terms of interference with forward and 
backward visuospatial serial recall. 
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METHOD 
Participants and Design. Fifty-three first-year students enrolled at the 
Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences of Ghent University 
(Belgium) participated for course requirement and credit. None of them had 
taken part in Experiment 1. They were randomly assigned to one of two 
reproduction instruction conditions (between-subjects: 28 participants in the 
forward and 25 in the backward reproduction instruction condition), in 
which the Corsi blocks tapping task was performed in a single-task condition 
and in concurrent execution with matrix tapping, a choice RT task and a 
simple RT task. These within-subject conditions, which also included single-
task matrix tapping, choice RT and simple RT conditions, were 
counterbalanced according to a randomized Latin square. 
Materials and Procedure. A computerized version of the Corsi blocks task 
was presented on a 15-inch touch screen. The 9 blocks were 30 x 30 mm 
white squares, positioned on a blue background according to Corsi’s (1972) 
original configuration. The presentation of a block-sequence was monitored 
by the computer: each block in turn was highlighted by changing its color 
from white to black for 1 s, with an inter-block interval of 0.5 s. 
The start of presentation was announced by a 400 msec 1000 Hz sound. The 
presentation ended with a 400 msec 100 Hz sound, which announced the 
reproduction phase. The participants were instructed to reproduce the 
highlighted blocks by touching the squares on the screen in the same or 
reverse order of presentation, depending on the condition they were assigned 
to. When a square was touched by the participant, it turned black for 200 
msec in order to provide feedback on the touching operation. At the end of 
recall, the participant was required to hit the escape key and after a 2s inter-
trial interval, the next trial started. A condition started with a sequence of 
three and ended with a sequence of eight blocks. Three trials were presented 
at each sequence length, so each condition consisted of 18 trials.  
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Instructions were presented on the computer screen. The experiment started 
with two practice trials and an entire single-task Corsi practice block, 
followed by the seven counterbalanced conditions. In the control condition, 
participants performed the Corsi block-tapping task alone. In the dual-task 
conditions, the secondary tasks (matrix tapping, the choice RT task and the 
simple RT task) were executed during the presentation of the Corsi block 
sequences but not during retrieval. Matrix tapping required the participants 
to hit the four corners of the numeric keypad in counterclockwise order at a 
pace of 2-3 keys per second. This operation was registered in terms of 
accuracy and latency. The other secondary tasks were the same as in 
Experiment 1. Performance on the three secondary tasks was also registered 
in a single-task situation (each task for 12 periods of 20 seconds). 
RESULTS 
Using the same measure as in Experiment 1 (τ'), the proportion of 
consonants recalled in correct relative order was expressed as a function of a 
2 (Reproduction Instruction: forward and backward) x 4 (Condition: control, 
matrix tapping, choice RT and simple RT) mixed design. The main effect of 
Reproduction Instruction was not significant, F < 1, while the main effect of 
Condition was, F(3, 49) = 61.15, p < .001. The interaction Reproduction 
Instruction x Condition, F(3, 49) = 6.68, p < .001, was also significant. 
Figure 2 displays the interaction. 
Planned comparisons showed that, in the single-task control condition, 
performance was comparable for both forward and backward serial recall of 
Corsi blocks, F < 1. Matrix tapping affected both forward, F(1, 51) = 96.73, 
p < .001, and backward recall, F(1, 51) = 30.42, p < .001, of block sequences 
but the interference was significantly stronger for forward than for backward 
recall, F(1, 51) = 7.54, p < .01. The choice RT task interfered with forward, 
F(1, 51) = 54.97, p < .001, and backward, F(1, 51) = 74.25, p < .001, recall 
of Corsi block sequences. The degree of interference was comparable for 
RESPONSE SELECTION AND EXECUTIVE CONTROL     47 
both reproduction instruction conditions, F(1, 51) = 1.22, p > .10. The 
simple RT task did not affect forward recall, F(1, 51) = 2.46, p > .10, while 
it did impair backward recall, F(1, 51) = 19.40, p < .001. However, the 
difference in simple RT task interference between both directions of recall 
failed to reach statistical significance, F(1, 51) = 3.93, p > .05. Furthermore, 
the interaction of Reproduction Instruction with the contrast between Matrix 
Tapping and the Choice RT task was significant, F(1, 51) = 12.08, p < .01, 
while the interaction of Reproduction Instruction with the contrast between 
the Choice and the Simple RT task was not, F < 1. 
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Figure 2. The proportion of blocks recalled in correct relative order (transformed Tau) 
as a function of the 2 (Reproduction Instruction: forward and backward) x 4 (Condition: 
control, matrix tapping, choice RT and simple RT) mixed design (Experiment 2). 
Whiskers denote standard errors. 
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DISCUSSION 
Experiment 2 replicated the findings reported by Vandierendonck et al. 
(2004) and further demonstrated that, in terms of interference with the 
forward and backward variants of the Corsi blocks task, the response 
selection task dissociated from a visuospatial task but gave evidence of a 
similar pattern of interference as the executive control task. Accordingly, in 
line with the findings of Experiment 1 for the verbal domain, we can 
conclude that the choice RT task does not interfere at the level of the VSSP, 
but probably does at the level of the Central Executive. 
EXPERIMENT 3 
So far, we have demonstrated that response selection contributes to a dual-
task impairment which is not situated at the level of the slave systems. If 
response selection is not produced at the level of verbal or visuospatial 
processing, what is the basis of the observed effects? We have suggested that 
the interference is mediated by executive control, based on the observation 
that the impairment of the choice RT task on verbal and visuospatial serial 
recall is comparable to a pattern of interference observed with another 
executive secondary task. Nevertheless, more direct evidence is needed to 
support the latter position. However, this additional evidence is more likely 
to be obtained with other tasks than verbal or visuospatial serial recall tasks. 
The reason is that the extent to which those serial recall tasks involve 
executive control is rather limited (see Engle et al., 1999). Thus, in spite of 
the fact that those verbal and visuospatial span tasks are useful to dissociate 
executive from domain-specific processing, which was the main purpose of 
Experiments 1 and 2, a more demanding measure of executive control is 
needed to evidence the specifically executive demands of response selection 
more directly. Therefore, Experiment 3 used a well-established 
neuropsychological measure with high executive demands, namely verbal 
fluency (e.g. Phillips, 1997; Rende, Ramsberger, & Miyake, 2002).  
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Verbal fluency usually requires a person to generate as many words as 
possible with a specified initial letter (letter fluency) or from a specified 
category (category fluency). Although verbal fluency was initially 
considered to be a relatively pure measure of frontal or executive functioning 
(e.g. Denckla, 1994), Rende et al. (2002) demonstrated that verbal and 
visuospatial processes also contribute to letter and category fluency, albeit in 
a different way. More precisely, the Phonological Loop seems to contribute 
to letter fluency while the Visuospatial Sketch Pad plays a similar role in 
category fluency. With respect to the executive contribution to verbal 
fluency, Rende et al.’s findings showed that the executive function of 
‘mental set shifting’ is equally involved in letter and category fluency tasks. 
Taking into account these findings, a number of predictions were formulated 
for Experiment 3. First, if response selection involves executive control, a 
concurrent choice reaction task should have a more disruptive effect on a 
task that requires many executive resources (i.e. verbal fluency) than 
concurrent simple reaction. The second prediction refers to the processing 
differences between letter and category fluency, as reported by Rende et al. 
(2002). If response selection is not mediated by verbal or spatial processing, 
the choice RT task is predicted not to differentially affect letter and category 
fluency. That is why the choice RT task is instead expected to cause a more 
general impact on verbal fluency, analogous to the arithmetic switching task 
that was used to operationalize the executive function ‘task set shifting’, in 
the study of Rende et al. (2002). 
METHOD 
Participants and Design. Twenty-four first-year students enrolled at the 
Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences of Ghent University 
(Belgium) participated for course requirements and credit. None of them had 
taken part in any of the previous experiments. The participants were 
randomly assigned to one of two between-subjects conditions of a 2 
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(Executive Task: simple and choice RT) x 2 (Condition: single and dual-
task) x 2 (Fluency Task: letter and category fluency) mixed design with 
repeated measures on the last two factors. 
Materials and Procedure. Letter and category fluency tasks were used. A 
letter fluency task requires participants to produce nouns or verbs beginning 
with a specified letter. Category fluency requires the participants to generate 
as many items as possible from a specified category (e.g. animals). In the 
present experiment, 14 fluency tasks were used: 8 letter fluency (4 nouns 
with N, A, K, B; 4 verbs with V, D, T, K) and 6 category fluency (flowers, 
fruits, animals, articles of clothing, names for girls, names for boys) tasks.  
The participants were seated at an 80486 PC with a 15-inch color monitor. 
The instructions were presented on the computer screen. Each subject 
performed the 14 verbal fluency tasks: 7 under single-task and 7 
concurrently with either simple or choice reaction, depending on which 
condition they were assigned to. The tasks were counterbalanced over the 
conditions contrasting single and dual-task verbal fluency performance and 
with the two kinds of verbal fluency represented equally in both conditions. 
In other words, the 7 tasks in the control condition and the 7 tasks 
concurrently executed with either simple or choice reaction, consisted of 4 
letter (2 nouns and 2 verbs) and 3 category fluency tasks that were 
counterbalanced over the conditions. Half of the participants started with the 
single-task verbal fluency tasks, the other half with the dual-task conditions. 
The fluency task was centered on the computer screen. 2000 milliseconds 
later, the word ‘START’ flickered on the screen to signal the beginning of 
the verbal fluency task. At this point, the participants generated as many 
verbal items as possible within 45 seconds. The words were taped by means 
of an audio recorder. The end of the fluency task was announced by a 100 
Hz tone.  
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In the dual-task conditions, the simple or choice reaction task was started 
5000 msec before the fluency task. After this single-task period, the task and 
the start-signal were presented following the same procedure, and from this 
point, both tasks were performed concurrently until the final sound. Each 
participant also performed the simple and choice RT task in a single-task 
condition for a period of 45 sec. 
RESULTS 
The number of words produced per 45 seconds as a function of the 2 
(Executive Task: simple and choice RT task) x 2 (Condition: single and 
dual-task) x 2 (Fluency Task: letter and category fluency) mixed design was 
subjected to a repeated measures analysis based on the multivariate general 
linear model (see Table 1). The main effect of Executive Task was not 
significant, F(1, 22) = 1.33, p > .10, while the main effects of  Condition and 
Fluency Task were, F(1, 22) = 30.82, p < .001, and, F(1, 22) = 49.08, p < 
.001, respectively. The interaction of Executive Task and Condition was 
significant, F(1, 22) = 19.51, p < .001, while the three-way interaction of 
Executive Task, Condition and Fluency Task was not, F < 1. Further 
planned comparisons revealed that the simple RT task affected neither letter 
fluency, F < 1, nor category fluency, F(1, 22) = 1.82, p > .10. In contrast, the 
choice RT task clearly affected both letter, F(1, 22) = 47.72, p < .001, and 
category fluency, F(1, 22) = 22.74, p < .001. Finally, the absence of an 
interaction between the factors Condition and Fluency Task in the choice RT 
task group, F < 1, shows that the choice RT task similarly affected letter and 
category fluency. 
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DISCUSSION 
The results of Experiment 3 show that the choice RT task interferes with 
verbal fluency while the simple RT task does not. Since both RT tasks differ 
in terms of response selection demands, the conclusion that response 
selection affects verbal fluency is straightforward. The choice RT task 
effects were also considered separately for the letter fluency and category 
fluency tasks. According to Rende et al. (2002), if response selection is 
mediated by a subsidiary component of working memory, the choice RT task 
should differentially affect letter and category fluency performance. 
However, we observed that the decrement in fluency performance due to the 
concurrent choice reaction task was similar for the different variants of the 
fluency task. In other words, the choice RT task caused this more general 
impairment on verbal fluency, which has been observed with another 
executive secondary task (e.g. Rende et al., 2002). For these reasons, the 
findings of Experiment 3 support our hypothesis that response selection 
involves executive control in a way that does not involve any of the 
subcomponents of working memory in a detectable manner. It is also 
important to mention that the simple RT task did not affect verbal fluency at 
all. An explanation for this finding will be given in the General Discussion 
section. 
 Letter Fluency Category Fluency 
 Single-Task Dual-Task Single-Task Dual-Task 
Simple RT task 7.50 (1.85) 7.85 (2.24) 15.47 (4.14) 13.80 (3.87) 
Choice RT task 9.23 (2.23) 5.77 (1.65) 15.75 (3.06) 9.86 (2.18) 
Table 1. The mean number of words produced per 45 seconds as a function of Executive Task 
(simple and choice RT task), Condition (single and dual-task) and Fluency Task (letter and 
category fluency). Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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RESULTS OF RT TASK PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
Performance on the simple and choice RT tasks was analyzed in order to 
investigate whether the RT tasks were also affected under dual-task 
conditions, or in other words, to make sure that our findings cannot be 
explained by dual-task tradeoffs. Because the dual-task analysis revealed a 
similar pattern of results in all three experiments, we decided to pool the 
three data sets. 
The reaction time data show that both the simple and the choice RT task 
were affected under dual-task conditions. Performance on the simple RT task 
was delayed from 273 msec (SD = 56.66) under single-task to 369 msec (SD 
= 93.55) under dual-task conditions. This 35% delay was statistically 
reliable, F(1, 108) = 184.91, p < .001. Similarly, performance on the choice 
RT task was delayed from 453 msec (SD = 73.01) under single-task to 530 
msec (SD = 97.87) under dual-task conditions, a 17% delay which was also 
statistically significant, F(1, 108) = 115.52, p < .001. The interaction of the 
Simple vs. Choice RT task contrast and the Single-Task vs. Dual-Task 
contrast was also significant, F(1, 108) = 6.49, p < .05. This shows that the 
dual-task effect on the simple RT task was stronger than on the choice RT 
task.  
From these analyses, it is clear that the dual-task setting affected both the 
primary memory tasks and the secondary RT tasks. This implies that no 
dual-task tradeoff occurred. The observation that the simple RT task was 
more adversely affected in a dual-task setting than the choice RT task 
replicates earlier findings of Frith and Done (1986), who also observed a 
greater dual-task cost in reaction time performance for a simple (24%) 
compared to a choice RT task (8%). Such results are taken to indicate that 
simple and choice RT tasks follow different neural routes, and thus are 
considered to be qualitatively different (see also Berns & Sejnowski, 1996; 
Rowe et al., 2000; Schubert, 1999). A final remark is related to the longer 
processing time observed in choice reaction compared to simple reaction. 
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This suggests that, in addition to the augmented executive demands, the 
increased processing time might also have contributed to the additional dual-
task interference due to response selection. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The present study compared the patterns of dual-task interference of a simple 
and a choice RT task to determine whether response selection involves 
executive control. Experiment 1 demonstrated that a choice RT task gives 
evidence of an executive pattern of dual-task interference with forward and 
backward verbal serial recall and that this interference is not produced at the 
level of working memory’s verbal slave system. Similarly, Experiment 2 
demonstrated that, also in concurrent execution with forward and backward 
visuospatial serial recall, a choice RT task gives evidence of an executive 
pattern of dual-task interference and that this interference is not produced at 
the level of working memory’s visuospatial slave system. Finally, 
Experiment 3 demonstrated that a choice RT task causes additional 
interference with executive control compared to a simple RT task. 
Altogether, these findings show that response selection interferes with 
primary tasks that require executive control and that the interference is not 
produced at the level of the domain-specific verbal or visuospatial slave 
systems. Following the logic of the selective interference paradigm within a 
working memory framework, this means that the response selection process 
involves executive control.  
A point that requires some elaboration is the observation that in Experiments 
1 and 2, the secondary task effects were obtained during the encoding and 
acquisition phase of a short-term memory task, whereas in Experiment 3, the 
effects were obtained during the retrieval of elements from long-term 
memory. This distinction is important because a number of studies by 
Naveh-Benjamin and colleagues have observed an asymmetry in attentional 
involvement between encoding and retrieval (e.g. Naveh-Benjamin, Craik, 
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Guez, & Dori, 1998). They argued that “whereas encoding processes are 
controlled, retrieval processes are obligatory but do require attentional 
resources for their execution” (Naveh-Benjamin et al., 1998, p. 1091). These 
authors claim that encoding processes are consciously controlled and 
attention demanding. Retrieval processes, however, appear to be more 
protected in the sense that under conditions of divided attention, the 
secondary task pays the entire dual-task cost. The present data fit well into 
this view of attentional involvement at encoding and retrieval. Our simple 
RT task affected the encoding of consonants and Corsi block positions and 
while it did not hinder the retrieval of verbal fluency items, the RT task itself 
was clearly affected. The choice RT task severely impaired encoding in the 
verbal and visuospatial span experiments and it also impaired the retrieval of 
verbal fluency items. The finding that choice reactions affect memory 
retrieval is not a new one (Carrier & Pashler, 1995; Rohrer & Pashler, 2003). 
However, it remains debatable whether the interference between response 
selection and retrieval originates from a structural bottleneck at response 
selection or from a shortfall in attentional resources when two attentional 
demanding tasks are simultaneously executed (see also Barrouillet, 
Bernardin, & Camos, 2004). 
A further important matter with respect to the current results is the issue of 
task difficulty. It is a fact that a manipulation of cognitive processing affects 
the difficulty of a task, by which a potential confound for the interpretation 
of the results is induced. In this debate, a number of researchers have argued 
that ‘difficulty’ cannot be put forward as a true alternative explanation for a 
manipulation effect, provided that the reason(s) for the differences in task 
difficulty are known. When the differences in task difficulty can be 
explained in terms of established qualitative processing differences, ‘task 
difficulty’ becomes “merely a descriptor of a manipulation’s consequence” 
(e.g. Garavan, Ross, Li, & Stein, 2000). In this view, the theoretical and 
empirical developments supporting the view of qualitative processing 
differences between simple and choice RT tasks (Berns & Sejnowski, 1996; 
Frith & Done, 1986; Rowe et al., 2000; Schubert, 1999), make an alternative 
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interpretation for the present findings, based on task difficulty, less 
plausible.  
Finally, what are the implications of the present results for current views on 
executive functioning? First of all, while a few studies have already reported 
neuroimagery (Rowe et al., 2000) and electromyographic (Allain et al., 
2004) findings suggesting that executive control is involved in response 
selection, the current study is the first to present converging evidence from a 
behavioral paradigm. In this sense, it supports the idea that executive control 
occurs at much more fundamental levels of human cognition than initially 
proposed by means of higher level concepts such as planning or problem 
solving. Secondly, the present findings also challenge the notion of a unitary 
executive controller such as the Central Executive (Baddeley, 1996; Miyake 
et al., 2000). In this regard, we prefer to look at executive control as a 
concept that stands for the combined action of a number of processes (such 
as monitoring, inhibition, updating and response selection), which are crucial 
to achieve an intended thought or behavior. Thirdly, and maybe most 
importantly given the current lack of paradigms to study executive control 
(Barnard, Scott, & May, 2001), the present study has demonstrated that the 
selective interference paradigm seems to be a useful tool to investigate 
executive functioning. The potential of this paradigm for exploring other 
candidate executive processes awaits further exploitation. 
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 CHAPTER 3 
ESTIMATING THE EXECUTIVE DEMANDS OF A ONE-
BACK CHOICE RT TASK BY MEANS OF THE SELECTIVE 
INTERFERENCE PARADIGM  
Manuscript under revision1 
The present study implements the selective interference paradigm to estimate 
the executive demands of the processing components involved in a one-back 
choice reaction time (RT) task. Based on the similarities between a one-back 
choice RT task and the running memory or n-back updating procedure, it 
was hypothesized that one-back delaying of a choice reaction involves 
executive control. In three experiments, framed within Baddeley’s (1986) 
working memory model, a one-back choice RT task, a choice RT task, 
articulatory suppression and matrix tapping were performed concurrently 
with primary tasks involving verbal, visuospatial or executive processing. 
The results demonstrate that one-back delaying of a choice reaction 
interferes with executive control and that the interference is neither mediated 
by the verbal nor by the visuospatial working memory slave system. The 
implications of these results for our views on executive control in general are 
discussed. 
                                                     
1 This paper was co-authored by André Vandierendonck 
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INTRODUCTION 
The term “executive” refers to a supervisory attentional control system that 
orchestrates the operation of several cognitive processes. To date, most 
cognitive (neuro)psychologists agree on the types of situations which require 
executively controlled processing (especially difficult, problematic and 
novel situations) but the nature of executive control itself remains less clear. 
The last years have witnessed a noticeable focus on executive functioning. 
This movement is partly a result of a few studies which have 
comprehensively summarized the unsatisfactory state of affairs in 
executive/frontal function research (Baddeley, 1996; Rabbitt, 1997).  
A number of empirical attempts at clarifying the concept of executive 
control have used Baddeley’s Working Memory (WM) model as a 
theoretical framework. The original WM model (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; 
Baddeley, 1986) proposes that working memory comprises a modality-free 
control system, the Central Executive, and two domain-specific slave 
systems which are supervised by this executive control system. One slave 
system, the Phonological Loop, is responsible for the manipulation and 
short-term maintenance of verbal information while the other slave system, 
the Visuospatial Sketch Pad, fulfills a similar role for visuospatial 
information. In this model, executive control was conceived as a unitary 
system, represented by the notion of the Central Executive. During the last 
years, this unitary character has been challenged (Baddeley, 1996; Baddeley, 
2000) and in this vein, a correlational study by Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, 
Witzki, Howerter and Wager (2000) clearly demonstrated that the executive 
functions of inhibition, updating and mental set shifting are separable but 
also interrelated. In accordance with this evidence, the working memory 
notion of executive control is nowadays preferably typified by both unity 
and diversity. 
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It is beyond doubt that the nowadays popular executive functions are more 
fundamental and purer measures of executive control than the ill-defined 
concepts of planning and problem solving which were usual at the onset of 
executive/frontal function research. However, the conclusion that the 
executive functions of updating, inhibition and shifting are both separable 
and interrelated, suggests that the tasks which measure those functions 
involve processes which are unique to the task, as well as processes which 
are shared with other executive tasks. This raises the question whether those 
executive functions reflect basic executive processing or whether they are 
each made up of several more fundamental processes which are not all 
necessarily executive in nature.  
One such more fundamental process which is involved in nearly all 
executive functions is response selection. An increasing number of empirical 
findings suggest that executive control might be involved in response 
selection (Allain, Carbonnell, Burle, Hasbroucq, & Vidal, 2004; Bunge, 
Hazeltine, Scanlon, Rosen, & Gabrieli, 2002; Hegarty, Shah, & Miyake, 
2000; Klauer & Stegmaier, 1997; Rowe, Toni, Josephs, Frackowiak, & 
Passingham, 2000). In a recent study, we presented additional behavioral 
evidence for this assumption (Szmalec, Vandierendonck, & Kemps, in 
press). The patterns of selective interference of a simple and a choice RT 
task were compared, relative to the effects of verbal and visuospatial 
secondary tasks, in concurrent execution with verbal, visuospatial and 
executive primary tasks. It was concluded that the additional demands of a 
choice RT task, compared to a simple RT task, interfere with executive 
control and that the interference is not produced at the level of the WM slave 
systems. 
PRESENT STUDY 
In view of the current lack of paradigms to study executive functioning 
(Barnard, Scott, & May, 2001; Van der Linden, Collette, Salmon, Delfiore, 
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Degueldre, Luxen et al., 1999), the purpose of the present study is to further 
exploit the potential of the selective interference paradigm to contribute to a 
clarification of the concept of executive control. The central idea is to design 
interference tasks in which particular – presumably executive – parameters 
are varied and to estimate the executive demands of the processing 
components associated with this parametric variation. Szmalec et al. (in 
press) used an established parametric variation, namely simple versus choice 
reaction (e.g. Schubert, 1999), to demonstrate that response selection 
involves executive control. The present study uses the selective interference 
paradigm for estimating the executive demands associated with other, less 
well understood but presumably executive parametric variations of 
interference tasks. Our basic assumption is that a better understanding of the 
parametric variations that affect the executive demands of a task can be 
useful to gain insight into the notion of “executive system” itself. For that 
purpose, the current study presents a parametric variation on the choice RT 
task, namely the one-back choice RT task, and it uses the selective 
interference paradigm to estimate the effect of this manipulation in terms of 
executive demands. As will be described in the following paragraphs, there 
are theoretical reasons to assume that a one-back choice RT task requires 
executive control in addition to the executive demands involved in response 
selection.  
A one-back choice RT task requires participants to make a choice reaction 
on a stimulus x with the particular demand to delay the response until the 
occurrence of the next stimulus x+1 (one-back). It implies that, during the 
inter-stimulus interval, participants have to keep an active representation of 
the information that will be necessary in order to make a correct choice 
reaction to stimulus x after stimulus x +1 is presented. This means that as 
soon as stimulus x+1 is presented, the response to the previous stimulus x is 
executed and the active representation is updated or refreshed with the 
information that will be necessary to make a correct choice reaction to 
stimulus x+1 when stimulus x+2 will be presented, and so on. In this way, 
the participants need to hold a representation of task-relevant information 
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active throughout the task and they need to update this representation each 
time new information (i.e. a new stimulus) is presented.  
The one-back choice RT task bears strong similarities to the running 
memory or n-back updating procedure, which was originally put forward by 
Pollack, Johnson & Knaft (1959) and further elaborated by Morris and Jones 
(1990). In the Morris and Jones n-back task participants are presented a list 
of consonants of unknown length. During this presentation, they are required 
to remember a specified number (n) of the most recent consonants serially 
(n-back). This implies that, while the task evolves and new items are 
presented, the subjects have to update the memorized string of n most recent 
items: they need to drop the oldest item in the string and add the most recent 
one. Morris and Jones (1990) demonstrated that most probably the Central 
Executive is responsible for the updating process involved in the n-back 
task. During the last decade, the n-back task has proven to be a widely used 
measure of working memory performance and at the same time a popular 
operationalization of the executive function of updating (e.g. Smith & 
Jonides, 1999; Miyake et al., 2000; Smith-Spark, Fisk, Fawcett, & Nicolson, 
2003; Van der Linden et al., 1999).  
Based on the descriptions of the one-back choice RT task and the Morris and 
Jones updating task, it can be argued that both tasks involve the updating of 
task-relevant information each time a new stimulus is presented. 
Accordingly, following the theoretical position that also a one-back choice 
RT task requires updating and on the assumption that the process of updating 
is executive in nature (Morris & Jones, 1990), it can be hypothesized that the 
one-back choice RT task involves executive control. However, in the light of 
recent findings supporting an executive involvement in a choice RT task 
(Allain et al., 2004; Rowe et al., 2000; Szmalec et al., in press), there is 
another potential source of executive involvement in a one-back choice RT 
task compared to a choice RT task, which must be considered. Allain et al. 
(2004) found electromyographic indicators for an online executive 
supervision of the processing involved in a choice RT task and they 
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demonstrated that these indicators were measurable until the final execution 
of the response. Since this execution is delayed in a one-back choice RT task 
─ a delay during which the task-relevant information is kept active ─ it can 
be hypothesized that also the executive supervision is prolonged, by which a 
one-back choice RT task is anticipated to give evidence of quantitatively 
increased executive demands compared to a choice RT task.  
The present study uses the selective interference paradigm within Baddeley’s 
tripartite model of working memory to investigate whether one-back 
delaying of a choice reaction involves executive control. Accordingly, the 
nature of the interference due to the one-back delaying of a choice reaction is 
estimated by comparing a standard and a one-back choice RT task as sources 
of interference with a number of working memory tasks that operationalize 
the three components of the WM model. The rationale of the experiments is 
as follows: if a process is executive in nature, it is expected to interfere with 
primary tasks that involve executive control while it must be demonstrated 
that this interference is not produced by the working memory slave systems. 
Experiment 1 compares the patterns of dual-task interference of a one-back 
and a standard choice RT task on two often used measures of executive 
control, namely letter and category fluency, in order to demonstrate that a 
one-back choice reaction interferes more with a primary task that requires 
executive control, than a standard choice reaction. Experiment 2 is aimed to 
demonstrate that the additional interference of the one-back choice reaction 
is not produced at the level of the Phonological Loop. Therefore, it compares 
the patterns of dual-task impairment of a one-back and a standard choice RT 
task, relative to the effects of a secondary task that selectively interferes with 
verbal processing (i.e. articulatory suppression), on forward and backward 
serial recall of consonants. Experiment 3 was designed to show that the 
Visuospatial Sketch Pad does not mediate the effect either, by comparing the 
patterns of dual-task impairment of a one-back and a standard choice RT 
task, relative to the effects of a secondary task that selectively interferes with 
visuospatial processing (i.e. matrix tapping), on forward and backward serial 
recall of visuospatial positions (i.e. Corsi blocks task). 
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EXPERIMENT 1 
Experiment 1 was set up in order to test whether one-back delaying of a 
choice reaction interferes with an executively demanding primary task. To 
this end, the one-back and the standard choice reaction time tasks were 
concurrently executed with a task that is known to involve high executive 
demands, namely verbal fluency. Verbal fluency has been used extensively 
in cognitive psychology and neuropsychology in order to assess executive or 
frontal (dys)functioning (Phillips, 1997; Baddeley, Lewis, Eldridge, & 
Thomson, 1984; Baddeley, Emslie, Kolodny, & Duncan, 1998; Martin, 
Wiggs, Lalonde, & Mack, 1994; Rosen & Engle, 1997). The task requires a 
participant to generate as many verbal items as possible within a predefined 
period of time. In the most popular variants of the task, these verbal items 
are nouns beginning with a specified letter (i.e. letter fluency) or members 
from a specified semantic category (i.e. category fluency). Several 
researchers have recommended verbal fluency as an easy and reliable 
measure of executive functioning (e.g. Denckla, 1994; Parker & Crawford, 
1992), while others have expressed some concerns about the task, in the 
sense that not all variants of verbal fluency seem to be reliable measures of 
executive control (Phillips, 1997; Reitan & Wolfson, 1994). Phillips (1997), 
for example, demonstrated that an executive task such as random number 
generation task affected figural fluency (i.e. producing as many different 
figures as possible) but not letter fluency, which suggests that the Central 
Executive is not involved in letter fluency, at least not to an extent that is 
measurable by the executive demands of a random number generation. Such 
findings imply that the Central Executive is not equally involved in all 
variants of the verbal fluency task. More recent studies have established that 
the processing differences between the different types of verbal fluency 
reach further than merely quantitative differences in the degree of executive 
involvement (Rende, Ramsberger, & Miyake, 2002; Abrahams, Leigh, 
Harvey, Vythelingum, Grise, & Goldstein, 2000). Rende et al. (2002), for 
example, demonstrated that working memory’s slave systems are 
differentially involved in letter and category fluency. More precisely, the 
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Phonological Loop seems to be involved in letter fluency, whereas the 
Visuospatial Sketch Pad seems to play an important role in category fluency. 
Given the compound nature of verbal fluency, it thus seems more useful to 
define the involved cognitive processes at the level of the different variants 
of the task (e.g. letter fluency or category fluency), rather than at the level of 
verbal fluency in general.  
This theoretical background shows that verbal fluency is potentially useful to 
investigate the executive demands of the one-back delaying of a choice 
reaction. If the requirement to delay a choice reaction one-back interferes 
with an executively controlled concurrent task such as verbal fluency, it may 
be predicted that the one-back choice RT task, compared to the choice RT 
task, will cause more interference with verbal fluency. Furthermore, we 
know that letter fluency requires additional verbal processing while category 
fluency also involves visuospatial processing (Rende et al., 2002). Hence, if 
the executive nature of updating is pure in the sense that neither verbal nor 
visuospatial processing is measurably involved, it is predicted that the one-
back choice RT task will not differentially affect letter and category fluency. 
METHOD 
Participants and Design. Twenty-four first-year students, enrolled at the 
Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences of Ghent University 
(Belgium) participated for course requirements and credit. The participants 
were randomly assigned to one of two groups. The design was a 2 (Group: 
choice RT task or one-back choice RT task) x 2 (Condition: single-task and 
dual-task) x 2 (Fluency Task: letter and category fluency) mixed design with 
repeated measures on the last two factors. 
Materials and Procedure. Letter and category fluency tasks were used. A 
letter fluency task requires participants to produce nouns or verbs beginning 
with a specified letter. Category fluency requires the participants to generate 
as many items as possible from a specified category (e.g. animals). In the 
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present experiment, 14 fluency tasks were used: 8 letter fluency (4 nouns 
with N, A, K, B; 4 verbs with V, D, T, K) and 6 category (flowers, fruits, 
animals, articles of clothing, names for girls, names for boys) fluency tasks. 
The RT tasks used two different and easily discriminable tones with a 
frequency of 262 (C1 note) and 524 Hz (C1 plus one octave). Each tone 
lasted 200 msec. The Inter-Stimulus Interval was fixed at 2000 msec. The 
participants were required to hit the ‘one’ key or the ‘four’ key on the 
numeric pad as fast as possible after they heard a low or a high frequency 
tone, respectively. They were instructed to rest the index finger of their right 
hand on the ‘one’ key and their middle finger on the ‘four’ key to avoid 
target seeking movements between both keys. In the one-back choice RT 
tasks, they were required to delay their response until the next stimulus 
occurred. 
The participants were seated at an 80486 PC with a 15-inch color monitor. 
The instructions were presented on the computer screen. Prior to the 
counterbalanced conditions, participants practiced both RT tasks until they 
met a criterion of 20 consecutively correct (1-back) choice reactions. Next, 
they performed the 14 verbal fluency tasks: 7 under single-task and 7 
concurrently with either simple or choice reaction, depending on which 
condition they were assigned to. The tasks were counterbalanced over the 
conditions contrasting single and dual-task verbal fluency performance and 
with the two kinds of verbal fluency represented equally in both conditions. 
In other words, the 7 tasks under control and the 7 tasks concurrently 
executed with either one-back or standard choice reactions, consisted of 4 
letter (2 nouns and 2 verbs) and 3 category fluency tasks that were 
counterbalanced. Half of the participants started with the single-task verbal 
fluency tasks, the other half with the dual-task conditions. 
The cue for the fluency task was centered on the computer screen. 2000 
milliseconds later, the word ‘START’ flickered on the screen to signal the 
beginning of the verbal fluency task. At this point, the participants generated 
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as many verbal items as possible within 45 seconds. The words were taped 
by means of an audio recorder. The end of the fluency task was announced 
by a 100 Hz tone.  
In the dual-task conditions, the one-back or standard choice reaction time 
tasks were started 5000 msec before the fluency task. After this single-task 
period, the task and the start-signal were presented following the same 
procedure, and from this point, both tasks were performed concurrently until 
the final sound. Each participant also performed both RT tasks in a single-
task condition for a period of 45 sec. 
RESULTS 
The number of words generated per 45 seconds were subjected to an analysis 
of variance on the basis of a 2 (Group: choice RT task or one-back choice 
RT task) x 2 (Condition: single-task and dual-task) x 2 (Fluency Task: letter 
and category fluency) mixed design. All data reported in this paper were 
analyzed by means of a repeated measures analysis based on the multivariate 
general linear model. The average number of words produced per 45 seconds 
for each condition is displayed in Table 1. 
The analysis revealed significant main effects of Condition, F(1, 22) = 
234.52, p < .001, and Fluency Task, F(1, 22) = 51.96, p < .001, but no 
significant main effect of Group, F < 1. The interaction of Group and 
Condition, F(1, 22) = 13.82, p < .01, indicates that the one-back choice RT 
task affected verbal fluency more severely than the standard choice RT task. 
The three-way interaction of Group, Condition and Fluency Task was not 
significant, F < 1.  
Further planned comparisons revealed that the choice RT task affected both 
letter fluency, F(1, 22) = 64.41, p < .001, and category fluency, F(1, 22) = 
21.86, p < .001. Similarly, the one-back choice RT task affected both letter 
fluency, F(1, 22) = 171.70, p < .001, and category fluency, F(1, 22) = 59.34, 
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p < .001. The interaction Condition x Fluency Task was neither significant in 
the choice RT task group, F < 1, nor in the one-back choice RT task group, 
F(1, 22) = 1.76, p > .10, which indicates that the RT tasks similarly affected 
letter and category fluency. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The results showed that a one-back choice RT task caused more interference 
with the verbal fluency tasks than the choice RT task. Given that verbal 
fluency tasks require executive control, this result suggests that executive 
control is also involved in both secondary tasks and even more in the one-
back choice RT task than in the standard choice RT task. Moreover, we 
observed that the additional interference of the one-back choice RT task was 
comparable for letter and category fluency. According to the theory put 
forward by Rende et al. (2002), this shows that there is no involvement of 
the slave systems in the updating process, at least not to a detectable extent. 
From Experiment 1, we can conclude that one-back delaying of a choice 
reaction calls on executive control. The subsequent experiments are aimed to 
consolidate this position and to investigate more directly whether the 
 Letter Fluency Category Fluency 
 Single-Task Dual-Task Single-Task Dual-Task 
CRT 7.83 (1.17) 4.31 (1.93) 15.08 (4.20) 9.25 (1.91) 
CRT-1 8.87 (1.33) 3.12 (1.62) 15.66 (4.19) 6.05 (1.73) 
Table 1. The mean number of words produced per 45 seconds as a function of Group 
(choice RT task and one-back choice RT task), Condition (single and dual-task) and Fluency 
Task (letter and category fluency). Standard deviations in parentheses. CRT and CRT-1 
stand for choice RT task and 1-back choice RT task, respectively. 
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interference of the one-back task is produced at the level of the working 
memory slave systems. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Experiment 2 used a verbal short-term memory span procedure with forward 
and backward serial recall instructions in order to further test our position 
that one-back delaying of a choice reaction requires executive control and to 
verify whether the predicted interference is mediated by verbal processing. 
In the verbal span procedure, subjects are presented a string of consonants at 
a rate of, for example, one consonant per second and they are instructed to 
memorize the string and to reproduce it afterwards. This short-term memory 
task is mainly relying on verbal processing at the level of the Phonological 
Loop. However, when the number of consonants in the string reaches the 
individual span level or in other words, when it exceeds the number of letters 
that can be properly maintained by the Phonological Loop, then the Central 
Executive has to intervene to manage the exceeding of the verbal capacities 
(Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). Overall, a verbal span procedure is assumed to 
put high demands on verbal storage and to a more moderate extent also on 
executive processing (e.g. Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999).  
An often used alternative to the regular forward verbal span procedure is to 
ask the participants to reproduce the string in the reverse order of 
presentation, which is known as the backward verbal span task. Performance 
on a backward verbal span task is often found to be worse than on a forward 
verbal span task, although differences in span measures, variations in the 
nature of the verbal material as well as practice effects have resulted in 
similar levels of performance for both directions recall (e.g. Engle et al., 
1999; Farrand & Jones, 1996; Szmalec et al., in press). A nowadays 
predominant view on verbal serial recall states that a backward recall of 
verbal material involves the same processes and representations as forward 
recall, but in addition, it requires a directional transformation which taxes 
EXECUTIVE DEMANDS OF A ONE-BACK CHOICE RT TASK     73 
executive resources (Ashman & Das, 1980; Case & Globerson, 1974; Elliott, 
Smith & McCulloch, 1997; Farrand & Jones, 1996; Gathercole, 1999; 
Gathercole & Pickering, 2000; Groeger, Field, & Hammond, 1999; Jensen & 
Figueroa, 1975; Lezak, 1995; Schofield & Ashman, 1986; Smyth & Scholey, 
1992; Vandierendonck, De Vooght, & Van der Goten, 1998a; 1998b).  Early 
studies (Hinrichs, 1968; Nilsson, Wright, & Murdock, 1979) have 
demonstrated that this directional transformation in backward verbal serial 
recall takes place at encoding, provided that the participants know the 
required direction in advance (e.g. by using a blocked design, like in the 
current experiment). The additional executive demands are explained by the 
fact that in backward verbal span, the automaticity of adding the new letter 
after the penultimately memorized letter is interrupted in order to put the 
new letter before the penultimate one. With respect to the verbal demands, 
forward and backward verbal span tasks are known to involve a similar 
degree of phonological processing (e.g. Engle et al., 1999; Rosen & Engle, 
1999). 
The logic of Experiment 2 relies on the differential contribution of executive 
processing and domain-specific (i.e. verbal) processing to forward and 
backward verbal serial recall, as described in the previous paragraph. More 
precisely, we know that backward verbal serial recall is more executively 
demanding than forward verbal serial recall and that both directions of recall 
involve a similar degree of verbal processing. This evidence suggests that it 
should be possible to dissociate verbal from executive involvement in an 
interference task, by investigating the pattern of dual-task impairment that is 
obtained when this interference task is simultaneously executed with forward 
and backward verbal serial recall. Following this rationale, Experiment 2 
compares the patterns of dual-task impairment of a one-back and a standard 
choice RT task, relative to the effects of a secondary task that selectively 
interferes with verbal processing (i.e. articulatory suppression), on forward 
and backward verbal serial recall. If one-back delaying of a choice reaction 
involves executive control while it does not require verbal processing, the 
predictions specified in what follows should prove to be correct. Note that in 
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the present study, the choice RT task is used as an executive control task in 
order to investigate whether one-back delaying of a choice reaction creates 
an additional executive load.  
We first predict that the executive control task (the choice RT task) will give 
evidence of a typically executive pattern of interference, which means that it 
will interfere more severely with the backward than with the forward span 
task, as observed by Szmalec et al. (in press). Second, if the one-back choice 
RT task is executively demanding just like the standard choice RT task is, it 
is predicted that the same pattern of interference will be obtained. Third, 
given the hypothesis that the one-back choice RT task requires other 
executive processes apart from response selection, it is predicted that the 
one-back choice RT task will have a larger detrimental effect than the 
standard choice RT task. Finally, since the amount of verbal/phonological 
resources is similar in forward and backward verbal serial recall, articulatory 
suppression is anticipated to similarly affect both directions of verbal recall. 
METHOD 
Participants and Design. Fifty-four first-year students enrolled at the 
Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences of Ghent University 
(Belgium) participated for course requirement and credit. None of them had 
taken part in one of the other experiments. They were randomly assigned to 
one of both reproduction instruction conditions (between-subjects: 27 
participants in both conditions), in which verbal serial recall was performed 
in a single-task condition and in concurrent execution with the choice RT 
task, the one-back choice RT task and with articulatory suppression. These 
within-subject-conditions, which also included single-task choice RT and 
one-back choice RT conditions, were counterbalanced according to a 
randomized Latin square. 
Materials and Procedure. The consonants were chosen from 13 groups 
with low intergroup confusability according to their Dutch pronunciation. 
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The groups were: (B, D, P, T), (C), (F, S), (G), (H, K), (J), (L), (M, N), (Q), 
(R), (V, W), (X), (Z). A string of consonants was composed by selecting one 
letter at random from each group in order to minimize the phonological 
similarity between the letters. For the RT tasks, the same parameters were 
used as in Experiment 1. 
The participants were seated at an 80486 PC with a 15-inch color monitor. 
The instructions were presented on the computer screen and the experiment 
started with a practice session that consisted of two single trials. A trial 
started with the presentation of a fixation cross (+) in the center of the screen 
and a sound (1000 Hz). After 500 msec the cross disappeared and after a 
2000 msec blank screen, the first consonant was displayed for 1500 msec, 
followed by a 500 msec blank screen before the next consonant appeared. 
The sequence ended with a sound (100 Hz) and three exclamation marks 
(‘!!!’) which were meant to trigger the reproduction. The participants were 
instructed to reproduce as many consonants as possible in the correct order. 
Oral recall was registered by the experimenter. At the end of reproduction, 
the experimenter started the next trial. After a two-trial practice, a verbal 
span task followed, which was also meant as a practice and was not included 
in the counterbalancing scheme. The verbal span task started with a sequence 
of three consonants and ended with a sequence of eight consonants. Three 
trials were presented per sequence; each participant performed 18 (6 
sequences x 3) trials, regardless of their individual performance. Prior to the 
counterbalanced conditions, participants also practiced both RT tasks until 
they met a criterion of 20 consecutively correct (1-back) choice reactions.     
After the practice sessions, participants started with the six conditions that 
were included in the counterbalancing scheme. In the control condition, 
participants performed the verbal span task alone. In the dual-task 
conditions, participants had to perform a secondary task (choice RT task, 
one-back choice RT task or articulatory suppression) during the presentation 
phase of the memory task but not during retrieval. The secondary tasks 
started 5000 msec before the primary task began and both primary and 
76     CHAPTER 3 
secondary tasks ended with the final sound that announced primary task 
recall. In the articulatory suppression condition, participants were required to 
continuously repeat aloud the word ‘de’ (Dutch for the). They were 
instructed and practiced so that the pace was not less than two and not more 
than three words per second. The experimenter continuously verified that 
this pace was respected throughout the experiment. The remaining two 
conditions that were included in the counterbalancing scheme were a single-
task choice RT and a single-task one-back choice RT task condition (each 
for 12 periods of 20 seconds).  
RESULTS 
As dependent variable for the verbal memory task, we calculated the 
proportion of consonants recalled in correct relative order. To that end, we 
used a transformation of Kendall’s rank correlation coefficient Tau, which 
reflects the proportion of stimuli recalled in correct relative order (see also 
Szmalec et al., in press). This measure, τ', is obtained as follows: 
 
 
where τ' is the Kendall rank correlation between the orders of the presented 
and the correctly recalled items, n is the number of presented items and nr is 
the number of recalled items. This formula yields an index between 0 and 1. 
Higher values denote many recalled items in correct order. Low values are 
obtained when the order is strongly violated or when only few items are 
recalled. Commission errors were rare and were therefore not taken into 
account. The τ' was subjected to an analysis based on a 2 (Reproduction 
Instruction: forward and backward) x 4 (Condition: control, articulatory 
suppression, one-back choice RT task and choice RT task) mixed design. 
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The main effect of Reproduction Instruction just failed to be statistically 
reliable, F(1, 52) = 3.39, p < .10. The main effect of Condition, F(3, 50) = 
98.79, p < .001, and the interaction Reproduction Instruction x Condition 
interaction, F(3, 50) = 5.87, p < .01, were significant. The interaction is 
displayed in Figure 1. 
The predictions were tested by means of planned comparisons. These 
revealed that, under a single-task control condition, performance for forward 
and backward serial recall of consonants was comparable, F < 1. 
Articulatory suppression affected both forward, F(1, 52) = 138.86, p < .001, 
and backward recall, F(1, 52) = 114.06, p < .001, of consonants. This 
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Figure 1. The proportion of consonants recalled in correct relative order (transformed 
Tau) as a function of the 2 (Reproduction Instruction: forward and backward) x 4 
(Condition: control, articulatory suppression, one-back choice RT and choice RT) mixed 
design (Experiment 2). AS, CRT-1 and CRT stand for articulatory suppression, one-back 
choice RT task and choice RT task, respectively. Whiskers denote standard errors. 
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adverse effect of articulatory suppression was similar in forward and 
backward recall, F < 1. Also the one-back choice RT task affected both 
forward, F(1, 52) = 73.97, p < .001, and backward, F(1, 52) = 132.97, p < 
.001, verbal recall, but the interference with backward recall was stronger, 
F(1, 52) = 4.59, p < .05. The dual-task impairment due to the choice RT task 
was also larger with backward than with forward recall, F(1, 52) = 7.82, p < 
.01. The one-back choice RT task interfered more severely with forward 
recall, F(1, 52) = 36.23, p < .001, and with backward recall, F(1, 52) = 
41.78, p < .001, than the choice RT task. The interaction of Reproduction 
Instruction with the planned contrast between Articulatory Suppression and 
the one-back Choice RT task was significant, F(1, 52) = 9.08, p < .01. The 
interaction of Reproduction Instruction with the contrast between the one-
back Choice RT task and the Choice RT task was not significant, F < 1. 
DISCUSSION 
Experiment 2 demonstrated that the one-back choice RT task interfered more 
with a primary task that involves executive control than the choice RT task. 
In addition, when the executive demands of the primary task were 
augmented by reproducing the verbal items in the reverse order of 
presentation, the interference of the one-back choice RT task increased.  
Furthermore, Experiment 2 demonstrated that the pattern of dual-task 
interference of the one-back choice RT task with forward and backward 
verbal serial recall dissociated from the interference observed with the 
articulatory suppression, while it ran parallel with the dual-task impairment 
observed with the executive control task, the standard choice RT task. 
Altogether, these findings consolidate the position that the one-back choice 
RT task gives evidence of an executive pattern of interference and that this 
interference is not produced at the level of the verbal working memory slave 
system. Given the architecture of working memory as proposed by Baddeley 
(1986), the one-back choice reaction must be investigated in interaction with 
visuospatial processing so as to assess its relation to the Visuospatial Sketch 
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Pad. This is the logical and imperative next step in determining the working 
memory demands of the one-back choice reaction task.  
EXPERIMENT 3 
Experiment 3 was designed to consolidate the position that a one-back 
choice RT task produces an executive pattern of dual-task interference and to 
test whether the interference, as it is not produced at the level of the 
Phonological Loop (Experiment 2), is neither due to a visuospatial 
involvement. To this end, we used the visuospatial counterpart to the verbal 
span task, namely the Corsi blocks task (for a review on the Corsi blocks 
task, see Berch, Krikorian, & Huha, 1998). In the Corsi blocks task, the 
experimenter points to a number of blocks (1 up to 9) that are irregularly 
positioned on a board. After presentation of the block-sequence, the 
participants are required to reproduce it in the same serial order as it was 
presented by the experimenter. Analogous to the verbal domain, an often 
used variation on the forward Corsi blocks task is to ask the participants to 
reproduce the spatial items in the reverse order of presentation, a procedure 
which has been shown to yield a similar level of performance as the forward 
Corsi blocks task (Isaacs & Vargha-Khadem, 1989; Szmalec et al., in press; 
Vandierendonck et al., 2004; Wilde & Strauss, 2002). For many years, the 
Corsi blocks task has been used to measure visuospatial short-term memory 
performance, both in healthy and clinical groups.  
Regarding the working memory components involved in the Corsi blocks 
task, a number of selective interference studies (Vandierendonck, Kemps, 
Fastame, & Szmalec, 2004; Szmalec et al., in press; Vecchi & Richardson, 
2001) demonstrated that both visuospatial and executive resources are 
required. With respect to the visuospatial involvement, the findings are 
slightly different from what is found with articulatory suppression in the 
verbal domain. More precisely, performance is more impaired by a 
secondary task which interferes with spatial rehearsal in the forward than in 
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the backward direction of visuospatial serial recall (Szmalec et al., in press; 
Vandierendonck et al., 2004). This finding which could be taken to mean 
that the Visuospatial Sketch Pad is more involved in the forward than in the 
backward Corsi blocks task, receives support from recent 
neuropsychological evidence (Mammarella, Cornoldi, & Donadello, 2003). 
This specific issue has been addressed more directly in a recent study by 
Vandierendonck and Szmalec (in press). Based on Wheeler and Treisman’s 
(2002) binding theory for visual short-term memory, Vandierendonck and 
Szmalec (in press) argued that performance for the backward memorization 
of block-sequences benefits from a recency effect in the sense that the last 
three to four blocks can be recalled without spatial rehearsal. This might 
explain why matrix tapping, a task that is known to interfere with 
visuospatial rehearsal (e.g. Logie, 1995), interferes less with the backward 
version of the Corsi blocks task. 
Another characteristic of spatial serial recall is that no additional executive 
resources are required to reverse the order of the items (Smyth & Scholey, 
1992). Smyth and Scholey explain this by the fact that series of spatial items 
are encoded in visuospatial patterns, both in forward and backward recall, 
with no involvement of serial order. Accordingly, whereas executive 
resources are required to reverse the order in verbal serial recall, the reversal 
in spatial serial recall is not executively demanding. This position is 
supported by the observation that an executive secondary task similarly 
affects the encoding of forward and backward Corsi block sequences 
(Szmalec et al., in press; Vandierendonck et al., 2004).  
By analogy with Experiment 2, the logic of Experiment 3 relies on the 
differential involvement of domain-specific (visuospatial) processing and the 
comparable involvement of executive processing in backward and forward 
recall of Corsi blocks. Based on this logic, it can be anticipated that 
executive and visuospatial secondary tasks will dissociate in terms of their 
interaction with the direction of recall in the Corsi blocks task (as 
demonstrated by Vandierendonck et al., 2004). Hence, the purpose of this 
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experiment is to investigate whether the one-back choice RT task gives 
evidence of an executive pattern of interference and whether this pattern 
dissociates from the dual-task impairment observed with matrix tapping.  
If the choice RT task interferes with a spatial task demanding executive 
control while this interference is not produced at the level of the Visuospatial 
Sketch Pad, the following predictions can be formulated. First, given that the 
Corsi blocks task requires executive control, it is predicted that the one-back 
choice RT task will impair the Corsi block task to a larger extent than the 
standard choice RT task. Second, knowing that the executive demands of the 
forward and backward variants of the Corsi blocks task are the same, we 
expect that the presumed executive one-back choice RT task will similarly 
affect forward and backward recall of visuospatial positions, just like the 
executive control task (i.e. the choice RT task). Finally, given the differential 
contribution of visuospatial processing to the forward and backward Corsi 
task, we predict that the contrast between the one-back choice RT task and a 
task that selectively interferes with visuospatial processing (i.e. matrix 
tapping; Farmer, Berman, & Fletcher, 1986) will interact with direction of 
recall. 
METHOD 
Participants and Design.  Forty-six first-year students enrolled at the 
Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences of Ghent University 
(Belgium) participated for course requirement and credit. None of them 
participated in one of both other experiments. They were randomly assigned 
to one of both reproduction instruction conditions (between-subjects: 23 
participants in both conditions), in which the Corsi block tapping task was 
performed in a single-task condition and in concurrent execution with the 
choice RT task, the one-back choice RT task and with matrix tapping. These 
within-subject conditions, which also included single-task choice RT, one-
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back choice RT and matrix tapping conditions, were counterbalanced 
according to a randomized Latin square.  
Materials and Procedure. A computerized version of the Corsi blocks task 
was presented on a 15-inch color touch screen (80486 PC). The 9 blocks 
were 30 x 30 mm white squares, positioned on a blue background according 
to Corsi’s (1972) original configuration. The presentation of a block-
sequence was monitored by the computer: each block in turn was highlighted 
by changing its color from white to black for 1 s, with an inter-block interval 
of 0.5 s. 
The start of presentation was announced by a 400 msec 1000 Hz sound. The 
presentation ended with a 400 msec 100 Hz sound, which announced the 
reproduction phase. The participants were instructed to reproduce the 
highlighted blocks by touching the squares on the screen in the same or 
reverse order of presentation, depending on the condition they were assigned 
to. When a square was touched by the participant, it turned black for 200 
msec in order to provide feedback on the touching operation. At the end of 
recall, the participant was required to hit the escape key and after a 2s inter-
trial interval, the next trial started. A condition started with a sequence of 
three and ended with a sequence of eight blocks. Three trials were presented 
at each sequence length, so each condition contained 18 trials.  
Instructions were presented on the computer screen. Prior to the 
counterbalanced conditions, participants performed two practice trials and an 
entire single-task Corsi practice block. Next, they practiced both RT tasks 
until they met a criterion of 20 consecutively correct (1-back) choice 
reactions. Then, the seven counterbalanced conditions followed. In the 
control condition, participants performed the Corsi block-tapping task alone. 
In the dual-task conditions, the secondary tasks (matrix tapping, the choice 
RT task and the one-back choice RT task) were executed during the 
presentation of the Corsi block sequences but not during retrieval. Matrix 
tapping required the participants to hit the four corners of the numeric 
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keypad in counterclockwise order at a pace of 2-3 keys per second. This 
operation was registered in terms of accuracy and latency. The other 
secondary tasks were the same RT tasks as in the previous experiments. 
Performance on the three secondary tasks was also registered in a single-task 
situation (each task for 12 periods of 20 seconds).  
RESULTS 
We used the same dependent variable as in Experiment 2, namely the 
proportion of spatial positions recalled in correct relative order, based on the 
transformed Tau (τ') formula. This measure was entered as the dependent 
variable in a 2 (Reproduction Instruction: forward and backward) x 4 
(Condition: control, matrix tapping, choice RT and simple RT) mixed 
design. 
The main effect of Reproduction Instruction was not significant, F(1, 44) = 
1.08, p > .10, while the main effect of Condition, F(3, 42) = 53.51, p < .001, 
and the interaction of Reproduction Instruction and Condition, F(3, 42) = 
4.38, p < .01, were significant. Figure 2 displays the interaction. 
Planned comparisons showed that, in the single-task control condition, 
performance was comparable for both forward and backward serial recall of 
Corsi blocks, F < 1. Matrix tapping affected both forward, F(1, 44) = 56.13, 
p < .001, and backward, F(1, 44) = 7.25, p < .01, recall of block sequences 
but the interference was significantly stronger for forward than for backward 
recall, F(1, 44) = 11.52, p < .01. The one-back choice RT task interfered 
with forward, F(1, 44) = 56.78, p < .001, and backward, F(1, 44) = 60.42, p 
< .001, recall of Corsi block sequences. The degree of interference was 
comparable for both reproduction instruction conditions, F < 1. Also the 
choice RT task similarly affected forward and backward recall of Corsi 
block sequences, F < 1. The one-back choice RT task was more impairing 
than the choice RT task on both forward recall, F(1, 44) = 38.44, p < .001, 
and backward recall, F(1, 44) = 36.10, p < .001. Finally, the interaction of 
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Reproduction Instruction with the contrast between Matrix Tapping and the 
one-back Choice RT task was significant, F(1, 44) = 5.31, p < .05, while the 
interaction of Reproduction Instruction with the contrast between the one-
back Choice RT task and the Choice RT task was not, F < 1. 
DISCUSSION 
The data from Experiment 3 demonstrated that the one-back choice RT task 
was more impairing on the Corsi blocks task than the choice RT task, which 
implies that the one-back delaying process caused additional interference 
with primary tasks that involve executive control. Furthermore, we observed 
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Figure 2. The proportion of blocks recalled in correct relative order (transformed Tau) as 
a function of the 2 (Reproduction Instruction: forward and backward) x 4 (Condition: 
control, matrix tapping, one-back choice RT and choice RT) mixed design (Experiment 
3). MT, CRT-1 and CRT stand for matrix tapping, one-back choice RT task and choice 
RT task, respectively. Whiskers denote standard errors. 
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a dissociation between the matrix tapping and the one-back choice RT task 
interference in the comparison of forward and backward recall conditions. 
More precisely, while the one-back choice RT task interfered with forward 
and backward recall to the same extent, matrix tapping had a stronger 
adverse effect on forward than on backward recall. This dissociation 
supports a qualitative differentiation between the cognitive processes that 
underlie performance on both tasks. Based on these findings, we argue that 
the dual-task effects of the one-back choice reaction are not produced at the 
level of the Visuospatial Sketch Pad. Given the typical executive pattern of 
interference with the forward and backward variants of the Corsi blocks task 
elicited by the one-back choice RT task (Szmalec et al., in press; 
Vandierendonck et al., 2004), also Experiment 3 supports the thesis that the 
interference occurs at the level of the Central Executive instead. 
ANALYSES OF RT TASK PERFORMANCE 
Further analyses were performed to specify the extent to which the RT tasks 
were affected by the concurrent execution of verbal and visuospatial serial 
recall and verbal fluency. Such analyses are necessary to investigate whether 
no dual-task tradeoffs occurred in the sense that the additional interference 
of the one-back choice RT task might be explained by a smaller dual-task 
cost (i.e. better performance in dual-task setting) for the one-back choice RT 
task compared to the choice RT task. Because the RT task performance 
analyses yielded a similar pattern of results in all three experiments, we 
decided to pool the three data sets. 
Speed (mean reaction times) and accuracy data (mean percentages of choice 
reaction mistakes) for the choice RT tasks are displayed in Table 2. With 
respect to the reaction times, these data show that in a single-task condition 
the one-back choice RT task was performed faster than the standard choice 
RT task, F(1, 111) = 14.86, p < .001. Furthermore, both the standard and the 
one-back choice RT task were affected under dual-task conditions: F(1, 111) 
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= 186.83, p < .001 and F(1, 111) = 211.86, p < .001, respectively. The 
interaction of the standard vs. the one-back choice RT task contrast and the 
single-task vs. dual-task contrast was not significant, F < 1. This shows that 
the dual-task costs of both RT tasks were comparable. Because the 
distribution of the accuracy data does not meet the ANOVA assumptions, we 
used a nonparametric sign test for dependent samples to compare the 
accuracy on both RT tasks. The results show that the one-back choice RT 
task was performed as accurately as the standard choice RT task, both under 
single as under dual-task conditions (both p’s > .10).  
 
Finally, we analyzed the percentage of anticipatory reactions that were made 
in the RT tasks. In the standard choice RT task, anticipations were rare. In 
the one-back choice RT task, on average 1.83 (SD = 4.66) percent 
anticipations were made under single-task and 2.93 (SD = 3.84) percent 
under dual-task conditions. A nonparametric sign test revealed that this dual-
task cost was significant (p < .001). 
 Speed Accuracy 
 Single-Task Dual-Task Single-Task Dual-Task 
CRT 509 (83) 662 (122) 1.82 (2.01) 5.95 (6.37) 
CRT-1 464 (121) 612 (149) 2.71 (3.71) 6.90 (6.42) 
Table 2. Mean speed (reaction times) and accuracy data (percentage of choice reaction 
mistakes) for the RT tasks as a function of Task (choice RT task and one-back choice RT 
task) and Condition (single and dual-task), averaged over Experiments 1, 2 and 3. Standard 
deviations in parentheses. CRT and CRT-1 stand for choice RT task and 1-back choice RT 
task, respectively. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the executive demands of a one-
back choice reaction by means of the selective interference paradigm. We 
predicted that a one-back choice RT task would interfere with other tasks 
calling on executive control, based on the theoretical position that a one-
back choice RT task bears strong resemblance to the n-back updating 
procedure described by Morris and Jones (1990). A series of experiments 
was designed in order to compare the patterns of dual-task interference of a 
one-back and a standard choice RT task in simultaneous execution with 
executive, verbal and visuospatial primary tasks. By comparing the 
interference of both RT tasks with letter and category fluency, Experiment 1 
demonstrated that the one-back task interfered more with verbal fluency than 
a standard choice RT task. Experiments 2 and 3 were designed to 
demonstrate that the basis of the augmented interference observed in 
Experiment 1 is executive in nature and is not produced at the level of 
working memory’s verbal or visuospatial slave systems. Experiment 2 
showed that in concurrent execution with forward and backward verbal 
serial recall, the one-back choice RT task gave evidence of a typical 
executive pattern of interference and that the one-back choice RT task was 
qualitatively dissociable from a verbal secondary task. In the same vein, 
Experiment 3 showed that in simultaneous execution with forward and 
backward visuospatial serial recall, the pattern of selective interference of 
the one-back choice RT task was typical for an executive task. Moreover, it 
was qualitatively separable from the pattern produced by a task that requires 
visuospatial processing. Overall, these results show that the one-back 
delaying of a choice reaction interferes with tasks calling on executive 
control and that neither verbal nor visuospatial processing is involved in this 
task, at least not to a measurable extent. Therefore, it is concluded that a one-
back choice reaction puts larger demands on executive control than a 
standard choice reaction.  
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Morris and Jones (1990) demonstrated that their n-back procedure also 
involves non-executive working memory processes which are related to the 
modality of the material that must be updated. In their task, letter strings had 
to be maintained and updated, which explains why also the Phonological 
Loop is involved. The present findings show that the one-back choice RT 
task is a source of executive interference with no measurable involvement of 
verbal or visuospatial processing. This raises the question how participants 
store the auditory signals in a one-back choice RT task in order to bridge the 
delay period. One possibility is to verbally recode the stimuli (high or low) 
and hold this verbal representation during the delay by verbal rehearsal. 
However, this would induce a continuous verbal load in the one-back task ─ 
something similar to an articulatory suppression ─ and this in addition to the 
executive demands of the task, offers an explanation that does not fit well 
within the observed patterns of interference with verbal serial recall; the 
same goes for an explanation in terms of spatial recoding. It is certainly not 
excluded that, in addition to the executive demands, minor verbal or 
visuospatial involvement might elude our measuring procedure but this can 
hardly be the case for a presumed verbal involvement which should be 
responsible for rehearsing phonological information (i.e. high or low) 
throughout the entire inter-stimulus interval. If the one-back delay period is 
not bridged by appealing to the slave systems, how is the task-relevant 
information maintained then? An answer to this question might be provided 
by findings from the motor preparation literature (e.g. Toni, Thoenissen & 
Zilles, 2001). Motor preparation is often measured by a delayed responding 
paradigm. A delayed RT task, for example, differs from a one-back task in 
the fact that in a delayed RT task, the response is triggered by an arbitrary 
signal before the next stimulus, which implies that the moment the next 
stimulus is presented, there is no active maintenance and by consequence no 
content to update.  Toni et al. (2001) argued that in a delayed choice reaction 
procedure, provided that the motor response can be prepared in advance, the 
motor response itself is used to bridge the delay period, and they 
demonstrated that the representation of this motor response is dissociated 
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from working memory processes (see also Toni, Thoenissen, Zilles, & 
Niedeggen, 2002). Conversely, when participants are obliged to store the 
stimulus during the delay period, either by experimental manipulation (e.g. 
Toni et al., 2001) or by the nature of the task itself (e.g. storing consonants), 
working memory is required. According to the theory put forward by Toni et 
al. (2001), a one-back choice RT procedure like the present one allows 
motor preparation, which might explain why no working memory storage 
was measured during the delay period. Interestingly, this idea matches the 
subjective impressions described by the participants to the present 
experiments. They consistently reported performing the one-back choice RT 
task by preparing the motor response, holding it standby until the next 
stimulus and then, finishing with the execution. This seems to suggest that in 
a one-back choice RT task, and perhaps also in the Morris and Jones (1990) 
n-back procedure, it is particularly the requirement to keep a task-set 
representation active and to update this representation which is executively 
demanding, independently of the nature of the representation. 
Some years ago, Smith and Jonides (1997) suggested that one-back might be 
a special case of the n-back task in the sense that it does not involve 
updating. Smith and Jonides (1997) investigated the neural basis of working 
memory by means of PET and therefore, they used an n-back task with 
parametric variations of n going from 0 up to 3. They observed that the 
number of activated brain regions increased with n but, it was especially as 
from n = 2 that the Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex (DPFC) became involved 
in the task. Since DPFC has often been associated with executive functions 
(e.g. D’Esposito, Detre, Alsop, Shin, Atlas, & Grossman, 1995), Smith and 
Jonides provided an indirect argument against executive involvement in a 
one-back task. This argument was in turn weakened by the more recent 
findings of Van der Linden et al. (1999) who demonstrated that the 
Frontopolar cortex mediates the process of updating, while DPFC is more 
likely to serve a storage function in working memory. Our findings strongly 
suggest that executive control is involved in a one-back task and, as far as 
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the updating process is the locus of executive control in the one-back choice 
RT task, it seems that updating is involved in a one-back task. 
As described in the introduction, we do not take for granted that only the 
updating process qualifies for the additional executive involvement that is 
measured in a one-back choice RT task compared to a standard choice RT 
task. In what follows, we present two alternative explanations which 
challenge the notion of updating as the locus of executive control in the one-
back task. The first is grounded in the recent developments demonstrating 
that also a choice RT task involves executive control (Allain et al., 2004; 
Rowe et al., 2000; Szmalec et al., in press). In a sense, the current findings 
demonstrate that a temporal manipulation (i.e. the delaying) of the choice 
reaction process affects the executive demands of a choice RT task. One 
cannot exclude that it might also be the active maintenance - which is 
required to bridge the delay period - that involves executive control and not 
(only) the updating process. The position that specifically the updating phase 
itself is executively demanding, as opposed to thinking of the active 
maintenance for example, has only been supported indirectly (e.g. Morris & 
Jones, 1990). It is not unthinkable that the additional executive demands of 
the one-back choice RT task are due to the fact that the same executive 
process activated to supervise the correct response selection in a choice RT 
task is also activated in a one-back choice RT task but to a temporarily 
different extent (i.e. as a function of the length of the delay period). This 
idea is based on Allain et al.’s (2004) electromyographic study which 
demonstrated that the executive demands of a choice RT task can be 
attributed to the fact that participants exert an online executive control that 
supervises the RT task until the motor execution of the response is 
terminated. Our point is that it cannot be excluded that in a one-back delayed 
choice RT task, this online control is prolonged as a function of the delay 
period, which might also explain the additional executive demands of a one-
back choice RT task. It is important to further investigate whether the 
executive demands of a one-back RT task differ from the executive demands 
of a regular RT task (1) in terms of a qualitatively different process (i.e. 
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updating) or (2) in quantitative (i.e. temporal) terms or (3) maybe both. This 
would be crucial information for the scientific debate on the unity and 
diversity in executive control (see Miyake et al., 2000). What the present 
study contributes to this debate is the idea that the findings regarding the 
additional executive demands of a one-back choice RT task compared to a 
choice RT task can be theoretically framed without invoking a qualitatively 
different process. 
Another alternative explanation for the increased executive demands of the 
one-back choice RT task is related to the fact that during a one-back choice 
reaction, there is an overlap of successive trials. In a one-back choice RT 
task, where the occurrence of stimulus x triggers the reaction on stimulus x-
1, the cognitive processing of stimulus x should be commenced before the 
choice reaction on stimulus x-1 is completed. If this were not the case, no 
relevant information on stimulus x would be available when the response on 
stimulus x-1 is terminated and hence, it would simply not be possible to go 
on with the task. It is not excluded that this partial temporal overlap between 
the choice reactions on stimulus x-1 and on stimulus x induces a competition 
between the task sets for those stimuli and that executive control is required 
to prevent that interference occurs at that level. Further research which 
directly addresses this issue would be welcome. 
Finally, what are the implications of the present study for executive function 
research in general? In our view, the selective interference paradigm is a 
powerful paradigm to study executive control. It offers a framework to 
design interference tasks that operationalize presumed executive processes 
and to test whether these processes are under executive control. Then, the 
changes in executive involvement associated with further parametric 
manipulations on these interference tasks (like the one-back manipulation in 
this study) can improve our understanding of presumed executive processes 
and can contribute to a clarification of the ill-defined concept of executive 
control. In addition, the interference tasks themselves can be useful to those 
working memory studies aimed to investigate the overall executive 
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involvement or the involvement of a particular executive process in more 
complex cognitive activities such as mental arithmetic, for example (e.g. 
Deschuyteneer & Vandierendock, in press; Deschuyteneer, Vandierendonck, 
& Muyllaert, submitted). 
 
 
EXECUTIVE DEMANDS OF A ONE-BACK CHOICE RT TASK     93 
REFERENCES 
Abrahams, S., Leigh, P.N., Harvey, A., Vythelingum, G.N., Grise, D., & Goldstein, 
L.H. (2000). Verbal fluency and executive dysfunction in Amyotrophic Lateral 
Sclerosis (Als). Neuropsychologia,  38, 734-747. 
Allain, S., Carbonnell, L., Burle, B., Hasbroucq, T., & Vidal, F. (2004). On-line 
executive control: An electromyographic study. Psychophysiology,  41, 113-116. 
Ashman, A. F., & Das, J. P. (1980). Relation between planning and simultaneous-
successive processing. Perceptual and Motor Skills,  51, 371-382. 
Baddeley, A. D. (1986). Working Memory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
Clarendon Press. 
Baddeley, A. (1996). Exploring the Central Executive. Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology,  49A, 5-28. 
Baddeley, A. (2000). The Episodic Buffer: A new component of Working Memory? 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences,  4, 417-423. 
Baddeley, A., Emslie, H., Kolodny, J., & Duncan, J. (1998). Random generation and 
the executive control of working memory. Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology,  51A, 819-852. 
Baddeley, A., & Hitch, G. (1974).  Working Memory. In G. A. Bower (Ed.), Recent 
Advances in Learning and Motivation. (pp. 47-90).  New York:  Academic Press. 
Baddeley, A., Lewis, V., Eldridge, M., & Thomson, N. (1984). Attention and 
retrieval from long term memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General,  
113, 518-540. 
Barnard, P. J., Scott, S. K., & May, J. (2001). When the Central Executive lets us 
down: Schemas, attention, and load in a generative working memory task. 
Memory, 9, 209-221. 
Berch, D. B., Krikorian, R., & Huha, E. M. (1998). The Corsi block-tapping task: 
Methodological and theoretical considerations. Brain and Cognition,  38, 317-338. 
Bunge, S. A., Hazeltine, E., Scanlon, M. D., Rosen, A. C., & Gabrieli, J. D. (2002).  
Dissociable contributions of prefrontal and parietal cortices to response selection. 
Neuroimage,  17, 1562-71. 
Case, R., & Globerson. (1974). Field independence and central computing space. 
Child Development,  45, 772-778. 
Denckla, M. (1994). Measurement of executive function. In G. Reid Lyon (Ed.), 
Frames of reference for the assessment of learning disabilities. New views on 
measurement issues. (pp. 117-142).  Baltimore, MD:  Paul H. Brookes. 
94     CHAPTER 3 
Deschuyteneer, M. & Vandierendonck, A. (in press). Are ‘input monitoring’ and 
‘response selection’ involved in solving simple mental arithmetical sums? 
European Journal of Cognitive Psychology. 
Deschuyteneer, M., Vandierendonck, A., & Muyllaert, I. (submitted). Is ‘memory 
updating’ involved in solving simple mental arithmetic sums and products? 
Manuscript submitted for publication. 
D’Esposito, Detre, Alsop, Shin, Atlas, & Grossman. (1995). The neural basis of the 
central executive of working memory. Nature, 378, 279-281. 
Elliot, C.D., Smith, P., & McCulloch, K. (1997). British Ability Scales II. Technical 
Manual. Windsor, UK: NFER-Nelson. 
Engle, R. W., Tuholski, S. W., Laughlin, J. E., & Conway, A. R. (1999). Working 
memory, short-term memory and general fluid intelligence: A latent-variable 
approach. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 128, 309-331. 
Farmer, E.W., Berman, J.V.F., & Fletcher, Y.L. (1986). Evidence for a visuospatial 
scratch-pad in working memory.  Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology ,  
38A, 675-688. 
Farrand, P., & Jones, D. (1996). Direction of report in spatial and verbal serial 
short-term memory. Quarterly Journal of Experimental,  49A, 140-158. 
Frith, C. D., & Done, D. J. (1986).  Routes to action in reaction-time tasks. 
Psychological Research-Psychologische Forschung,  48, 169-177. 
Gathercole, S. (1999). Cognitive approaches to the development of short-term 
memory. Trends in Cognitive Science, 3, 410-418. 
Gathercole, S., & Pickering, S. J. (2000). Working memory deficits in children with 
low achievements in the national curriculum at 7 years of age. Britisch Journal of 
Educational Psyhology, 70, 177-194. 
Groeger, J. A., Field, D., & Hammond, S. M. (1999). Measuring memory span. 
International Journal of Psychology, 34, 359-363. 
Hegarty, M., Shah, P., & Miyake, A. (2000). Constraints on using the dual-task 
methodology to specify the degree of central executive involvement in cognitive 
tasks. Memory & Cognition, 28, 376-385. 
Hinrichs, J.V.(1968). Prestimulus and poststimulus cueing of recall order in the 
memory span. Psychonomic Science, 12, 261 - 262. 
Isaacs, E.B., & Vargha-Khadem, F. (1989). Differential course of development of 
spatial and verbal memory span : A normative study. Britisch Journal of 
Developmental Psychology, 7, 377-380. 
EXECUTIVE DEMANDS OF A ONE-BACK CHOICE RT TASK     95 
Jensen, A. R., & Figueroa, R. A. (1975). Forward and backward digit span 
interaction with race and IQ - Predictions from Jensens theory. Journal of 
Educational Psychology,  67, 882-893. 
Klauer, K. C., & Stegmaier, R. (1997). Interference in immediate spatial memory: 
shifts of spatial attention or central-executive involvement? Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 50A, 79-99. 
Lezak, M. D. (1995). Neuropsychological assessment. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Logie, R. H. (1995). Visuo-spatial working memory. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 
Mammarella, N., Cornoldi, C., Donadello, E. (2003). Visual but not spatial working 
memory deficit in children with spina bifida. Brain and Cognition, 53, 311-314. 
Martin, A., Wiggs, C.L., Lalonde, F., & Mack, C. (1994). Word retrieval to letter 
and semantic cues - a double dissociation in normal subjects using interference 
tasks. Neuropsychologia,  32, 1487-1494. 
Miyake, A., Friedman, N. P., Emerson, M. J., Witzki, A. H., Howerter, A., & 
Wager, T. D. (2000). The unity and diversity of executive functions and their 
contributions to complex "frontal lobe" tasks: A latent variable analysis. Cognitive 
Psychology,  41, 49-100. 
Morris, N., & Jones, D. M. (1990). Memory updating in working memory: The role 
of the central executive. British Journal of Psychology, 81, 111-121. 
Nilsson, L.G., Wright,E., & Murdock,B.B. (1979). Order of recall, output 
interference, and the modality effect. Psychological Research, 41, 63-78. 
Parker, D. M., & Crawford, J. R. (1992).  Assessment of frontal lobe dysfunction. In 
J.R. Crawford, D. M. Parker, & W. M. McKinlay (Eds.),  A handbook of 
neuropsychological assessment. (pp. 267-291). Hove: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates Ltd. 
Phillips, L. H. (1997). Do "frontal tests" measure executive function?: Issues of 
assessment and evidence from fluency tests. In P. Rabbitt (Ed.), Methodology of 
Frontal and Executive Function. (pp. 191-214).  Hove, UK:  Psychology Press. 
Pollack, I., Johnson, L., & Knaft, P. (1959). Running memory span. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 57, 137-146. 
Rabbitt, P. (1997). Methodology of frontal and executive function. Hove, UK:  
Psychology Press. 
Reitan, R. M., & Wolfson, D. (1994). A selective and critical-review of 
neuropsychological deficits and the frontal lobes. Neuropsychology Review, 4, 
161-198. 
96     CHAPTER 3 
Rende, B., Ramsberger, G., & Miyake, A. (2002).  Commonalities and differences 
in the working memory components underlying letter and category fluency tasks: 
A dual-task investigation. Neuropsychology, 16, 309-321. 
Rosen, V.M., & Engle, R.W. (1997). Forward and Backward Serial Recall.  
Intelligence,  25, 37-47. 
Rowe, J. B., Toni, I., Josephs, O., Frackowiak, R. S. J., & Passingham, R. E. (2000).  
The prefrontal cortex: Response selection or maintenance within working 
memory? Science,  288, 1656-1660. 
Schofield, N. J., & Ashman, A. F. (1986). The relationship between digit span and 
cognitive processing across ability groups. Intelligence, 10, 59-73. 
Schubert, T. (1999). Processing differences between simple and choice reactions 
affect bottleneck localization in overlapping tasks. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology-Human Perception and Performance, 25, 408-425. 
Smith, E. E., & Jonides, J. (1997). Working memory: A view from neuroimaging. 
Cognitive Psychology, 33, 5-42. 
Smith, E. E., & Jonides, J. (1999). Storage and executive processes in the frontal 
lobes. Science, 283, 1657-1661. 
Smith-Spark, J. H., Fisk, J. E., Fawcett, A. J., & Nicolson, R. I. (2003).  
Investigating the central executive in adult dyslexics: Evidence from phonological 
and visuospatial working memory performance. European Journal of Cognitive 
Psychology,  15, 567-587. 
Smyth, M. M., & Scholey, K. A. (1992). Determining spatial span - the role of 
movement time and articulation rate. Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology,  45A, 479-501. 
Szmalec, A., Vandierendonck, A., Kemps, E. (in press). Response selection 
involves executive control: Evidence from the selective interference paradigm. 
Memory & Cognition. 
Toni, I., Thoenissen, D., & Zilles, K. (2001). Movement preparation and motor 
intention. Neuroimage,  14, S110-S117. 
Toni, I., Thoenissen, D., Zilles, K., & Niedeggen, M. (2002). Movement preparation 
and working memory: A behavioural dissociation. Experimental Brain Research, 
142, 158-162. 
Van der Linden, M., Collette, F., Salmon, E., Delfiore, G., Degueldre, C., Luxen, 
A., & Franck, G. (1999). The neural correlates of updating information in verbal 
working memory. Memory,  7, 549-560. 
Vandierendonck, A., De Vooght, G., & Van Der Goten, K. (1998a). Interfering with 
the Central Executive by means of a Random Interval Repetition task. Quarterly 
Journal of Experimental Psychology,  51A, 197-218. 
EXECUTIVE DEMANDS OF A ONE-BACK CHOICE RT TASK     97 
Vandierendonck, A., De Vooght, G., & Van Der Goten, K. (1998b). Does random 
time interval generation interfere with working memory executive functions? 
European Journal of Cognitive Psychology,  10, 413-442. 
Vandierendonck, A., Kemps, E., Fastame, M.C., & Szmalec, A. (2004). Working 
memory components of the Corsi blocks task. British Journal of Psychology, 95, 
57-79. 
Vandierendonck, A., & Szmalec, A. (in press). An asymmetry in the visuospatial 
demands of forward and backward recall in the Corsi blocks task. Imagination, 
Cognition and Personality. 
Vecchi, T., & Richardson, J.T.E. (2001). Measures of visuospatial short-term 
memory: The Knox cube imitation test and the Corsi blocks test compared. Brain 
and Cognition, 46, 291-294. 
Wheeler, M. E., & Treisman, A. M. (2002). Binding in short-term visual memory. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 131, 48-64. 
Wilde, N., & Strauss, E. (2002). Functional Equivalence of Wais-Iii/Wms-Iii Digit 
and Spatial Span Under Forward and Backward Recall Conditions. Clinical 
Neuropsychologist,  16, 322-330. 

 CHAPTER 4 
THE AMOUNT OF EXECUTIVE CONTROL INVOLVED IN 
A CHOICE RT TASK AS A FUNCTION OF            
RESPONSE CONFLICT 
Manuscript under revision1 
An increasing number of studies demonstrated that executive control is 
involved in a choice RT task. Based on the perceptual overlap/response 
conflict theory put forward by Nieuwenhuis, Yeung and Cohen (2004), the 
present Event Related brain Potential (ERP) study used the N2 as an 
electrophysiological marker of executive control in order to test the 
hypothesis that the amount of executive control involved in a choice RT task 
is a function of the degree of response conflict, as induced by the level of 
perceptual overlap among the stimuli. To this end, an experiment was 
designed in which 13 participants performed a simple and a choice RT task 
under three different levels of stimulus discriminability. The data revealed 
that the N2 observed in the ERPs associated with the choice RT task was 
amplified with increasing perceptual overlap, while no N2 component was 
observed in the simple RT task conditions. It is concluded that the executive 
demands of a choice RT task depend on the level of response conflict which 
is determined by the perceptual overlap between stimuli. In the discussion, 
the present conclusion is integrated into current theoretical accounts of 
executive involvement in choice reaction. 
                                                     
1 This paper was co-authored by Frederick Verbruggen, Wouter De Baene and 
André Vandierendonck 
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INTRODUCTION 
In research on executive control, often postulated executive processes such 
as inhibition or task switching have since long been measured by several 
variants of choice RT tasks, like the Go/Nogo task, conflict tasks such as the 
Stroop task or switching between choice RT tasks. In the mean time, both 
behavioral and electromyographic (EMG) studies have provided empirical 
support for the position that executive control is also involved in a speeded 
choice RT task where participants are only required to make a binary choice 
reaction based on a compatible (e.g. left pointing arrow = left) or neutral 
(e.g. circle = left) stimulus-response mapping (Allain, Carbonnell, Burle, 
Hasbroucq, & Vidal, 2004; Klauer & Stegmaier, 1997; Szmalec, 
Vandierendonck, & Kemps, in press). Whereas there is relative consensus 
about the sources of executive involvement in more complex variants of 
choice RT tasks like the Stroop task or the Go/Nogo task, it is at the moment 
less clear which central processing demands (or which so-called executive 
function(s)) are responsible for the cognitive control exerted in the basic 
variants of the choice RT task.  
Recently, Carbonnell, Hasbroucq, Grapperon and Vidal (2004) observed 
EMG and electrophysiological markers of inhibition in a binary choice RT 
task, which indicate that response inhibition is involved in a choice reaction 
in order to suppress the activation of the incorrect response, so that the 
correct response can be executed (see also Burle, Vidal, Tandonnet, & 
Hasbroucq, in press). If inhibition of incorrect response activation is a source 
of executive involvement in a choice RT task, it can be assumed that the 
amount of executive control exerted in a choice RT task is a function of the 
degree of activation of the erroneous response, or in other words, a function 
of the degree of response conflict between the activated response 
alternatives. The present study uses the N2 component of the ERP to test this 
assumption. 
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In ERP studies of cognitive control, the N2 is a usually observed negative 
deflection of the stimulus-locked ERP with a frontocentral topography. It is 
assumed to be produced by activation of the anterior cingulated cortex 
(ACC), a brain structure that is believed to play a predominant role in 
executive or cognitive control (see Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004, for a 
review). To date, no consensus was reached on which cognitive processes 
are reflected by the N2: some researchers argue that it reflects response 
inhibition (e.g. Falkenstein, Hoormann, & Hohnsbein, 1999; Kok, 1986), 
while others see it as an index of response conflict (Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, 
Van den Wildenberg, & Ridderinkhof; 2003). Nevertheless, there is general 
agreement that the N2 is a marker of general cognitive control. In an ERP 
study of the Go/Nogo task, Nieuwenhuis, Yeung and Cohen (2004) showed 
that the usually observed N2 modulation associated with Nogo trials depends 
on the degree of perceptual overlap (or discriminability) between the Go and 
Nogo stimuli. More precisely, when Go and Nogo stimuli are easily 
discriminable, N2 amplitudes for Go and Nogo trials are comparable. 
Conversely, when the perceptual overlap between both kinds of trials is 
high, the classic Go/Nogo N2 modulation can be observed, i.e. higher N2 
amplitude for the Nogo trials. Nieuwenhuis et al. (2004) explained their 
findings, regarding Nogo N2 mediation by perceptual overlap, in terms of 
response conflict. When Go and Nogo stimuli are hard to discriminate (i.e. 
high perceptual overlap), the Go response is also undeservedly activated 
when a Nogo trial is presented, which results in a conflict between the Go 
and the Nogo response, as reflected by an N2 amplification.  
Based on the perceptual overlap rationale delineated by Nieuwenhuis et al. 
(2004), the purpose of the present ERP study is to test the hypothesis that the 
amount of executive control involved in an RT task with binary choice 
reactions is determined by the degree of response conflict induced by 
perceptual overlap between two stimuli. In a choice RT task involving 
binary choice reactions, the perceptual overlap between the stimuli is 
arbitrary. And even when two stimuli are subjectively reported to be “easily” 
discriminable, it remains plausible that response conflict is induced to some 
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extent. Accordingly, the aim of the present study is to demonstrate that in an 
elementary choice RT task, which does not involve inhibition of prepotent 
responses and which uses a neutral stimulus-response mapping, the degree of 
perceptual overlap determines the executive load of the task. 
In order to address this research issue, an experiment was designed which 
evaluates the effects of perceptual overlap on the N2 amplitude of a simple 
and a choice RT task. Previous research has shown that a choice RT task 
puts higher demands on executive control than a simple RT task does 
(Szmalec at al., in press). One possible reason for this is the presence of 
response conflict in a choice RT task. If such response conflict, which varies 
with perceptual overlap and is reflected by N2 amplitude, is responsible for 
the increased executive demands of a choice RT task compared to a simple 
RT task, the following predictions can be formulated. First, knowing that 
more executive control is involved in a choice RT task than in a simple RT 
task, the N2 amplitude is expected to be higher in the choice than in the 
simple RT task. Second, N2 amplitude is predicted to increase with 
perceptual overlap in the choice RT task conditions, but not in the simple RT 
task conditions because the response conflict is assumed not to be present in 
a simple RT task in which by definition all stimuli lead to the same response. 
METHOD 
Participants. Thirteen right-handed participants (6 females and 7 males) 
between the age of 19 and 26 years (mean = 22.50 years) were remunerated 
for taking part in the study. All participants had normal hearing and they 
reported being free from neurological or psychiatric problems. 
Design and Stimuli. Participants were subjected to a 2 (Task: simple vs. 
choice RT task) x 3 (Perceptual Overlap: hard vs. intermediate vs. easy 
discriminability) within-subject design, in a sound-attenuated and 
electrically shielded room. The stimuli for the choice RT task depended on 
the degree of perceptual overlap: in the condition with hard discriminability, 
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the first sound was 262 Hz and the second sound 262 Hz + the Just Notable 
Difference (in Hz), assessed at individual level (see Procedure). In the easy 
condition, participants performed choice reactions between sounds of 262 
and 524 Hz (difference of one octave). In the condition with intermediate 
discriminability, sounds of 262 and 376 Hz where presented, where the latter 
is the logarithmic midpoint between 262 and 524 Hz (discriminability is a 
logarithmic function of the frequency difference). All sounds were 150 msec 
sinusoidal tones, binaurally presented through a headphone at approximately 
60 dB SPL. 
Procedure. Prior to the counterbalanced experimental conditions, we 
determined the Just Notable Difference (JND) at 262 Hz for each participant 
individually, by using the psychophysical method of constant stimuli 
(Fechner, 1860). Piloting work suggested that, for the audio parameters and 
apparatus used in the present study, perfect discriminability for normal 
hearing and musically untrained subjects could be obtained within a range of 
28 Hz from the 262 Hz base sound. Accordingly, stimulus pairs were 
constructed which consisted of the 262 Hz base sound and a deviant up to 
290 Hz (262 + 28) in steps of 2 Hz. This resulted in a set of 14 sound pairs, 
which were each presented 20 times in a random order. Participants were 
asked to judge whether they heard a difference between the two sounds in 
the pair. Then, the JND for this study was determined as the difference in 
frequency which was recognized in 90% of the trials. A lower percentage 
would probably produce too low an accuracy and consequently too 
important a loss of EEG epochs. 
After the JND assessment, participants rested for 20 minutes, during which 
they were prepared for the EEG recording. Then, they went through the six 
counterbalanced conditions of the experimental design. In each condition, 3 
blocks of 120 sounds were presented, which makes a total of 360 sounds per 
condition. In the choice RT task, participants were instructed to make a left-
right response on a response box, as a function of the frequency of the 
sound. The high tone was mapped to the right key of the response box, the 
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low tone to the left key. For the simple RT task, which requires a simple 
reaction independent of the frequency of the sounds, 180 trials where 
responded to with the right hand, the other half with the left hand. In order to 
prevent that in the simple RT task, participants would respond based on 
anticipation, rather than responding to the stimulus, we used pseudo-random 
inter-stimulus intervals (ISIs) of 900 and 1500 msec, with the constraint that 
no more than three consecutive intervals were of equal duration. Also the 
randomness of the identity of the sounds was restricted so that no more than 
three consecutive sounds were of equal frequency. Between each condition, 
participants rested for five minutes and halfway the experiment, they had a 
15 minutes break with the opportunity to drink water. The entire procedure 
lasted approximately three hours. 
EEG recordings. EEG was continuously recorded (bandpass 0.8 – 30 Hz; 
sample rate = 250 Hz) with tin electrodes at 13 scalp locations (Fz, Cz, Pz, 
F8, F7, F4, F3, C4, C3, P4, P3, Fp1 and Fp2) of the 10-20 International 
System, referenced to the nose and with the forehead serving as ground. In 
order to detect records contaminated with eye movements and blinks, 
vertical EOG was monitored above the right eye, horizontal EOG at the 
outer canthus of the right eye. All impedances were below 5 kΩ. All 
recordings were performed with InstEP hard- and software (Ottawa, Ontario, 
Canada). 
EEG analysis. Trials with a reaction time of less than 100 msec in the 
simple RT task conditions and less than 150 msec in the choice RT task 
conditions were regarded as anticipations and hence excluded from further 
analyses. Similarly, choice RT task trials on which participants made an 
incorrect choice reaction were discarded. EEG and EOG were filtered with a 
1-20 Hz bandpass filter. The EEG and EOG were divided into epochs of 
1000 msec time locked to the onset of each stimulus including a 200 msec 
pre-stimulus baseline. Epochs with amplitude values exceeding ± 75 µV 
relative to the baseline at any electrode were also discarded. The remaining 
epochs were averaged per condition. 
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A dominant frontal topography was obtained for the N2 component. The 
amplitude and latency of the component were assessed in a 200-400 msec 
range, by a computer-assisted peak-picking routine. The amplitude of the 
peaks was scored for each participant by determining the maximum 
amplitude in the corresponding time-window, and the latency was scored at 
the maximum amplitude. Both computer-assisted peak-picking and visual 
inspection failed to recognize an N2 component in the simple RT task 
conditions. 
Statistical analysis. The data from one male subject were discarded from the 
statistical analyses because in the EEG analysis, 82% of his trails were 
rejected due to excessive eye-movements. For the other 12 participants, an 
average of 24% of the trials was rejected due to eye-movements. Behavioral 
data, N2 latency and N2 amplitude were analyzed by means of repeated 
measures analyses of variance with the factors Task (simple vs. choice RT 
task) and Perceptual Overlap (hard vs. intermediate vs. easy 
discriminability). 
RESULTS 
JND Estimation. With respect to the JND estimation at 262 Hz, all 
participants reached perfect discriminability within the 28 Hz range. The 
mean difference at which 90% of the trials was judged different was 16.83 
Hz (SD = 5.42). 
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Behavioral Results. Mean speed and accuracy data, as a function of the 
factors Task and Perceptual Overlap, are represented in Figure 1. The main 
Figure 1. Mean speed (upper panel) and accuracy (lower panel) data 
for the simple and the choice RT tasks at the different levels of 
Perceptual Overlap. Vertical bars denote .95 confidence intervals. 
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effects of Task and Perceptual Overlap on the reaction times were 
significant, F(1, 11) = 166.02, p < .001 and F(2, 22) = 7.83, p < .01, 
respectively, as was the interaction, F(2, 22) = 15.28, p < .001. Planned 
comparisons revealed that for the choice RT task conditions, reaction times 
in the condition with hard discriminability were slower than in the condition 
with intermediate discriminability, F(1, 11) = 11.17, p < .01, while reaction 
times in the conditions with intermediate and easy discriminability were 
performed equally fast, F < 1. Perceptual Overlap had no significant effect 
on the speed of the simple reactions, F(2, 22) = 1.84, p > .10. A similar 
pattern of results was observed for the accuracy data. 
Electrophysiological Results. The mean amplitude and latency of the N2 as 
a function of Perceptual Overlap in the choice RT task conditions are 
presented in Table 1. The stimulus locked ERPs at the frontal scalp site, as a 
function of Task and Perceptual Overlap, are displayed in Figure 2. 
N2 Latency. As described in the EEG analysis section, an N2 peak did not 
occur in the simple RT task conditions. In the choice RT task conditions, N2 
latency was comparable for all three levels of Perceptual Overlap, F < 1. 
N2 Amplitude. N2 amplitude differed as a function of Perceptual Overlap, 
F(2, 22) = 5.38, p < .05. Further planned comparisons revealed that the 
difference in N2 amplitude between the choice RT task conditions with hard 
and intermediate discriminability was significant, F(1, 11) = 8.55, p < .01, 
while the difference between the intermediate and easy condition was not 
significant, F < 1. The difference in N2 amplitude between the choice RT 
task conditions with hard and easy discriminability was significant, F(1, 11) 
= 5.53, p < .05. 
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Figure 2: Stimulus-locked ERPs at Fz 
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DISCUSSION 
Based on earlier findings which support the position that cognitive control 
(as reflected by the N2 component of the ERP) involved in a Go/Nogo task 
is mediated by a response conflict as induced by the perceptual overlap 
between the Nogo and the Go stimuli, it was hypothesized that the cognitive 
control exerted in a basic speeded choice RT task (no prepotent responses, 
neutral stimulus-response mapping) also depends on the degree of perceptual 
overlap between the stimuli. Accordingly, an experiment was designed in 
which the N2 amplitude was evaluated while participants performed a single 
and a choice RT task under three different levels of perceptual overlap (or 
discriminability). 
The behavioral results showed that a binary choice reaction was significantly 
slower and less accurate when the stimuli were hard to discriminate 
compared to when they were moderately or easily discriminable. The speed 
and accuracy of simple reactions were unaffected by the perceptual overlap 
between the stimuli. With respect to the electrophysiological results, we 
observed a pattern of N2 modulation in the choice RT task that ran parallel 
to the behavioral data. More precisely, the N2 amplitude in the condition 
with high perceptual overlap was significantly higher than in the conditions 
with intermediate and little perceptual overlap. Based on the assumption that 
                                               Perceptual Overlap (Discriminability) 
 Hard Intermediate Easy 
Latency (msec) 262 (39) 262 (37) 257 (32) 
Amplitude (µV) -3.40 (2.21) -2.59 (2.13) -2.64 (2.42) 
Table 1. Mean N2 latency and amplitude as a function of Perceptual Overlap in the choice 
RT task conditions. Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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the N2 is a marker of general cognitive processes, the present ERP study 
supports earlier evidence for executive involvement in a binary choice RT 
task. But most importantly, on account of the perceptual overlap/response 
conflict rationale put forward by Nieuwenhuis et al. (2004), we conclude 
that the extent to which control is involved in a choice RT task depends on 
the degree of response conflict resulting from the level of perceptual overlap 
between the stimuli. 
A first point that deserves some attention is the finding that no N2 could be 
detected in the simple RT task conditions. On the one hand, this finding is 
not surprising given the observed average simple reaction times of 
approximately 200 msec and given that the N2 is known to occur around 
200-400 msec after stimulus onset (Bruin, Wijers, & van Staveren, 2001). 
But also in theoretical terms, it can be argued that an ERP component 
indicating response conflict or inhibition is not likely to be found in simple 
reactions, where all stimuli lead to the same response. On the other hand, 
some studies have reported an N2 component in a simple RT task. 
Falkenstein, Hohnsbein and Hoormann (1993), for example, observed an N2 
around 230 msec in a simple RT task in which participants reacted in 250 
msec on average. The different findings might be due to methodological 
differences between Falkenstein et al.’s study and the present one. 
Participants in the Falkenstein et al. study were required to make simple 
reactions on letters, presented either visually or auditory within blocks, 
which means that a continuous within-block modality switch was required. 
Based on the evidence for N2 amplification during task switching in general 
(Swainson, Cunnington, Jackson, Rorden, Peters, Morris et al., 2003) it 
cannot be excluded that the dimensional switch in the Falkenstein et al. study  
might have produced the observed N2. In any case, the absence of an N2 in 
the present simple RT task conditions is an important finding. As far as the 
N2 is concerned, it means that cognitive control is not measurably involved 
in a simple RT task and that any information processing involving a choice 
reaction requires cognitive control (Carbonnell et al., 2004). 
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Next, a theoretical account of executive involvement in a choice RT task will 
be formulated, on the basis of both the present and earlier findings. As 
described in the introduction, there exists EMG and behavioral evidence for 
the involvement of general cognitive control mechanisms in a choice RT 
task. In addition to this, a number of studies observed EMG and ERP 
indicators of response inhibition in the same task, which makes response 
inhibition a source or maybe the source of executive involvement in the 
choice RT task. The present experiment provided ERP evidence in support 
of the position that the extent of executive control exerted in a choice RT 
task, depends on the degree of perceptual overlap between the stimuli. In our 
view, these findings can be integrated as follows. In a choice RT task, a 
response must be selected as a function of the identity of a stimulus. When a 
target stimulus is presented, the response alternatives are activated 
(Carbonnell et al., 2004) and a state of response conflict is induced. This 
conflict situation is detected, presumably at the level of the ACC, and top-
down control is engaged to resolve this conflict (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, 
Carter, & Cohen, 2001). Carbonnell et al.’s (2004) findings suggest that 
response inhibition is presumably the cognitive control mechanism which 
suppresses the activation of the erroneous response alternatives (see also 
Burle et al., in press). Presumably, the amount of inhibition or cognitive 
control that must be exerted is not a constant but it depends on the degree of 
activation of the incorrect response alternatives or in other words, on the 
degree of response conflict. Now, Nieuwenhuis et al. (2004) and the present 
findings suggest that response conflict or the difference in activation 
between the correct and incorrect response is a function of the degree of 
perceptual overlap between the stimuli. Hence, the conclusion that the 
amount of executive control (or response inhibition according to Carbonnell 
et al., 2004; Burle et al., in press) exerted in a choice RT task is related to the 
level of perceptual overlap, is straightforward. Thus, when a person for 
example performs a choice reaction between two hardly discriminable 
stimuli, both response alternatives are highly activated and a severe response 
conflict is induced. Hence, top-down control imposes high demands on 
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response inhibition in order to suppress the activation of the erroneous 
alternative, so that the correct response can be executed. In such a centrally 
demanding situation, a higher N2 is expected, irrespective of whether it 
specifically reflects the response conflict or the response inhibition. 
It should finally be noted that in the present study, we used the N2 as a 
marker of cognitive control because, like earlier studies (e.g. Nieuwenhuis et 
al., 2004), also the present experiment does not allow to dissociate the 
response inhibition and response conflict accounts of the N2. But that does 
not undermine the main claim of this study, which states that the amount of 
executive control required to perform a choice reaction is related to the 
degree of response conflict induced by the perceptual overlap between the 
task stimuli. This conclusion implies that the physical resemblance between 
stimuli can have important cognitive implications and that researchers 
should be aware of these implications when determining stimulus 
parameters. At the same time, the present finding corroborates the view that 
any task requiring choice reaction also involves some degree of cognitive 
control to handle the response conflict. 
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 CHAPTER 5 
EXPLORING THE SOURCES OF EXECUTIVE 
INVOLVEMENT IN A ONE-BACK CHOICE RT TASK 
Work in progress12 
INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 3 of this dissertation, we introduced the one-back choice RT task 
with auditory stimuli and estimated the executive demands of this task by 
means of the selective interference paradigm, within Baddeley’s (1986) 
Working Memory framework. It was concluded that the one-back choice RT 
task demands more executive control than a standard choice RT task and that 
the effects of the one-back task do not seem to be contaminated by the slave 
systems. In this chapter, we attempt to further clarify the finding that the 
requirement to delay a choice reaction until the onset of the next stimulus 
(one-back) is an operation that involves executive control. It is at this point 
unclear what the source of this executive involvement is.  
One of the hypotheses we have put forward in Chapter 3 is that the 
additional executive demands of the one-back choice RT task – compared to 
the standard choice RT task – originate from a temporal overlap between the 
processing of two consecutive one-back choice reactions. As can be seen in 
Figure 1, this temporal overlap lays in the fact that stimulus X is already 
presented before the response to stimulus X-1 is terminated. The question 
the present study addresses is whether this temporal overlap produces a 
                                                     
1 In collaboration with Ans Vercammen, Frederick Verbruggen and André 
Vandierendonck. 
2 One important future direction of the research project outlined in this dissertation 
is aimed to gain an insight into the cognitive processes involved in a one-back 
choice RT task. Chapter 5 presents early results from recent empirical work that is a 
first step in addressing this issue. 
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competition between the cognitive processing associated with the choice 
reactions to stimulus X-1 and stimulus X.  
In essence, stimulus X in a one-back choice RT task functions as a trigger 
for the response to stimulus X-1. But at the same time, the identity of 
stimulus X is relevant since participants know that a response on stimulus X 
is required on presentation of stimulus X+1. This implies that at a certain 
moment in time, also the cognitive processing of (trigger) stimulus X must 
begin and the key question is whether this occurs before or after the reaction 
on stimulus X-1 is terminated? Or to put it differently: is stimulus X 
instantly processed or is its processing delayed until the reaction to stimulus 
X-1 has been given? On the one hand, participants might process (trigger) 
stimulus X after the previous choice reaction (i.e. on stimulus X-1) has been 
completed. The observation that a one-back choice reaction lasts 
approximately 450 msec (Chapter 3) would in the latter case imply that the 
cognitive processing of stimulus X is initiated only 450 msec after its onset 
and that participants have to rely on perceptual (echoic) memory in order to 
bridge this period. On the other hand, participants might not be able to 
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the standard choice RT task (CRT) and the one-
back choice RT task (CRT-1), in which three successive trials are presented (stimuli X-1, 
X and X-1). In this example, the three subsequent stimuli are a low pitch tone (S1), a high 
pitch tone (S2) and again a low pitch tone. R1 and R2 represent a reaction to an S1 
stimulus and to an S2 stimulus, respectively. 
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efficiently bridge the 450 msec delay period relying on echoic memory and 
they might thus process stimulus X immediately after its presentation, i.e. 
prior to the response execution associated with stimulus X-1. The immediate 
processing of stimulus X would then offer the possibility to construct a more 
decay-resistant representation of task-relevant information (e.g. a memory 
representation rather than a sensory representation of the stimulus) in order 
to bridge the 450 msec period prior to the X-1 response. It should be noted 
that the latter account has important implications for the executive demands 
of the task. If the processing of stimulus X is engaged while the processing 
of stimulus X-1 is not yet finished (at least the response has not been 
executed), a cognitive conflict situation is likely to occur. The reason is that 
the processing of stimulus X might produce irrelevant S-R information that 
can conflict with the processing of stimulus X-1, analogous to effects of 
irrelevant stimuli or irrelevant stimulus dimensions observed in conflict tasks 
such as the Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) or the Stroop task 
(Stroop, 1935; MacLead, 1991), respectively. 
Accordingly, the present experiment was designed to investigate whether 
participants in a one-back choice RT task start the cognitive processing of 
stimulus X before the reaction to stimulus X-1 is terminated. It is supposed 
that the additional executive demands of a one-back choice RT task, 
compared to a standard choice RT task, are due to a cognitive conflict that 
arises from this overlap between the processing of subsequent stimuli. To 
this end, behavioral measures were complemented with three 
electrophysiological measures (the N2, the P3 and also the LRP). They are 
discussed in more detail below. 
The N2 is a negative deflection of the Event Related brain Potential (ERP) 
with a frontocentral topography, which peaks around 200-400 msec after the 
onset of the stimulus. It is believed to reflect activation of the Anterior 
Cingulate Cortex (ACC; Liotti, Woldorff, Perez, & Mayberg, 2000). The N2 
component is a widely used measure of executive control (Nieuwenhuis, 
Yeung, & Cohen, 2004). In the task switching paradigm for example, it has 
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been demonstrated that N2 amplitude is larger for task alternation trials 
compared to task repetition trials (Swainson, Cunnington, Jackson, Rorden, 
Peters, Morris, et al., 2003). In the inhibition literature, it is a well replicated 
finding that suppression of prepotent responses, such as in a Go/Nogo task, 
is reflected by N2 amplification (Falkenstein, Hoormann, & Hohnsbein, 
1999). The most acknowledged theoretical account of the N2 is that it is an 
ERP correlate of response conflict (Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004). This 
is evidenced by broad empirical support for the position that N2 amplitude 
increases as a function of the amount of response conflict in several 
cognitive tasks (e.g. Eriksen flanker task, Go/Nogo task, Stroop task).  
The second electrophysiological measure that was investigated in relation to 
the one-back choice RT task is the classical P3 (or P3b). The P3 component 
is a positive deflection with a parietal distribution. There is general 
agreement that P3 does not reflect activity of one particular brain structure 
but rather the activity of various distributed brain areas (Kok, 2001). Most 
researchers agree that the P3 is associated with stimulus-related, rather than 
response-related processing and in this regard, the component is assumed to 
be evoked when the evaluation of a stimulus is terminated (Doucet & 
Stelmack, 1999). In most ERP studies, the P3 is used as a general marker of 
cognitive processing whose amplitude reflects the mental activity that is 
invested in a task. Particularly relevant for the present study is the fact that 
P3 amplitude is known to decrease when the attentional load of a task 
increases (Joppich, Dauper, Dengler, Johannes, Rodriguez-Fornelis, & 
Munte, 2004; Kok, 2001). In this context, reduced P3 amplitude is assumed 
to indicate a greater consumption of attentional resources (Joppich et al., 
2004). 
A third ERP measure that was used in this study is the Lateralized Readiness 
Potential (LRP). The LRP is a negative shift in the EEG of the motor cortex 
that precedes motor activity. It has been considered a sensitive measure of 
motor activation or preparation (Coles, 1989; Miller & Hackley, 1992). In 
the present study, the LRP was used in order to trace the time course of 
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motor activation in the one-back choice RT task. As will be described in 
what follows, according to the movement preparation literature, the 
requirement to delay a response until the onset of the following stimulus 
might have implications at the level of the LRP. An important line of 
research in the movement preparation literature is the precuing technique 
initially put forward by Rosenbaum (1980, 1983). In Rosenbaum’s precuing 
paradigm, a cue that is presented prior to the onset of a target stimulus, may 
provide the (or part of the) defining parameters of the required response, 
allowing (partial) movement preparation. It has been demonstrated that also 
precues elicit an LRP, which is called the foreperiod LRP (e.g., Wild-Wall, 
Sangals, Sommer, & Leuthold, 2003), referring to the fact that it occurs in 
the period between the precue and the target stimulus. In addition, a number 
of studies showed that the amplitude of the foreperiod LRP is a function of 
the degree of stimulus information that is contained in the precue (Leuthold, 
Sommer, & Ulrich, 1996; Ulrich, Leuthold, & Sommer, 1998). More 
precisely, when the precue is fully informative about the forthcoming target 
stimulus, foreperiod LRP amplitude is larger compared to when the precue 
only provides a restricted number of parameters of the target stimulus. 
Another important finding in movement preparation research is that the 
presence of precue information shortens the motor part of the reaction time 
on the target stimulus (e.g. Müller-Gethmann, Rinkenauer, Stahl, & Ulrich, 
2000). This is evidenced by the observation that in the response-locked 
lateralized motor potentials, the onset of the late LRP is delayed when 
stimulus-information is precued (i.e. when a foreperiod LRP is elicited) 
compared to when no precues are available. The reason why these LRP 
findings associated with movement preparation are summarized here, is 
because the one-back choice RT task in principle permits motor preparation. 
If we regard stimulus X-1 in the one-back choice RT task as a (fully 
informative) precue for the response that is required after presentation of 
stimulus X, motor preparation should be possible. 
For the current research goals, an experiment was designed in which the 
ERP correlates mentioned before were measured during a standard choice 
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RT task and a one-back choice RT task with auditory stimuli. In addition, 
the perceptual overlap of the stimuli was manipulated in two levels: easy and 
hard discriminability. A few studies (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004; Chapter 4) 
have demonstrated that increasing the perceptual overlap of stimuli in a 
choice RT task (i.e. decreasing the perceptual discriminability) increases the 
amplitude of the N2 component. This finding was explained in terms of 
response conflict theory which supposes that under conditions of high 
perceptual overlap, the incorrect response is more activated than under 
conditions of low perceptual overlap. Accordingly, a stronger response 
conflict (between the correct and incorrect responses) is induced under 
conditions of high perceptual overlap, as evidenced by N2 amplification. 
The perceptual overlap manipulation was implemented in the present 
experimental design in order to investigate whether N2 amplitude varies 
with stimulus discriminability, not only in the standard choice RT task but 
also in the one-back choice RT task. The occurrence of a response conflict in 
the interval between the presentation of stimulus X and the response to 
stimulus X-1 would be supportive of the assumption that (trigger) stimulus X 
is instantly processed to the level of response activation, concurrently with 
the final processing of the previous stimulus X-1.  
In view of the research issue that is addressed in the present study, we 
hypothesize that participants in a one-back choice RT task engage cognitive 
processing of stimulus X before the response to stimulus X-1 has been 
terminated, so that a cognitive conflict is anticipated to occur. If this 
assumption is correct, the following predictions regarding the 
electrophysiological correlates of the one-back task should be confirmed. 
First, if (trigger) stimulus X in the one-back choice RT task is instantly 
processed (i.e. the cognitive processing of stimulus X is not delayed until the 
response on X-1 is made), and this early processing proceeds until the stage 
of response activation, we predict that response conflict will be detectable in 
the one-back task by means of an effect of perceptual overlap on N2 
amplitude, similarly to what has been found in a standard choice RT task 
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(Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004; Chapter 4). At the same time, we anticipate that 
by analogy with motor preparation findings, the final motor activation for 
response X (which is then after presentation of stimulus X+1) will benefit 
from the early processing of stimulus X that has occurred prior to the 
response to stimulus X-1. This should be reflected in a delayed response 
locked late LRP onset for the one-back choice RT task (Müller-Gethmann et 
al., 2003; Wild-Wall et al., 2003). Second, if cognitive processing of 
stimulus X begins prior to response X-1 (see previous prediction), we 
anticipate a conflict to occur between the information processing of stimulus 
X and stimulus X-1. In that case, larger N2 amplitude is expected in the one-
back choice RT task than in the standard choice RT task. The third 
prediction concerns the amplitude of the P3 component. It has been 
demonstrated that P3 amplitude is smaller in those tasks that consume more 
executive resources (Joppich et al., 2004; Kok, 2001). In this view and based 
on earlier evidence for higher executive demands in a one-back than in a 
standard choice RT task, we expect P3 amplitude to be smallest in the one-
back task. It should finally be noted that no straightforward prediction is 
made regarding a potential foreperiod LRP in the one-back task, although 
this EEG measure is known to be involved in motor preparation. The reason 
is that in the one-back task, foreperiod LRP (provided that it does occur) as 
well as late LRP are presumed to be elicited at about the same time: the 
foreperiod LRP associated with stimulus X should logically coincide with 
the response activation related to stimulus X-1. By consequence, the 
examination of foreperiod LRP will be on an exploratory basis. 
METHOD 
Participants. Fourteen right-handed participants (7 females and 7 males) 
were remunerated for taking part in the study. All participants reported being 
free from neurological or psychiatric problems, had normal hearing and 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. One male subject was discarded from 
the sample because more than 80% of his data were rejected for excessive 
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artifacts. The mean age of the remaining thirteen participants was 25.38 
years, ranging from 21 to 31 years.  
Design and Stimuli. Participants were subjected to a 2 (Task: standard vs. 
one-back choice RT task) x 2 (Perceptual Overlap: hard vs. easy 
discriminability) within-subject design. The four conditions were 
manipulated between blocks and the order of the blocks was 
counterbalanced across subjects. The Perceptual Overlap manipulation was 
obtained as follows: in the (standard choice RT task and one-back choice RT 
task) conditions with hard discriminability, the first sound was 262 Hz and 
the second sound 262 Hz + the Just Notable Difference (in Hz), assessed at 
individual level (see Procedure). In the conditions with easy 
discriminability, participants performed standard and one-back choice 
reactions between sounds of 262 and 524 Hz (difference of one octave). All 
sounds were 150 msec sinusoidal tones, binaurally presented through a 
headphone at approximately 60 dB SPL.  
Procedure. Prior to the counterbalanced experimental conditions, the Just 
Notable Difference (JND) at 262 Hz was measured for each participant 
individually by using the psychophysical method of constant stimuli 
(Fechner, 1860). To this end, stimulus pairs were constructed which 
consisted of a 262 Hz base sound and a variable deviant sound. This deviant 
sound measured between 0 and 28 Hz (in steps of 2 Hz) more than the 262 
Hz base sound. This resulted in a set of 14 sound pairs, which were each 
presented 20 times in a random order. Participants were required to judge 
whether they heard a difference between the two sounds in the pair. For this 
study, we assigned the participants’ difference threshold at the level of 
discriminability that was reported to be different in 90% of the trials. It was 
decided not to use a lower percentage in order to avoid too low an accuracy 
and consequently too important a loss of EEG epochs in the actual 
experiment. 
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After the JND assessment, participants practiced both RT tasks until they 
met a criterion of consecutively 20 correct (standard and one-back) choice 
reactions. Then, they rested for 20 minutes, during which they were prepared 
for the EEG recording. Next, the participants went through the four 
counterbalanced conditions of the experimental design. In each condition, 3 
blocks of 120 sounds were presented, which makes a total of 360 sounds per 
condition and thus a total of 1440 experimental trials. In the standard choice 
RT task, a left-right response on a response box was required, based on the 
pitch of the sound. The high tone was mapped to the right key of the 
response box, the low tone to the left key. In the one-back choice RT task, 
participants were demanded to delay the choice reaction until the occurrence 
of the next stimulus or in other words to respond to the pitch of the previous 
sound (one-back). In order to avoid anticipations, especially in the one-back 
choice RT task, pseudo-random inter-stimulus intervals (ISIs) of 1500 and 
2500 msec were used. Between each condition, participants rested for five 
minutes and halfway the experimental blocks, they were offered a 15 
minutes break with the opportunity to drink water. The entire experimental 
procedure lasted approximately three hours. 
EEG recordings. The electroencephalogram was continuously recorded 
(bandpass 0.8 – 30 Hz; sample rate = 512 Hz with Ag/AgCl electrodes at 19 
scalp locations (Fp1, Fp2, AFz, F3, Fz, F4, FC3, FCz, FC4, C3, Cz, C4, 
CP3, CPz, CP4, P3, Pz, P4 and Oz) of the 10-20 International System. 
Horizontal EOG was recorded at the outer canthi and vertical EOG above 
and below the left eye. The ground electrode was placed on the forehead. All 
impedances were kept below 5 kΩ. 
EEG analysis. Trials with a reaction time of less than 150 msec in the 
standard choice RT task conditions and less than 100 msec in the one-back 
choice RT task conditions were regarded as anticipations and excluded from 
further analyses. Similarly, trials on which participants made an incorrect 
choice reaction were discarded (cfr. Behavioral results). EEG and EOG were 
filtered with a 1-20 Hz bandpass filter. For the stimulus-locked analyses, the 
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EEG and EOG were divided into epochs of 1200 msec time locked to the 
onset of each stimulus and referred to a 200 msec pre-stimulus baseline. For 
the response-locked analyses, the epochs started 800 msec before until 200 
msec after the response was given. The 200 msec response-locked baseline 
ran from 1000 msec until 800 msec prior to the response. Epochs with 
amplitude values exceeding ± 75 µV relative to the baseline at any electrode 
were discarded. The remaining epochs were averaged per condition. 
The N2 and P3 components of the ERP were examined on the frontal (Fz) 
and parietal (Pz) scalp sites, respectively. The amplitude and latency of the 
components were assessed by a computer-assisted peak-picking routine in 
the 200-400 msec range for the N2 and in the 200-500 msec range for the 
P3. The amplitude of the peaks was scored for each participant by 
determining the maximum amplitude in the corresponding time-window, and 
the latency was scored at the maximum amplitude. The LRP was defined as 
the difference between the electrodes (C3 and C4) ipsi- and contralateral to 
the responding hand over the primary motor cortices (i.e. ((C3-C4)right + (C4-
C3)left)/2), calculated per participant, per condition at the average C3 and C4 
waveforms. The amplitude of the LRP was assessed by a computer-assisted 
peak-picking routine and the LRP onset was defined at 50% of the maximum 
value of the LRP observed in the condition (Mordkoff & Gianaros, 2000). 
Statistical analysis. Behavioral data, N2 and P3 amplitudes and latencies as 
well as LRP amplitudes and onsets were analyzed by means of repeated 
measures analyses of variance with the factors Task (standard vs. one-back 
choice RT task) and Perceptual Overlap (hard vs. easy discriminability). 
RESULTS 
JND estimation. All participants reached the point of 100% reported 
discriminability within the 28 Hz range above 262Hz. The mean 90% 
difference threshold at 262Hz was 14.42 Hz (SD = 4.07).  
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Behavioral results. Mean speed and accuracy data, as a function of the 
factors Task and Perceptual Overlap, are represented in Figure 2. With 
respect to the latencies, we observed significant main effects of Task and 
Perceptual Overlap and a significant interaction of both factors, F(1, 12) = 
7.25, p < .05, F(1, 12) = 22.81, p < .001, and F(1, 12) = 22.55, p < .001, 
respectively. Planned comparisons showed that standard choice reactions 
were performed faster when the sounds were easily discriminable compared 
to when they were hard to discriminate, F(1, 12) = 67.89, p < .001. The one-
back choice RT task however was performed equally fast under both 
conditions of discriminability, F(1, 12) = 1.09, p > .30. Regarding the 
accuracy data, we observed significant main effects of Task and Perceptual 
Overlap, F(1, 12) = 16.66, p < .01 and F(1, 12) = 11.59, p < .01, 
respectively. The lack of interaction between both factors points towards a 
similar decline in accuracy for both RT tasks when the stimuli were hard to 
discriminate, F(1, 12) = 2.18, p > .10. 
Electrophysiological results. N2. The grand average stimulus-locked ERPs 
at the Fz frontal scalp site, as a function of Task and Perceptual Overlap, are 
displayed in Figure 3. Neither of the main effects (Task, F < 1, Perceptual 
Overlap, F(1, 12) = 1.38, p > .20), nor the interaction between both factors, 
F < 1, on N2 latency was significant. With respect to the N2 amplitude data, 
we observed a significant main effect of Perceptual Overlap, F(1, 12) = 
15.37, p < .01, while the main effect of Task and the interaction between 
Task and Perceptual Overlap were not significant (both F’s < 1). Planned 
comparisons revealed that N2 amplitude increased with perceptual overlap in 
the standard choice RT task, F(1, 12) = 13.99, p < .01, as well as in the one-
back choice RT task, F(1, 12) = 10.29, p < .01. 
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Stimulus-locked P3. Grand average stimulus-locked ERPs at the Pz scalp 
site, as a function of Task and Perceptual Overlap, are displayed in Figure 4. 
Figure 2: Mean speed (upper panel) and accuracy (lower panel) data for 
the standard choice RT task and the one-back choice RT task under 
conditions of hard and easy discriminability. Vertical bars denote .95 
confidence intervals. 
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We observed a significant main effect of Task on P3 latency, indicating that 
the P3 component occurred earlier in the one-back choice RT task, F(1, 12) 
= 5.95, p < .05. The significant main effect of Perceptual Overlap shows that 
P3 peaked earlier under conditions of small perceptual overlap, F(1, 12) = 
20.16, p < .001. Also the interaction Task x Perceptual Overlap was 
statistically reliable, F(1, 12) = 8.82, p < .05. Planned comparisons revealed 
that Perceptual Overlap significantly affected P3 latency in the standard 
choice RT task, F(1, 12) = 16.97, p < .01, but not in the one-back choice RT 
task, F(1, 12) = 1.96, p > .10.  
Furthermore, a significant main effect of Task revealed that P3 amplitude 
was significantly smaller in the one-back choice RT task, than in the 
standard choice RT task, F(1, 12) = 41.87, p < .01. The main effect of 
Perceptual Overlap showed that P3 amplitude was smaller when stimuli were 
here hard to discriminate compared to when they were easily discriminable, 
F(1, 12) = 19.18, p < .001. The interaction of Task and Perceptual Overlap 
was not significant, F(1, 12) = 1.95, p > .10.  
Response-locked P3. The stimulus-locked analyses at Pz indicate that P3 
amplitude was smaller for the one-back choice RT task than for the standard 
choice RT task, and that P3 amplitude decreased with increasing perceptual 
overlap. In order to rule out the alternative explanation that these reductions 
in P3 amplitude are an artifact of the higher variability in reaction times (see 
Figure 2), the Pz waveforms were locked to the onset of the response. The 
results are illustrated in Figure 5. In the response-locked analyses, we still 
observed a significantly lower late positivity in the one-back choice RT task 
than in the standard choice RT task, F(1, 12) = 16.34, p < .01. The 
interaction Task x Perceptual Overlap was marginally significant, F(1, 12) = 
3.53, p = .08. Planned comparisons showed that in the standard choice RT 
task, the Pz waveforms were comparable for both levels of perceptual 
overlap, F < 1. In the one-back choice RT task, the late positivity was 
smaller when the stimuli were harder to discriminate, F(1, 12) = 9.05, p < 
.01.  
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Figure 3: Stimulus-locked ERPs at the Fz electrode, illustrating the 
main effect of Task (upper panel) and the effect of Perceptual 
Overlap on the Standard Choice RT task (middle panel) and on the 
One-back Choice RT task (lower panel). 
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Figure 4: Stimulus-locked ERPs at the Pz electrode, illustrating the 
main effect of Task (upper panel) and the effect of Perceptual 
Overlap on the standard Choice RT task (middle panel) and on the 
One-back Choice RT task (lower panel). 
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Figure 5. Response-locked ERPs at the Pz electrode, 
illustrating the main effect of Task (upper panel) and the effect 
of Perceptual Overlap on the Standard Choice RT task (middle 
panel) and on the One-back Choice RT task (lower panel). 
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LRP. We analyzed the LRP waveforms locked to the onset of the response 
(Figure 6). These analyses revealed a significant main effect of Task on the 
LRP onset, F(1, 12) = 11.06, p < .01, pointing towards a later onset in the 
one-back choice RT task. The main effects of Task and the interaction Task 
x Perceptual Overlap on LRP onset were not significant, F < 1, and, F(1, 12) 
= 2.67, p > .10, respectively. Similarly, on LRP amplitude, we observed a 
significant main effect of Task, F(1, 12) = 21.63, p < .001, whereas the main 
effect of Perceptual Overlap and the interaction between both factors were 
not significant (both F’s < 1). Note that since the analyses revealed no 
reliable effect of or interactions with the factor Perceptual Overlap, the 
waveforms shown in Figure 6 are averaged over both levels of 
discriminability.  
Figure 6. Lateralized Readiness Potentials associated with the standard choice RT task and 
the one-back choice RT task. The grand average waveforms are locked to the onset of the 
response. 
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DISCUSSION 
In a one-back choice RT task, the reaction to a target stimulus is delayed 
until the presentation of the next stimulus (see Figure 1). It has been 
demonstrated that this one-back delay involves additional executive 
resources compared to a standard choice RT task, in which participants 
instantly respond to the target stimulus (Chapter 3). It is at present unclear 
what causes the additional executive demands of the one-back choice RT 
task. One potential explanation may be related to the fact that in the one-
back choice RT task, the processing of a given stimulus X-1 is still going on 
at the time the next stimulus X is presented. If participants start the cognitive 
processing of the new stimulus X before the choice reaction to stimulus X-1 
is terminated, a cognitive conflict is assumed to occur. The present 
experiment was designed to test this assumption.  
First, we predicted that in the one-back choice RT task, stimulus X is 
processed before the choice reaction to stimulus X-1 is terminated. The data 
show that in the one-back choice RT task, like in the choice RT task, the N2 
was amplified with increasing perceptual overlap. According to the 
perceptual overlap/response conflict theory (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004), this 
suggests that (trigger) stimulus X is processed until the stage of response 
activation, even before the response to X-1 has been executed, through 
which the first prediction is empirically supported. Second, we predicted that 
the early cognitive processing of stimulus X (i.e. prior to the reaction to 
stimulus X-1) is likely to induce a cognitive conflict between the choice 
reactions to stimuli X and X-1 and therefore we anticipated that N2 
amplitude would be larger in the one-back than in the standard choice RT 
task. This prediction was not supported by the present findings. Later in this 
discussion, we will come back to this finding. Regarding the third prediction, 
we observed that P3 amplitude was smaller in the one-back than in the 
standard choice RT task, which still does point towards a larger consumption 
of executive resources in the one-back task (Joppich et al., 2004). 
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The findings further demonstrated that the one-back choice RT task differed 
from the standard choice RT task both in terms of onset and amplitude of the 
late lateralized readiness potential. In essence, the one-back task can be 
regarded as a temporal manipulation of the standard choice RT task in the 
sense that the choice reaction must be delayed, but the processing stages as 
such are basically the same. Nevertheless, the onset of the (response-locked) 
motor potential occurred later (26 msec on average) in the one-back task 
than in the standard choice RT task or in other words, the motor portion of 
the reaction time was (26 msec) shorter in the one-back task. As we 
described in the introduction, such an RT shortening is typically observed 
when advance information, such as a precue, is available and the motor 
response can by consequence be prepared (Müller-Gethman et al., 2000). In 
this view, the onset differences on the late LRP observed in the current study 
suggest that motor preparation was possible in the one-back choice RT task. 
Moreover, according to the same motor preparation literature, if motor 
preparation is involved in the one-back choice RT task, a foreperiod LRP is 
expected prior to the late LRP, as an index of early motor activation. More 
precisely, foreperiod LRP is assumed to follow on the presentation of 
(trigger) stimulus X, presumably shortly before the late LRP, the latter 
reflecting motor activation for the response to stimulus X-1. In the present 
data, only a late LRP component was visible. Identification of a foreperiod 
LRP seems problematic in the one-back choice RT task, probably because 
foreperiod LRP for a given stimulus X coincides with the late LRP for the 
response to X-1 so that both motor potentials are elicited in the same S-R 
interval and they might by consequence not be distinguishable. In addition, 
when stimulus X-1 and stimulus X are different (i.e. high tone vs. low tone), 
foreperiod LRP and late LRP will be elicited in the opposite motor cortices 
and this might, as will be described in what follows, have implications for 
the resulting LRP amplitude.  
This brings us to the difference in LRP amplitude between both RT tasks. 
Based on the relevant literature, two main explanations for this finding can 
be formulated. First, a number of studies have shown that the magnitude of a 
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late LRP decreases as a function of the degree of motor preparation (i.e. the 
extent to which the foreperiod LRP has already activated the response; 
Willemssen, Hoormann, Hohnsbein, & Falkenstein, 2004). Second, it has 
been demonstrated that coinciding (foreperiod and late) LRPs can under 
certain circumstances (Willemssen et al., 2004) be merged into a single 
compound. If then, for example, both waveforms activate opposite motor 
cortices, the resulting motor potential can be drastically reduced in terms of 
amplitude. Both these accounts of LRP amplitude reduction can be applied 
to the present data. It is possible that a smaller amplitude for late LRP in the 
one-back task reflects motor preparation, as well as it may be a compound of 
foreperiod and late motor potentials elicited in opposite hemispheres (i.e. 
when stimuli X and X-1 are different). In summary, the LRP onset and 
amplitude differences between the standard and the one-back choice RT task 
seem to reflect motor preparation in the one-back task. Nevertheless, we are 
not able to consolidate this presumption since a foreperiod LRP could not be 
identified. The motor potentials analyzed in the present study were averaged 
at the task-level and the statistical power of the design is too small for 
directly comparing the electrophysiological correlates associated with the 
different types of one-back choice RT task trials (e.g. trials where stimulus X 
activates the same vs. a different response compared to the X-1 response). In 
future experimental designs, direct manipulations at trial level will be 
necessary to improve our understanding of the time course of motor 
activation in the one-back choice RT task.  
The observation that at task level, the amplitude of the N2 index of response 
conflict was comparable in the one-back choice RT task as in the standard 
choice RT task does not mean that conflict was not induced at all. First, in 
most conflict tasks (e.g. flanker task) conflict is only induced in a subset of 
the trials (e.g. incongruent flanker trials), by which it might not be detectable 
at general task level. Second, it would be unexpected that a response conflict 
does not occur in a one-back choice RT task where the processing of a 
stimulus X-1 is not yet finished at the time processing of a stimulus X is 
already engaged to a stage of response activation (see N2 amplification and 
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LRP onset differences in the present data). We further investigated this 
matter by conducting a post-hoc analysis of the one-back choice RT task at 
the level of the individual trials. In the one-back task, congruent and 
incongruent trials can be distinguished. A congruent trial occurs when 
stimulus X elicits the same response as stimulus X-1. Conversely, when 
stimulus X and stimulus X-1 require a different response, the trial on which 
stimulus X is presented will be incongruent. A post-hoc comparison (Tukey 
test) pointed towards a significant congruency effect of 48 msec on average 
(p < .001). 
What do we conclude from this comparison at the level of individual trials? 
Reaction times in the one-back choice RT task are 48 msec slower for 
incongruent trials, i.e. when the response elicited by stimulus X is different 
compared to the response required for stimulus X-1, or in other words, when 
the stimulus identity alternates (when stimuli X-1 and X are different, trial X 
is always incongruent). In a further post-hoc comparison, we compared N2 
amplitudes as a function of the trial types, but we found no reliable effects. 
However, the number of valid ERP epochs per type condition was low and 
the number of observations per condition was unevenly distributed over the 
conditions. Further experiments that directly manipulate trial type are needed 
in order to contrast N2 amplitudes for congruent and incongruent trials. 
Interestingly, N2 amplitude was similar for both RT tasks and P3 amplitude 
differed, whereas both ERP measures are acknowledged measures of 
executive control. At first sight, these results might seem contradictory, but 
not when we take into account the fact that both ERP markers presumably do 
not reflect exactly the same underlying control mechanisms. The N2 has 
specifically been associated with cognitive conflict (especially response 
conflict) and inhibition, whereas the relation between P3 and executive 
control is more idiosyncratic (P3 reflects the consumption of executive 
resources in general). Like the present post-hoc analyses suggest, conflict 
does not occur at each one-back choice RT task trial, which can explain the 
present failure to detect an enhanced N2 at task level. What the P3 amplitude 
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reduction in the one-back task suggests, is that the consumption of executive 
resources is possibly not limited to those trials at which cognitive conflict 
occurs. In the conflict literature, it has been demonstrated that in specific 
circumstances, executive control and conflict can be dissociated (Mayr, 
Awh, & Laurey, 2003). When a congruent trial X follows an incongruent 
trial X-1, top-down conflict adaptation has occurred at trial X-1 and subjects 
are under a state of high executive control when trial X is presented, even if 
X is not a conflict trial. Accordingly, trial X will be characterized by high 
executive control but low conflict (thus no N2 amplification) and at task 
level by consequence, conflict trials will be less numerous than trials for 
which executive control resources are deployed. Hence, it is possible that 
electrophysiological differences between the standard and the one-back 
choice RT tasks are more easy to detect on an ERP marker of executive 
resource deployment (i.e. P3) than on an index of cognitive conflict (i.e. the 
N2), as observed in the present study. It must be emphasized that these 
tentative conclusions are drawn on an exploratory basis; still we believe that 
they point towards the necessity to further explore the potential of the one-
back choice RT task as a conflict task.   
Finally, the conclusions of the present study can be summarized as follows. 
First, the reduced P3 amplitude for the one-back choice RT task compared to 
the standard choice RT task is consistent with the earlier behavioral finding 
that the one-back task involves more executive resources than the standard 
choice RT task. Second, the N2 data revealed that in the one-back choice RT 
task, stimulus X is processed to the stage of response activation (see effect of 
Perceptual Overlap on N2 amplitude) before the choice reaction to stimulus 
X-1 is terminated, a finding that is indirectly supported by the observation 
that the late LRP associated with the one-back task gives evidence of 
response preparation. This overlap between the cognitive processing of the 
successive stimuli X-1 and X was hypothesized to induce a response 
conflict, which we identified as a potential source of additional executive 
involvement in the one-back task. On the one hand, this hypothesis was not 
confirmed since at task level, the N2 marker of response conflict was 
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comparable for both choice RT tasks. On the other hand, post-hoc analyses 
at trial level showed that incongruent one-back trials were processed slower 
than congruent ones, a finding that is analogous to the congruency effects 
observed in conflict tasks. The lack of clear effects on the N2 and LRP 
measures and the indications provided by the post-hoc congruency analysis 
suggest that further ERP investigation at the level of the individual trials is 
necessary in order to gain an insight into the cognitive processes involved in 
the one-back choice RT task and in order to explore its potentials as a new 
conflict task. 
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 CHAPTER 6 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
In this final chapter, I will first summarize the main findings that emerged 
from the present series of studies. Next, I will attempt to incorporate these 
findings into an integrative theory of executive control. Further, attention 
will be drawn to several points of interest that require some elaboration in 
the light of the theoretical formulations. The chapter is concluded with 
directions for future experimental research on executive control. 
RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
The point of departure of the present dissertation was the unsatisfactory 
theoretical and methodological situation in executive control research today 
(Rabbitt, 1997). As described in the general introduction, the concept of 
executive control is still poorly understood, the conventional measures of 
executive control are psychometrically inadequate and most essentially, 
there is a lack of paradigms to study executive control (Barnard, Scott, & 
May, 2001). The purpose of this dissertation was twofold. First, it was aimed 
to meet the methodological shortcomings by introducing a new method to 
study executive control within the working memory framework. The second 
objective was to apply the new method in order to gain a theoretical insight 
into the concept of executive control. This was done by addressing the 
research question whether executive control is a unitary system or whether it 
is rather a conglomerate of separable executive functions? 
BEHAVIORAL STUDIES 
In Chapter 2, we proposed to use the selective interference paradigm to 
investigate executive control within Baddeley’s (1986) working memory 
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framework. The idea was to operationalize a potential executive function by 
means of a so-called secondary task and to estimate the executive demands 
of this secondary task by investigating its pattern of interference with a 
number of primary tasks that tap the different subcomponents of working 
memory. The target executive function in Chapter 2 was response selection, 
a function that was quite recently proposed to involve executive control (e.g. 
Hegarty, Shah, & Miyake, 2000; Klauer & Stegmaier, 1997; Rowe, Toni, 
Josephs, Frackowiak, & Passingham, 2000). Response selection was made 
operational by means of an auditory choice RT task. The executive 
involvement in response selection was measured by comparing the dual-task 
effects of the choice RT task and a control task that does not involve 
response selection (i.e. a simple RT task; Schubert, 1999), on primary tasks 
that require executive, verbal and visuospatial processing. In addition, the 
patterns of dual-task impairment of the simple and the choice RT task were 
compared to the interference of secondary tasks which are known to 
selectively interfere with the working memory slave systems (i.e. 
articulatory suppression for the Phonological Loop and matrix tapping for 
the Visuospatial Sketchpad). The results showed that the choice RT task 
interfered more with a primary task that involves executive control (i.e. 
verbal fluency), than the simple RT task. In addition we observed that when 
the executive demands of the primary task were augmented and the verbal 
demands were kept equal (backward versus forward verbal serial recall), the 
dual-task effects of the choice RT task on the primary task increased while 
the interference due to articulatory suppression remained similar. Finally, 
when the executive demands of the primary task were held constant and the 
visuospatial involvement was manipulated (forward versus backward 
visuospatial serial recall), the primary task impairment due to the choice RT 
task did not change whereas the interference of matrix tapping did. Together, 
these results show that (1) the choice RT task, compared to the simple RT 
task, causes additional interference with executively demanding primary 
tasks, (2) the choice RT task gives evidence of a pattern of dual-task 
interference that is typical for secondary tasks that selectively interfere with 
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executive control and (3) the patterns of impairment associated with 
secondary tasks that selectively interfere with verbal and visuospatial 
processing can be dissociated from the dual-task interference observed with 
the choice RT task. Therefore, we concluded that the choice RT task is a 
relatively selective source of interference with executive control in the sense 
that the interference is not mediated at the level of working memory’s slave 
systems. We interpreted this as supportive evidence for the position that 
response selection involves executive control.  
How does Chapter 2 contribute to the research goals of this dissertation? 
First, it provides a method for studying executive control within Baddeley’s 
(1986) working memory framework. The method operationalizes an alleged 
executive function and it offers a tool to (1) measure the magnitude of the 
executive involvement and (2) examine whether the effects of the 
hypothesized executive function can be dissociated from effects achieved at 
the level of the slave systems. Second, Chapter 2 indicates that the method 
can be applied to explore the fractionability of executive control. As outlined 
in the introduction, there is a tendency to redefine the Central Executive as 
an aggregate of related executive functions (Baddeley, 1996; Miyake, 
Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, Howerter, & Wager, 2000). In this vein, we 
demonstrated that executive involvement is already detectable at a rather 
basic level of cognitive processing, which is response selection. Importantly, 
based on the observation that response selection is involved in nearly all 
tasks that measure the conventional executive functions, this suggests that 
functions such as updating, inhibition or switching are probably not the basic 
units of executive control, since they seem to be fractionable into even more 
basic elements, like response selection for example. Third, while task 
impurity has since long been a major problem in executive function research, 
the study reported in Chapter 2 yielded an executively demanding task that 
does not put an important load on the slave systems, namely the choice RT 
task with auditory signals. This particular task has been used in a number of 
recent studies, both as an operationalization of response selection (e.g. 
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Deschuyteneer & Vandierendonck, in press), and as a not further specified 
executively demanding task (e.g. De Houwer & Beckers, 2003).  
The research method which was validated in Chapter 2 was further applied 
in Chapter 3 to estimate the executive demands of a task manipulation that 
has not been investigated before. It concerns the requirement to delay a 
choice reaction until the presentation of the subsequent stimulus, which we 
represented by means of the one-back choice RT task. Based on the 
theoretical similarities between the one-back choice RT task and the n-back 
procedure which is generally assumed to involve the executive function of 
updating (Morris & Jones, 1990), it was proposed that the one-back choice 
RT task also operationalizes updating. Accordingly, assuming that the one-
back choice RT task involves updating whereas a standard choice RT task 
does not, we hypothesized that the one-back task involves more executive 
control than a standard choice RT task. This hypothesis was tested by 
formulating the same predictions and following the same experimental 
rationale as in Chapter 2. The results showed that the one-back choice RT 
task, compared to the standard choice RT task, interfered more with primary 
tasks that require executive control. Furthermore, it was demonstrated that 
the additional interference of the one-back choice RT task was not achieved 
at the level of the Phonological Loop or the Visuospatial Sketchpad. On the 
basis of these findings, we concluded that the requirement to delay a choice 
reaction until the onset of the next stimulus is an executively demanding 
operation.  
What does the latter conclusion tell about underlying executive processes? 
Based on the theoretical position that the one-back choice RT task involves 
the active maintenance of information and the updating of this information 
each time a new trial is presented (i.e. the definition of updating according to 
Morris & Jones, 1990), one could be prudent and conclude that the results of 
Chapter 3 support the position that updating is involved in a one-back choice 
RT task. However, one could go further. More precisely, starting from the 
Morris and Jones definition of updating, it is theoretically sound to assume 
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that updating is involved in the one-back task. Hence, the observation that 
the one-back task is more executively demanding than a standard choice RT 
task, could lead towards the conclusion that updating is an executive 
function and that the one-back choice RT task is an operationalization of the 
updating function that does not load importantly on the slave systems. I 
believe that, although they are somewhat circular, both aforementioned 
conclusions are acceptable in the domain of executive control research 
today, provided that their hypothetical nature (with respect to the assumption 
that updating is involved) is acknowledged. As put forward in the discussion 
of Chapter 3, I remain doubtful about whether we need the executive concept 
of updating to provide an interpretation of the observed findings. In what 
follows, I will go more deeply into this point of discussion. 
The central point of my argument is the distinction between task demand and 
cognitive process. Task demands and the underlying cognitive processes are 
not mapped one-to-one. This makes it difficult to draw straightforward 
conclusions when task manipulations are interpreted at the processing level. 
In this view, the only legitimate conclusion that can be drawn from the study 
presented in Chapter 3 is that the task instruction to delay a response until 
the occurrence of the following stimulus selectively taxes executive 
resources. Similarly, the only straightforward conclusion to be drawn from 
Chapter 2 is that making a choice reaction taxes more executive resources 
than making a simple reaction. Any further conclusions on the cognitive 
processes that underlie these task demands remain hypothetical. Which 
cognitive process(es) make(s) a choice RT task more executively demanding 
than a simple RT task? It may be response selection, but it could equally 
well be a process that is related to the stimulus classification phase. And 
what makes a one-back choice RT task more executively demanding than a 
standard choice RT task? Is it the process of updating or is it rather a 
cognitive conflict that arises from the fact that in a one-back task, stimulus 
X+1 is already presented before the choice reaction to stimulus X is finished 
(cfr. Chapter 5). By consequence, also the main question remained 
unanswered: are the response selection task and the updating task 
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operationalizations of two different executive processes or should they be 
understood as two different tasks that tap a common executive control 
mechanism? It is with this kind of questions that we were left, when the 
studies presented in Chapters 2 and 3 were terminated. In this sense, the 
behavioral studies yielded a new method to investigate executive control as 
well as two relatively pure measures of executive control, i.e. the choice RT 
task and the one-back choice RT task, but the relation between those two 
tasks and the two hypothesized executive functions of response selection and 
updating, remained unclear. In this vein, the contribution of the behavioral 
studies was mainly methodological but the theoretical issues were not 
solved.  
ELECTROPHYSIOLOGICAL STUDIES 
In answer to the problems raised above, the response selection task and the 
updating task were further investigated by means of a method which makes 
it possible to measure task performance at the processing level (Chapters 4 
and 5). To this end, the Event Related Potentials paradigm was used. Event 
related brain potentials are widely supported as an appropriate tool to index 
the brain activity that underlies cognitive processing. The ERP paradigm was 
applied in Chapter 4 in order to study the neural basis of the cognitive 
processes involved in the response selection task. Based on the perceptual 
overlap/response conflict theory of Nieuwenhuis, Yeung and Cohen (2004), 
we hypothesized that the executive demands of a choice RT task are related 
to the intensity of a response conflict that is a function of the degree of 
perceptual overlap between the stimuli (i.e. the discriminability of the 
auditory signals). Accordingly an experiment was designed in which 
participants performed a simple RT task and a choice RT task under three 
conditions of perceptual overlap (hard, intermediate and easy 
discriminability). The effects of this manipulation were investigated on the 
N2 component of the ERP. The N2 is a negative deflection of the fronto-
parietal brain potential that is assumed to reflect activity from the Anterior 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS     147 
Cingulate Cortex (ACC). Although there has been some debate about 
whether the N2 specifically reflects response conflict or inhibition (e.g. 
Bruin, Wijers, & van Staveren, 2001), it is nowadays mainly recognized as 
an ERP marker of response conflict. Based on the aforementioned 
hypothesis, we predicted that response conflict - and thus the N2 – would be 
larger in a choice RT task than in a simple RT task, because in the latter task, 
all stimuli lead towards the same response and by consequence no response 
conflict is expected to occur. Second, assuming that response conflict in the 
choice RT task is a function of the discriminability among the stimuli, we 
predicted that N2 amplitude would increase with perceptual overlap in the 
choice RT task. The results showed a clear N2 in the choice RT task whereas 
in the simple RT task no N2 occurred at all. Regarding the perceptual 
overlap manipulation, the findings indicated that for the choice RT task N2 
magnitude was larger in the condition with hard stimulus discriminability 
compared to the conditions with intermediate and easy discriminability. 
These results were explained as follows. When a stimulus is presented in a 
choice RT task, not only the correct response alternative is activated but also 
the incorrect response. The activation of the erroneous response seems to 
depend on the degree of perceptual overlap between the response 
alternatives. When, in a two-choice RT task for example, the stimulus 
alternatives (e.g. a high and a low tone) are perceptually resembling, also the 
incorrect response is highly activated when a stimulus occurs, through which 
a situation of high response conflict is induced (as evidenced by N2 
amplification). Conversely, when both stimulus alternatives are easy to 
discriminate, the incorrect response is less activated and by consequence also 
the response conflict is smaller (and N2 amplitude is reduced). In a response 
conflict situation, executive control can be understood as a top-down 
regulation from the central task goal representation to the level of response 
activation which must ensure that the incorrect response alternative is 
inhibited so that the correct response can be executed. In a simple RT task, 
however, participants are required always to make the same response, 
irrespective of the identity of the stimulus. This implies that there is only one 
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response alternative and by consequence, a response conflict situation is not 
expected, as evidenced by the finding that no N2 occurs. 
In Chapter 5, we carried out a similar ERP experiment to investigate the 
cognitive processing underlying performance on the one-back choice RT 
task, our hypothesized measure of the executive function of updating. The 
nature of this study was more explorative in the sense that, contrary to 
Chapter 4, no explicit predictions were formulated about the neural basis of 
executive involvement in the one-back choice RT task. The main goal of the 
study was to understand how the one-back choice RT task is completed and 
more specifically to address the question whether stimuli in the one-back 
task are instantly processed or whether their cognitive processing is delayed 
until the choice reaction to the previous stimulus is terminated. The specific 
matter of potential sources of additional executive involvement in the one-
back compared to the standard choice RT task was addressed post-hoc. The 
main results of the study presented in Chapter 5 can be summarized as 
follows. First, the findings of Chapter 4, regarding the N2 amplification with 
increasing perceptual overlap (in the standard choice RT task), were 
replicated. Second, the same N2 amplification was observed in the one-back 
choice RT task. Given that the N2 is assumed to reflect response conflict, the 
latter finding suggests that, although a newly presented stimulus is in 
essence a trigger for executing the response to the previous stimulus (one-
back), it is still instantly processed until the stage of response activation. 
Third,  the data revealed that one-back choice RT task trials on which the 
response elicited by (trigger) stimulus X+1 is different from the response to 
stimulus X (i.e. incongruent trials), are processed slower than trials on which 
both stimulus X and X+1 require the same response (i.e. congruent trials). 
On the one hand, this corroborates the finding that stimulus X+1 is instantly 
processed (cfr. N2 data). On the other hand, it shows that interference occurs 
between the processing of subsequent stimuli. This interference is a potential 
source of conflict, in the form of competition between the response to 
stimulus X and the response to stimulus X+1, a situation were ACC is 
typically engaged. The potentials of the one-back choice RT task as a 
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conflict task can be elaborated by investigating the congruency effect at the 
level of N2 amplitude. This could not be realized on the basis of the 
experimental design presented in Chapter 5 but it is nevertheless something 
that deserves further attention. 
The neurophysiological studies suggest that the neural basis of executive 
involvement in the response selection task is reflected in the N2 component 
(Chapter 4), which is not present in a task that does not involve response 
selection and which varies in terms of amplitude as a function of response 
conflict (as induced by the degree of perceptual overlap between alternative 
stimuli). The conclusions regarding the updating task (Chapter 5) are more 
speculative but seem to suggest that (part of) the executive involvement in 
the one-back choice RT task may be related to a cognitive conflict between 
successive trials. Interestingly, the N2 component has also been associated 
with other executive functions like inhibition (e.g. Bruin et al., 2001) or task 
switching (e.g. Swainson, Cunnington, Jackson, Rorden, Peters, Morris, et 
al., 2003). In the inhibition literature, virtually any task that requires the 
overriding of a prepotent response involves N2 amplification (Stroop task, 
Flanker task, the Go/Nogo paradigm, the global-local paradigm). This N2 
amplification is generally accounted for by a conflict between the correct 
response and the one being overridden. In the domain of task switching, it is 
a replicated finding that N2 amplitude is larger for switch (i.e. task 
alternation) than for nonswitch trials (i.e. task repetition). It has been 
demonstrated that both the classical switch cost as well as the residual switch 
cost (a cost that remains despite endogenous or voluntary preparation; 
Rogers & Monsell, 1995) are associated with a N2 amplification. Also in the 
task switching paradigm, these N2 findings are attributed to a response 
conflict. When a person switches from one task to another, a competition 
arises between the correct response and the response that applied to the 
previous task, and top-down regulation is involved in order to actively 
suppress the inappropriate response (Swainson et al., 2003).  
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The main conclusion that can be drawn from the electrophysiological part of 
this dissertation is that most of the task manipulations that are supposed to 
tax a hypothesized executive function produce an increase in the amplitude 
of the N2. This conclusion counts for the presumed executive functions of 
inhibition and task switching and, on the basis of the current findings, also 
for response selection (and possibly updating). In addition, an unpublished 
manuscript by Vandromme (2003) indicates that the conclusion may also be 
applied to the executive function of dual-tasking since it was demonstrated 
that N2 amplitude in a choice RT task is higher under dual-task (i.e. 
concurrently with verbal serial recall) than under single-task conditions. 
Therefore, we conclude that neural activity at the level of the ACC (which 
can be inferred from N2 amplitude) provides a neural basis for a large 
number of the often postulated executive functions. 
AN INTEGRATIVE THEORY OF EXECUTIVE CONTROL 
Starting from the Central Executive component of working memory, the 
initial goal of this dissertation was to demonstrate that executive control is 
not a unitary system but merely a generic term for a set of independent but 
interacting executive functions. It is from this perspective that the 
experiments described in Chapter 2 were interpreted. The study reported in 
Chapter 3 clearly demonstrated that the task instruction to delay a choice 
reaction until the onset of the next stimulus demands additional executive 
resources. This does however not necessarily imply that another executive 
function is involved as well. At that point, some concerns were expressed 
about what is really being fractionated: executive task demands or executive 
processes. The latter possibility was somehow weakened by the ERP studies, 
which suggest that a common mechanism, which manifests itself in the N2 
component of the ERP, underlies performance on a range of so-called 
executive tasks. Today, I remain doubtful, not only about the idea that 
executive control is a unitary system but also about the position that 
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switching, updating, inhibition, response selection … are separable executive 
functions.  
Accordingly, in this second part of the general conclusions, I attempt to 
formulate a tentative integrative theory of executive control which I presume 
can account for a majority of the findings in executive control research 
today. I would like to stress that this theoretical account is not restricted to 
the findings presented in this dissertation. The reason is that the empirical 
part of this dissertation does not deal with a number of issues that are of 
importance in executive control research today and that by consequence 
should be incorporated in an integrative account of executive control (e.g. 
the role of the Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex in executive control). In this 
vein, the following theoretical position is based on the broad executive 
control literature, amongst which also the present empirical contributions. 
As I mentioned before, executive control is probably neither a unitary 
mechanism, nor is it a conglomeration of four or five separable executive 
functions. An inspection of the relevant literature indicates that during the 
last decade, only two executive control mechanisms have clearly been 
identified and dissociated, namely one serving an active maintenance 
function and another serving a monitoring function. In the next paragraphs, 
both mechanisms will be described in more detail and I will argue that these 
two mechanisms suffice to integrate current working memory, 
neurophysiological and the neuroimaging views on executive control.  
As explained in the introduction, the effectiveness of executively controlled 
behavior is associated with the capacity to keep active a task-goal and the 
means to achieve that goal. It is assumed that these goals and rules are 
maintained in working memory, through which working memory is 
attributed a crucial role in executive control. Over the years, several 
neuroimaging studies have tried to find out where in the brain this task 
relevant information is kept active, or in other words, which areas of the 
brain serve executive control in working memory (Smith & Jonides, 1997; 
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1999; Van der Linden, Collette, Salmon, Delfiore, Degueldre, Luxen et al., 
1999). Several executive control tasks have been used in these studies, each 
presumed to tap on a particular executive function. Interestingly, despite the 
fact that those tasks were presumed to operationalize different executive 
functions, they were mostly demonstrated to activate a common brain area, 
namely the Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex (DLPFC). Based on these 
findings, the view has developed that DLPFC serves a specific function in 
executive control: the active maintenance of task goals and task rules (see 
Miller & Cohen, 2001). According to Miller & Cohen (2001), this active 
maintenance should be understood as a pattern of neural activity that biases 
activation along the neural pathways leading to appropriate action. These 
authors argued that the postulated executive functions “depend on the 
representation of goals and rules in the form of patterns of activity in the 
PFC, which configure processing in other parts of the brain in accordance 
with current task requirements” (Miller & Cohen, 2001, p. 170). Therefore, 
demands for control are associated with an increase in DLPFC activity, as 
usually observed in brain imagery literature (Smith & Jonides, 1999). It is 
assumed that by way of biasing activation, DLPFC has a top-down 
regulative effect on lower level cognitive processes, so that purposeful action 
is taken. Whereas DLPFC is believed to be primarily a regulative device 
(perform adjustments in executive control by way of altering patterns of 
activation) it is assumed not to have the capacity to evaluate when the need 
for top-down regulation occurs. As outlined in the next paragraph, this 
evaluative function is rather attributed to a monitoring system that resides in 
the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC). 
The main hypothesis concerning the ACC is that it functions to signal the 
occurrence of conflict (mainly response conflict) in information processing 
(Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004), thereby triggering adjustments in 
executive control, the latter being the function of the DLPFC as described 
before. The conflict monitoring hypothesis is grounded on a wealth of 
evidence for ACC activation in tasks that require the overriding of prepotent 
responses (the so-called conflict tasks). Furthermore, ACC activation has 
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also been associated with the commission of errors and with 
underdetermined responding (i.e. a context of competition between 
permissible responses), two settings in which involvement of ACC is also 
explained based on a single function, namely the detection of response 
conflict (Barch, Braver, Akbudak, Contoro, Ollinger, & Snyder, 2001). More 
recently however, it has been suggested that ACC is involved in a broader 
context of monitoring and evaluating the outcomes of action and that conflict 
is merely one of the outcomes to which the ACC is sensitive. This position is 
based on a number of phenomena that trigger ACC activation but that are not 
plausibly interpretable in terms of response conflict detection (e.g. gambling, 
reward expectation). By consequence, the conflict monitoring hypothesis is 
now preferably seen as a specific case of the broader outcome evaluation 
account of ACC functioning (Botvinick et al., 2004).  
In summary, we propose that executively controlled behavior is produced by 
both the capacity to maintain a task-goal active and the capacity to detect a 
possible mismatch between the task-goal and the actual outcome of 
behavior. When a goal is not satisfactorily met, the monitoring function 
signals the active maintenance mechanism which is able to shift attention or 
strengthen top-down control in the form of biasing the appropriate patterns 
of neural activation towards lower level processes (top-down). Also 
computational modeling work has demonstrated that coupling outcome 
evaluation to compensatory adjustment can accurately simulate participants’ 
behavior in executive tasks (e.g. Botvinick, Nystrom, Fissell, Carter, & 
Cohen, 1999). Next, I will attempt to clarify how the active maintenance - 
monitoring theory can account for the findings described in this dissertation. 
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The task-goal and particularly the means to achieve that goal are more 
complex in a choice RT task than in a simple RT task. The choice RT task 
imposes higher demands on stimulus evaluation and response selection1 and 
also the stimulus-response translation rules are more complicated. In 
addition, the specific stimulus-response translation rules that were used in 
the present studies (push right for high tone, left for low tone) are arbitrary 
which suggest that they are more controlled than more natural (or 
automated) rules (e.g. push right for an arrow that points to the right). This 
suggests that DLPFC, the brain area where the goals and rules for the choice 
RT task are maintained active (Bunge, Hazeltine, Scanlon, Rosen, & 
Gabrieli, 2002; Rowe et al., 2000), will exert stronger neural activation bias 
(arbitrary translation rules) and also activation bias towards brain regions 
that are not involved in the simple RT task (e.g. for stimulus discrimination 
or response selection). Accordingly, a stronger DLPFC activation pattern is 
expected in the choice RT task or to put it differently, the choice RT task is 
anticipated to be more executively demanding than a simple RT task (which 
was observed in Chapter 2). Then, while participants are performing the 
choice RT task, left and right responses alternate in an unpredictable order, 
and when a new stimulus is presented, both response alternatives are 
activated. The ACC detects the undesired activation (Chapter 4) and signals 
the top-down control mechanism (in DLPFC) in order to adjust the patterns 
of response activation conform to the task requirement.  
The results of Chapter 3 demonstrated that the one-back choice RT task in 
turn involves more executive control than the standard choice RT task. In a 
majority of real life situations and in any capacity assessment context, 
                                                     
1 This does of course not mean that stimulus evaluation or response selection as 
such occurs in DLPFC, nor that specific stimulus or response information (e.g. 
perceptual characteristics) is represented in this brain region; it rather suggest that 
DLPFC “knows” that part of the task is to categorize a stimulus and to select a 
response, which is reflected by an activation bias towards the brain areas that serve 
these specific processes.  
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people are used to provide a response as soon as it is available. In the context 
of the one-back task however, participants are required to delay a response 
until the following trial. It is likely that such an unconventional task demand 
is not applied automatically and that it must be maintained active in DLPFC, 
which can explain the additional executive demands of the one-back task. In 
addition, the results of Chapter 5 suggest that the one-back choice RT task 
involves a competition between the response to stimulus X and the response 
elicited by stimulus X+1, which is a potential locus of ACC involvement in 
the one-back task and by consequence, a possible source of additional top-
down regulation at the level of DLPFC, which might also account for the 
additional executive demands observed in Chapter 3.   
One aim of this doctoral dissertation was to take a position in the debate on 
unity versus diversity within executive control. Although, as I described 
earlier, this position has evolved throughout the course of the present work, 
it should be clear from the integrative theoretical account that the active 
maintenance/monitoring theory assumes that the classical executive 
functions depend on the representations of goals and rules in the form of 
patterns of activity in the DLPFC. This is supported by the observation that 
virtually any task manipulation that operationalizes a hypothesized executive 
function, is associated with activation in the DLPFC. Analogously, the need 
for adaptation of control is in nearly all executive tasks signaled by the ACC. 
This shows that the often postulated executive functions share a common 
neural basis, which favors the view that these presumed executive functions 
can be seen as task demands that are met by a common executive control 
system. But there is more evidence which suggests that it might be 
acceptable to define executive involvement at the task level rather than at the 
level of individual processes.  
Take response selection for example. A number of studies have suggested 
that response selection is an executive function, based on the observation 
that a choice RT task involves executive control (Chapter 2; Klauer & 
Stegmaier, 1997). However, the flanker paradigm makes an assumption that 
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somewhat concurs with this idea. In essence, the Eriksen flanker task 
(Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) is a choice RT task with arrows (left/right 
selection as a function of left/right pointing arrow) in which the target arrow 
is flanked by arrows pointing either in the same (i.e. congruent trial) or in a 
the different direction (i.e. incongruent trial). It is typically observed that 
incongruent flanker trials are processed slower than the congruent ones, a 
finding which is referred to as the flanker effect. In order to explain this 
effect, it is assumed that the flanking stimuli are processed automatically; 
even to the stage of response activation (flankers elicit an LRP; Willemssen, 
Hoormann, Hohnsbein, & Falkenstein, 2004).  
The assumption that a two-choice reaction occurs automatically in the 
Eriksen flanker paradigm, while it appears to be controlled in other 
circumstances, points towards the importance of the task context. Therefore, 
it may be preferable to consider executive involvement at the task level than 
at the level of individual processes. In fact, this is quite consistent with what 
Allain, Carbonnell, Burle, Hasbroucq and Vidal (2004) observed in an 
electromyographic (EMG) study of executive involvement in a choice RT 
task. They reported that EMG indicators of executive involvement were 
activated throughout a choice RT task trial and that this activation declined 
after the response was executed. This suggests that executive control does 
not supervise one discrete stage of the choice RT task but that it rather 
continuously monitors performance until the response has been given. 
Therefore, Allain et al. concluded that a choice RT task involves executive 
control, which is in the light of the present discussion not the same as saying 
that response selection is an executive function. This can also explain why 
the idea of executive involvement in a relatively basic process as response 
selection has been an issue of controversy. Several researchers have doubts 
about it because indeed, there are clearly contexts in which response 
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selection is more automated than in others2. When it comes to integrating 
both areas of evidence in order to gain a theoretical insight into the concept 
of executive control, I now believe that it is more plausible to shift the locus 
of executive involvement from the process level to the task level and assume 
that some tasks might require that response selection is executively 
controlled (rather than saying that response selection is an executive function 
in some circumstances). Note that this line of reasoning can be applied to 
other executive functions as well. During task switching for example, it has 
been argued that the inhibition of the previous task-set occurs more 
automatically than the inhibition of erroneously activated responses during 
incongruent (i.e. when both the task and the required response alternate) 
switch trials (e.g. Koch, Gade, & Phillip, 2004).  
With respect to the outcome evaluation (in ACC) and the active maintenance 
functions (in DLPFC), a number of studies involving the Stroop and the 
flanker tasks have provided compelling evidence for a dissociation between 
those functions (e.g. MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2000). These 
studies demonstrated that high-conflict/low-control trials (i.e. high ACC 
activation, low DLPFC activation) can be differentiated from low-
conflict/high control trials (i.e. low ACC activation, high DLPFC 
activation). The first situation usually occurs when an incongruent flanker or 
Stroop trial follows a series of congruent trials, the latter especially when an 
incongruent trial is preceded by a series of incongruent trials. By contrast, 
regarding the several postulated executive functions, it has proven 
particularly difficult to find dissociations, by which the unity versus 
diversity debate is still going. Also in the present dissertation, the patterns of 
dual-task interference that were observed with the response selection task 
and the updating task were not dissociated. As I mentioned in the 
introduction, a number of correlational approaches have addressed the issue 
                                                     
2 As explained before, this might be due task properties like the physical properties 
of the stimuli, the number of choice alternatives or the extent to which the stimulus-
response mappings are unusual, for example. 
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(Lehto, 1996; Miyake et al., 2000) and although the results of this studies 
have predominantly been interpreted in favor of the diversity position, I 
believe that they can equally well be explained by the position that has been 
taken in the present conclusions. What would one expect from a 
correlational analysis of performance on an n-back updating task and a stop-
signal inhibition task? I would predict moderate correlation because even if 
both tasks might have a common executive basis, non-executive, task-
specific differences (such as stimulus material or response modalities) can 
still distort the common variance; and moderate correlations are in fact 
mainly found.  
There is one potential drawback of reducing executive functions to 
differences in task demands met by common executive control mechanisms. 
If for example, the difference in executive demands between a one-back 
choice RT task and choice RT task can not be explained in terms of 
qualitative processing differences (i.e. updating), one might argue that the 
risk for confounding executive demands with task difficulty becomes 
eminent. Moreover, the findings of Barch, Braver, Nystrom, Forman, Noll 
and Cohen (1997) who showed that task difficulty increases ACC activity, 
underline the pertinence of this concern. Therefore, in the final point of this 
section, some attention will be given to the issue of task difficulty. To this 
day, an important number of researchers believe that, even when variations 
in task difficulty can be accounted for by differences in processing demands, 
task difficulty remains a potentially confounding variable. In this debate, I 
adhere to the view that it is crucial to know which cognitive processes cause 
additional task difficulty but once these are known, task difficulty becomes 
merely a descriptor of a manipulation’s consequence (Garavan, Ross, Li, & 
Stein, 2000). By contrast, the position that task difficulty can be confounded 
with cognitive demands (whatever their nature) does assume that both are 
separable variables and thus that task difficulty has more than a descriptive 
function. However, it does not seem plausible that the cognitive demands of 
a task can be increased without altering the difficulty of a task and similarly, 
that the difficulty of a task can be increased without appealing on some 
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specific cognitive demand. In other words, task difficulty and cognitive 
demand do not seem dissociable, which is a serious challenge to the notion 
of confounding factors. Therefore, I agree with Botvinick et al. (2004) that 
the induction of cognitive demands like conflict monitoring or top-down 
control can be considered to be a defining feature of difficult tasks.  
FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
In the final part of this concluding chapter, a number of directions for future 
investigation are presented. In the preceding conclusions, I have expressed a 
preference for the position that the concept of executive control involves an 
evaluative (outcome evaluation) and a regulative (top-down control) 
function and that the conventional executive functions can be seen as 
different task requirements that are met by applying these evaluation and 
regulation mechanisms. In this view, although there might be several tasks 
(updating, inhibition, switching tasks) available to measure executive control 
capacities, the different tasks are in essence assumed to measure the same 
evaluative and regulative executive capacities. This position is principally 
based on the observation that the conventional executive functions share a 
common neural basis (DLPFC and ACC), that these functions are apparently 
not always executively controlled and that, contrary to the regulation and 
evaluation mechanisms, no conclusive evidence has been found for 
dissociation among executive functions. In this vein, I think that the 
potential to dissociate among the hypothesized executive functions must be 
more thoroughly elaborated because this is probably a most crucial but to 
this day still undetermined source of information for the unity versus 
diversity debate. One requirement will be to have valid and reliable measures 
of the often postulated executive functions, for which the new strategy 
presented in this dissertation may be helpful. 
A second future direction is related to the specific role of working memory 
in executive control. It is assumed that working memory maintains the task-
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goal and the belonging rules active during controlled processing. Quite 
recently, it has been suggested that also verbal working memory is involved 
in the presumed executive function of task switching. More precisely, 
Emerson and Miyake (2003) argued that verbal working memory (by means 
of inner speech) plays a supportive role during task switching, in the sense 
that it holds a phonological representation of the upcoming task. This seems 
to suggest that the high demands put on the limited capacity executive 
control system can somehow be relieved by holding active a verbal 
representation of the task-goal (see also Liefooghe, Vandierendonck, 
Muyllaert, Verbruggen, & Vanneste, in press). I think that it is interesting to 
see how in the context of task switching, the Central Executive (or maybe 
the Episodic Buffer) can be assisted by the Phonological Loop in keeping the 
task-goal active and in the context of examining the functional diversity 
within executive control, I believe it would be worth while investigating 
whether also the other postulated executive functions can benefit from such 
verbal support.  
Furthermore, with respect to the Episodic Buffer, it seems to me that 
Baddeley’s working memory model has benefited from the inclusion of a 
multimodal maintenance system. The reason is that many researchers believe 
that working memory still serves a maintenance function in executive 
control (for the task-goals and rules; Miller & Cohen, 2001), whereas the 
Central Executive is not conceived of as maintenance system and the 
Episodic Buffer  conversely is. The definition of the Episodic Buffer has not 
been made operational yet, but I believe that its role in executive control 
requires more attention in order to keep working memory’s notion of 
executive control up to date. Finally, given the growing body of evidence for 
dissociation between a regulative and evaluative function in executive 
control research, it can be plausible to consider that the working memory 
component responsible for executive control by way of active maintenance 
and top-down regulation, is assisted by a component that is specialized in 
outcome evaluation.  
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